

were killed. Perhaps the British and American secret services should also be informed of the possible intentions of a abandoned Stalin or Tito in this way, in order to put pressure on the Western Allies to speed up the preparations for the invasion.

The exact date of the capture of this courier is not known. On May 10, 1941, Rudolf Hess flew to England to initiate a separate peace between the German Reich and Great Britain, as Stalin had mistakenly assumed for years. The late start of the invasion may have encouraged Stalin in this view.

What is certain is that the interrogation of the captured courier was carried out by a Hungarian captain, Zoltán Gát, who had previously done such good intelligence work that it stood up to all scrutiny. If he also worked for the other side, then it may have been 'game stuff' to make him trustworthy. This view becomes more plausible when one considers that this captain later went over to Tito, became major general and head of intelligence in the Hungarian army after World War II, and was entrusted with the ideological education of the young officers of the Kossuth Academy in Budapest (49).

CHAPTER TWELF

Rommel's memorandum to Hitler - Bormann's role - Funkspiel with Moscow with Gestapo-Müller and Bormann's participation - Funkabwehr becomes suspicious - Reasons that made Canaris believe in Bormann's betrayal - Gestapo-Müller's "change of front" - Why did Müller and Bormann remain in besieged Berlin ?

The fading away of the special reports, which began with fanfares and reported on large-scale victories in the East and in Africa, made the German people thoughtful. First rumors trickled in, then more and more news of German losses and defeats reached home. The higher positions in the Wehrmacht were better informed. The understandably arising concerns of responsible officers found expression in numerous memoranda, touched upon in Chapter 9.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who was commanded to France as Commander-in-Chief West after the lost Africa campaign and who, after the Allies had landed, was in a difficult struggle against the enemy's superiority, also wrote a memorandum to Adolf Hitler. Gert Buchheit (90) writes about this: "The field marshal wrote his letter to Hitler on July 14" (1944) in an unequivocal, sharp

manner, without any consideration of the consequences that such openness could entail. In this last admonition he stated that the situation at the front was approaching the decisive crisis. The supply of ammunition, fuel and material of all kinds to the troops was completely inadequate... The few new divisions that arrived had, apart from their defective equipment, no front-line experience... Under these circumstances it must be expected that the enemy will succeed in breaking through their own thin front in the foreseeable future - 14 days to three weeks - and thrust into the vastness of French territory. The consequences will be unforeseeable... The troops

fights everywhere heroically, but the unequal fight is coming to an end.

The field marshal ended with the addition in his own hand: 'I must ask you to draw the political conclusions from this situation immediately. I feel obliged, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, to state this clearly. Rommel, Field Marshal.' On Speidel's advice, the word 'political' was dropped, since the 'conclusions' should not be limited to the political but should be inclusive. Also, the word 'political' would doubtless have come as a challenge to the hypersensitive Hitler...

In earlier times it was a responsible leadership that drew the conclusions from an inevitable defeat in good time. During World War II, Field Marshal Rommel was left to remind the leader of the Greater German Reich that it was a crime to continue a war with an army that had ceased to be an army because of its vast material and human resources could no longer cope with the superiority of the enemy..."

Three days later, on July 17, 1944, Rommel was severely wounded in an attack by British fighter pilots while driving at the front. He was treated in a hospital near Paris. After he had recovered to some extent, he went to his family in Herrlingen near Ulm. About this Gert Buchheit (90): "One day - it was the beginning of October -" (1944) "he said to an

old friend and regimental comrade with calm certainty that his days were numbered. And when the latter declared it impossible that Hitler would attack him too, Rommel remarked: 'Yes, he wants to get rid of me. The reasons are my ultimatum of July 15" (1944, written on July 14, 1944, sent on July 15, 1944) "my open, honest language, the events of July 20 in general and the report from the party and security."

Writes about the days of Rommel's recovery in Herrlingen Eberhard Zeller in his book "Spirit of Freedom", 1952 edition:

"Initially there was nothing to indicate that Rommel would be included in the persecution" (the conspirator of July 20, 1944): it was not particularly noticeable that Bormann's agents took him to his Albtal, where the seriously wounded man had taken himself let, had to watch constantly." (91)

It is surprising that Eberhard Zeller, in the third edition of his book "Spirit of Freedom" (1963), chose a new formulation for the same issue. He writes:

"It didn't seem particularly remarkable that party officials had to monitor his behavior."

The reasons that were decisive eleven years after the publication of the first edition of this book by Eberhard Zeller for replacing the name "Bormann" with "Party" in the third edition (1963) are not noted anywhere (92).

A few days after Rommel's statement quoted above to his friend and fellow regiment, Martin Bormann reported - after Gert Buchheit "Hitler the General" -

"... as usual since the day of the assassination, the leader about the course of the last executions. There was no doubt that Rommel was also mentioned, for immediately after Bormann's lecture there was a meeting at Hitler's, in which Keitel, Himmler and General Burgdorf also took part. We don't know what was discussed at the time, because none of those involved is still alive. It is, however, absolutely certain that on October 7th" (1944) "Rommel was ordered by telephone to go to Berlin on October 10th. When Rommel telephoned, General Burgdorf informed him that Keitel wanted to talk to him about his future assignment. On the advice of the doctors, Rommel refused to go to Berlin. He may have guessed that they wanted to 'use' him in one of the usual show trials." (90)

The subsequent course of events has often been described: On October 14, 1944, Generals Burgdorf and Meisel appeared at Rommel's on Adolf Hitler's orders. After an hour's talk they left the house and waited for Rommel in the garden.

Rommel now stepped in front of his wife and said to her that he was in

be dead in a quarter of an hour. He said he was accused of involvement on July 20th. Hitler gave him the choice of either poisoning himself or being sentenced by the People's Court. He chose the poison because he was convinced he would never get to Berlin alive and because he wanted to protect his family from the customary clan imprisonment. Then he said goodbye to his wife and son and to his orderly officer, who asked him to resist.

Rommel refused because he knew that the exits from Herrlingen and the area around the house were manned by SS guards with machine guns.

Rommel left Herrlingen with the two emissaries from Adolf Hitler's headquarters at 1:00 p.m. Mayer

as Dr. Mayer wanted to carry out an autopsy, this General Burgdorf forbade him with the words: "Do not touch the corpse, everything is already arranged from Berlin."

Martin Bormann brought the news of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's death to Adolf Hitler during a meeting. General Burgdorf, who was a close friend of Martin Bormann's, survived this deed, to which he had volunteered, by seven months. He committed suicide by poison when the spearheads of the Red Army had already advanced to the immediate vicinity of the Reich Chancellery bunker.

Again we have rushed ahead of events to describe Martin Bormann's behavior towards the high officers of the Wehrmacht, whom he hated as "the eternal opponent of the army". (Guderian) to make it clearer. Most who knew Martin Bormann well described him as resentful, especially when a difference of opinion had preceded it. Perhaps Martin Bormann also added the supposed neglect of General Rommel at the beginning of the Polish campaign, which was reported on in Chapter 7.

We now come to a subject about which much has been written but little has been said clearly. It is the so-called "Big Radio Game" with Moscow, also known as "Operation Bear", which aimed to sow distrust between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union in order to cause a rift between these powers. Stalin's first suspicion that the Western powers might come to an agreement with the Third Reich had been awakened by the greatly delayed Anglo-American invasion of the Atlantic coast; The initially mysterious flight of Rudolf Hess to England also strengthened Stalin in this view.

In 1942, the German radio counter-intelligence managed to get hold of the personnel of several transmitters of the "Red Orchestra" (13). First, a radio game was played with some of these transmitters, whose radio operators had been "reversed", with the aim of penetrating deeper into the organization of the "Red Orchestra". It was only later that people switched to working for the Germans and at the same time against the Soviets by supplying them with certain information - also known as game material. For this purpose, with the knowledge of Adolf Hitler and on the orders of Himmler, a "Sonder Command" was set up, the existence of which was only known to a very small circle of insiders. In order to increase the credibility of the information broadcast, "good game material", i.e. news that corresponds to the facts, was fundamentally necessary (13).

The head of the Secret State Police, Heinrich Müller, and his close colleague, Kriminalrat Scholz, were responsible for the technical success of this radio game from the start. Himmler procured the messages to be sent, the "game material". It came with individual ministries, especially with the Foreign Office v. Ribbentrops on disagreements that could only be settled by Adolf Hitler (13). To eliminate these discrepancies, Adolf Hitler subsequently commissioned Martin Bormann to continue the "Big Game" ("Operation Bear"). Dar about Klaus Benzing (13):

"On Hitler's express orders he took care" (Martin

Bormann) "take care of it personally, without having to be helped by a member of staff or a secretary. Apart from Gestapo chief Heinrich Müller, only Ribbentrop and a few specially selected experts were in the know. The files were locked away in a huge safe; Password: 'Action Bear'. By virtue of the power of attorney given to Bormann, from that point on nobody could criticize or prevent the transmission of any information via the transmitters of the 'Red Orchestra'.

The radio defense of the military defense under Admiral Canaris now watched this 'big game' with growing astonishment. Of course one could decipher the individual reports and found that they no longer contained only 'game material', but rather exact reports about the German armament potential, about strategic planning of the Wehrmacht, even casualty figures and troop movements. Parallel to Bormann's and Müller's 'Big Game' about the ('reversed') 'transmitters of the 'Red Orchestra', the radio countermeasures department of the Foreign Office/Defense Office registered an increasingly lively, completely uncontrolled transmitter that only Martin Bormann had at his disposal. Soon it was also determined *that this transmitter was in radio communication with a transmitter in Switzerland.*

At first one could not get a clear picture of the defense and believed that this was still the 'big game' on Himmler's orders. All of these decoded radio messages were collected under the strictest secrecy on the personal orders of Admiral Canaris, and important files were also created on Martin Bormann. In view of its importance, this file was kept completely separately and was last located in Zossen. *A copy of it, like the Heydrich files, was transferred to Spain at an early stage...* (*italics by the author*) In his book "Agenten Funken nach Moskau" (93) two officers of the counterintelligence in 1948: "Why was the German, despite the tremendous experience

Do organs in particular in this group" (Rado in Switzerland) "the most important in the whole war, never found a transmission route from Germany to Switzerland? How was it possible that one of the most important informants of the group Lucie"

(Rößler) "could it be determined? Something is wrong here.

You know that General Fellgiebel used an old, experienced expert in 1944 to use the material, the findings of the agents in Switzerland and the deciphered radio messages to find the people who were the informants Lucies and Pakbos, ie the Rado *group* , *could come into question*..

. Even before the transfer order reached that specialist, it was directed to France, right into the middle of the invasion pocket. But he came out of it safe. In the meantime the assassination attempt of July 20 had taken place, and Fellgiebel was executed. And the expert mentioned was ordered to hold a six-week course for women radio operators before he was transferred. He only got his place in November 1944, the transfer order had followed him for half a year...

Now the long-discarded Rado files suddenly came to life. Various departments suddenly needed them extremely urgently. They darted all over the place, from one office to another. And the number of deciphered radio messages was getting smaller and smaller. The Pakko telegrams disappeared, as did the Werther radio messages, those from Olga, Anna, etc. What was left was insignificant stuff... When the specialist finally got the rest of the files together in January 1945, the Russians began their last offensive. And when he wanted to look at the files again one morning, they were gone; they had been burned in the night 'so that they would not fall into the hands of the Russians'."

Klaus Benzing (13) gives an answer to the questions at hand: "Müller, as

the technical director of the 'Big Game', the 'Aktion Bär', and Bormann, as the one who got the radio reports for the game transmitters, both tended towards Bolshevism. Along with the intercepted radio messages from Bormann about

From the only transmitter controlled by him via Switzerland and other facts compiled in the 'Bormann File', Admiral Canaris came to the conclusion that Bormann could have been an agent of Moscow."

Klaus Benzing's views, based on suspicions and circumstantial evidence, are worth examining more closely because they are supported by the memoirs of Walter Hagen (49) and Walter Schellenberg (16); the comments of Giles Perrault (36) should also be used as a supplement.

Walter Hagen (49) speaks of "people who knew Müller better and who claimed that just as he once served the Bavarian People's Party until 1933 and then the Nazi regime until 1945, he worked just as well for anyone else system could become more reliable police officers".

Walter Hagen continues:

"Acquaintances of Müller even claim that he had been in contact with the Soviets since the end of 1944 and that he managed to defect to the Russians after the German collapse. This version is by no means fantastic. The Secret State Police had a separate department dedicated to continuing to operate the radios of captured Soviet agents as if the radio operator in question were still at liberty...

It is by no means impossible that Müller used one of these numerous radio lines through familiar employees in the relevant department of his apparatus in order to make contact with the Soviets even before the collapse, in fact to give them real news. So it would be conceivable that

Müller really had changed fronts and put himself at the disposal of the Soviets. Müller could use ...

the Bolsheviks. A man who headed the German Secret State Police for many years and who ruled almost all of Europe with his police force at the time of the greatest German expansion of power has immensely valuable capital to offer the Russians: his enormous knowledge. Müller has always been famous for his phenomenal memory; he could get out of that

Head recite the names of the smallest agents in some distant city abroad. There is certainly no police expert ... who had such a deep insight into the political affairs, the knowledge of which is still of current importance today. So one cannot a priori declare it unthinkable that Miiller is actually in Russian service.

Admittedly, there is no evidence for this, at least not for the time being; what is certain is that after Hitler's death he *disappeared from the Reich Chancellery with his trusted friend Scholz and has never been seen since. But this Scholz was the man who directed the said 'Funkspiele' on behalf of Müller.* It is up to each individual to judge whether this is a coincidence or intentional." (emphasis on author)

While Walter Hagen - regarding the radio messages - covers Martin Bormann by hardly mentioning him in his book, despite his knowledge, as if he had played a completely irrelevant role, another witness from the higher SS area, Walter Schellenberg, is considerably more open in this regard. Schellenberg dealt in detail with Martin Bormann's work around Heydrich, as well as with Martin Bormann's skilful tactics in presenting facts. "Whereas Bormann and Himmler were quite opposites in appearance, Bormann came very close not only in appearance but also in character to another type already described. I mean millers. Because of the astonishing about-face that this man made, I must come back to him in more detail."

Schellenberg writes that during the unmasking of the "Red Orchestra" Müller distanced himself more and more from the work against the Soviet secret service. In 1943, in a drunken state, Müller spoke to Schellenberg, arguing that the betrayals of the »Red Orchestra« had led him to the realization that Soviet influence in Western Europe affected not only the communist-leaning working-class circles, but also the spiritual-intellectual class of the peoples have grasped what inevitably arises from the situation of the age.

"Our intellectual upper class," Müller continued, "with their unclear mental attitude, was not able to be reshaped by National Socialism, and the communist East is now pushing into this vacuum. If we lose the war, it's not so much a question of Russian military strength as it is a question of the mental potential of our leadership... I can't help but think more and more that Stalin is on the right track. He is vastly superior to the Western leadership and if I had something to say, we would come to terms with him as soon as possible —"

"It was now clear to me," reports Schellenberg further, "that Müller had made a total change of front and no longer believed in Germany's victory. Since then I have had increased evidence that he was connected with Soviet intelligence. So I wasn't surprised when, in 1950, an officer returning from Russian captivity reported to me that Müller had gone over to the Soviets in 1945. He saw him in Moscow in 1948 and later heard that he had died shortly afterwards."

French lawyer Giles Perrault (36) builds on Walter Hagen and Walter Schellenberg, adding new insights. He writes: "Müller and Bormann had a lot in common.

They were both power men, both had the same goal in mind and both used the same means to achieve it; they were both imbued with a passion for power per se, not for power as a means to an end... two apparatchiks, as the Russians say, skilled in the art, in an unobtrusive but skillful way, effectively pushing the levers of power into the to get hands—"

Giles Perrault continues:

"Gestapo-Müller did not install himself in the Reich Chancellery bunker. He comes regularly to report, but then immediately returns to Kurfürstenstrasse, where the Gestapo moved after their headquarters on Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse were bombed out. The underground bunker there is the same

Bombproof like the one in the Reich Chancellery, yes, it also offers a few other advantages that should not be underestimated: the secret rooms, which you can access through cleverly hidden doors, have been equipped with electric lights and running water for long stays. Food supplies and medicines are available. Several corridors — one of which is one and a half kilometers long — lead in different directions to emergency exits on rubble lots ... Since Berlin was surrounded, Müller has lived here together with his faithful colleague Scholz, who, under Müller's leadership, is responsible for the technical functioning of the Funkspiel had taken over."

Schellenberg assured — as Giles Perrault goes on to say "Müller was still in radio contact with the Russians from his 'Fuchsbau' on Kurfürstenstrasse.

If Müller really did continue his broadcasts from the Fuchsbau, Schellenberg's claims gain considerable weight, because what man with common sense - and Müller was a cool-headed realist - would try a few days before the final collapse with a tremendously complicated system to mislead an enemy only a kilometer or two away? So if Müller was still using his transmitter, then he was undoubtedly in honest radio contact with the Russians, as Schellenberg claims."

Giles Perrault also reports on a find in Berlin, which unfortunately does not contain exact information about the time and place. He writes: "Müller's

name was found after he disappeared with his trusty Scholz on a grave in the middle of the rubble of Berlin, and he was officially considered dead. But when it was later decided to open the grave to To identify the body, the remains of three men were found inside, all younger than Müller at the time of their death

...

Did Bormann and Müller (Bormann or Müller) use the Funkspiel to secure their own future by forwarding authentic material to the headquarters? ... Ha

Did the two of them play their little personal game behind the scenes of the 'Big Game'? One could only find out if one were allowed to see the headquarters archives, which are not open to the public. What is certain is that Bormann generously provided the Funkspiel with material, to the horror of the ministries concerned, who had to watch as first-class information was transmitted to the enemy. That's a hint, but not proof. We also know that after the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944, Gestapo-Müller had a free hand. On Hitler's orders, 'Operation Bear' was stopped and the specialists were entrusted with other tasks. The Gestapo was able to continue the game on its own account, without reporting to the highest authorities about the radio messages sent to Moscow: this gave its boss the opportunity to establish honest communication with the headquarters. But the existence of such a possibility does not prove that he has perceived it."

More reflections from Giles Perrault that give food for thought

encourage: "No detail of the fresco is entirely convincing. Seen from close up, everything becomes blurred, it can be interpreted in multiple ways, sometimes in contradictory ways. Is that surprising? If Bormann and Müller were able to keep their treacherous activities secret from their compatriots, with the possible exception of Schellenberg, then historians would have to be incredibly lucky to find proof of this treachery. Both were masters at operating in the semi-dark, and they knew how to cover their tracks.

So acquitted for lack of evidence?

The picture as a whole is quite thought-provoking. There are two apparatchiks who know how to use the apparatus in their charge, but who are ready to smash it if it fails (this is not betrayal; you betray an idea, a country, a party, a person - not an apparatus); Both are fascinated by Stalinist Russia: Müller's ideal is the Soviet GPU and Bormann suggested in 1944 that the Wehrmacht should be modeled after the political commissars in

training the Nazi command officers of the Red Army; both are the only ones suspected by the whole Nazi clique of collaboration with Moscow, by two figures as different as Canaris and Schellenberg, who did not draw their information from the same sources; Because of their high positions, both were able to see the first signs of inevitable defeat as early as 1943; both were clear-sighted enough to read these signs correctly, not wearing the blinders of fanaticism like many others; both had, God knows, reason enough to fear defeat, coincidentally" (really coincidence?) "but at the same time had the right means at hand to make contact with the most realistic of the enemies at a very early stage; both remained in encircled Berlin, although Hitler had allowed his staff to retreat south; although only all desirable forged papers, all long-prepared escape routes were available to the head of the Gestapo; they endured in the lost city with a last bunch of fanatics and romantics, though they were neither one nor the other; both disappeared at the last moment and were the only ones never to be found again from the leading class - all other leading Nazis have been caught or their bodies have been found. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the only two dignitaries to escape justice co-chaired the 'Great Game' for more than two years."

Giles Perrault's remarks should be read carefully, as he asks numerous questions and makes many reflections that have not yet been found in any work of historical research to date. He goes so far in his accuracy that he analyzes Schellenberg's statements and says:

"Let's not forget that Schellenberg brings, for example, 'restored dialogues'. He didn't record his memories until years later, so he can't have remembered every word spoken by Müller. Does he at least reproduce them in spirit? Good. But when it comes to using an Unterhal

In order to prove that the chief of the German police worked for the enemy, every sentence is important, then every word counts, yes, we should actually know the intonation. That the cautious, reserved Müller would expose himself in such a way to a rival seems very strange... finally he steers him straight onto his own track... he almost asks him to monitor the 'reversed' transmitters... The broadcasters of all things? —"

In this discussion, which took place between Müller and Schellenberg at Müller's polite request and which so surprised Schellenberg, it should not be forgotten that Müller spoke in an uninhibited state; he had been drinking wine and was "leaning back in his chair, eyes red from the wine". Further down, Schellenberg says, "He hastily drained his glass and stared grimly ahead." The otherwise reserved Müller had evidently recognized his ambivalent situation after coming to the described conclusions, found refuge in alcohol and thought that he had now found the right person to talk to in Schellenberg. Whether he wanted to explore Schellenberg's view of the ideological failure of National Socialism and the supposed probation of Stalinist methods, possibly for the aftermath—that can only be guessed at.

CHAPTER THIRTEENTH

General Fellgiebel's execution from a new perspective - v. Schramm: Dr. Scheidt or Bormann? — Keitel suppresses news from Canaris to Hitler — Where did Bormann and Müller go? — Did Müller want to commit suicide at all?

Government councilor Wilhelm Franz Flicke, radio and deciphering expert in the counterintelligence, reported - as already mentioned in Chapter 12 - in his book *Agents Funken nach Moscow* (93) that General Fellgiebel deployed an experienced specialist in 1944 with the Task,

"Using the material, the findings of the agents in Switzerland and the deciphered radio messages, to find those people who could be the informants of Lucie and Pakbo, ie the Rado group..."

Flicke also reports that a)
the expert commissioned by General Fellgiebel was prevented from solving the task assigned to him by transfer orders, b) the number of radio messages to be processed is constantly decreasing took,
c) the remainder of these radio messages were burned overnight.

General Fellgiebel himself, who had given this order together with Admiral Canaris, was executed for his part in the events of July 20, 1944 - Admiral Canaris succeeded General Fellgiebel in his death on April 9, 1945. (He was murdered in the Flossenbürg concentration camp.)

Apparently Canaris, Fellgiebel and, after the war, Flicke were hot on the heels of the traitors in the closest circle around the head of state. After all, not only Flicke (93) described the news source "Pakbo" as "Bormann Party Chancellery". William v. Schramm, on the other hand, believes that Flicke was on the wrong track, because "Pakbo" (the Swiss journalist Dr. Otto Pünter) himself had declared in 1967 that the deck

The name of his working group came from the first letters of the residences of his most important employees: Pontresina - Arth-Goldau - crossings - Bern - Orselina (94). Sándor Radó, the Soviet resident leader in Switzerland, explains the term "Pakbo" as follows:

The imaginative Nazi agent Flicke interprets this strange alias as an abbreviation for the Bormann party chancellery, by which he means that Pünter would not have gotten his information from anyone other than one of the supreme leaders of the Nazi party, i.e. from Bormann personally. Undoubtedly this is a fantastic invention and a wicked lie. Pünter himself derives his alias from the five first letters of the meeting places he had agreed with the members of his questionable group of conspirators before the war. (Pontresina/Poschiavo - Arth-Goldau - crossings - Bern/Basel - Orselina = Pakbo.) Kolja" (a co-conspirator of Radó) "who now really had to know gave a much more prosaic explanation. Pünter, with his lurching movements, 'rowed' as he walked, which Kolya always thought of as a ship; Schiff, French paquebot, becomes pakbo in the transcription according to the Russian pronunciation." (95)

Sándor Radó, now back in his hometown of Budapest after being "rehabilitated", gives the casual reader in his explanation for the alias "Pakbo" several things to think about, as certainly there is nothing against the will in the Eastern bloc of the director of the Moscow headquarters: 1. Flicke's explanation of "Pakbo" as "Bormann party chancellery" is rejected indignantly, followed by Pünter's explanation of "Pakbo", which, as he emphasizes,

2.

3. was agreed "before the war". But also 4. "Kolja, who really had to know, gave a much more prosaic explanation", comparing Pünter's movements with a ship, which is called "paquebot" in French and the Russian Kolja pronouncing this French word in Russian, whereby it becomes "pakbo".

One wonders what might have caused Radó to make a second statement through Kolja to Pünter's explanation for "Pakbo", "who now really had to know". Here you can get suspicious. Why the inclusion of Radó "before the war"? Is this supposed to increase the credibility of Pünter's explanation for "Pakbo"? It is logical that Pünter's espionage network was set up before the war as a precaution.

Why even a second explanation for the alias "Pakbo"? Wasn't Pünter, the leader of this group, credible? Or so that the reader adopts the explanation that seems most credible to him, i.e. can choose what fits best?

We believe that there can only be one correct explanation for "Pakbo".

Incidentally, Radó's postscript "Ship, French paquebot, becomes in the transcription according to the Russian pronunciation for 'pakbo'" is incorrect. The great Larousse (Paris, 1963) gives for: a)

"Ship: navire, bateau, vaisseau", but not "paquebot", as Radó claims, and b) "paquebot
(pakbo): passenger steamer, ship, mail steamer, ocean liner, steamer."

In the Larousse, "Pakbo" is included in brackets, but this refers to the French pronunciation and not the Russian pronunciation as Radó claims.

It is also remarkable that Wilhelm v. Schramm Dr. Otto Pünter takes his word for it when he says "because 'Pakbo' himself declared that the alias of his working group was derived from the initials of the residences of his most important employees..." and thus deviates from Radó's explanation, which uses this alias explained the five first letters of the meeting places of his people. Residences and meeting places cannot have been the same; in conspiracy it is not customary for agents to meet at residence. The inaccuracy between v. Schramm's and Radó's statements remain, in both cases accompanied by the decidedly rejected idea that "Pakbo" was Bormann's party chancellery

could be. Radós sharply and passionately disagrees with Flicke's interpretation, v. Schramm somewhat milder, but with which the correctness of the explanation Dr. Otto Pünters is not proven.

About Dr. We learn about Otto Pünter from Dr. Gert Sudholt (96): "Born on April 4th, 1900, Swiss, lawyer and journalist, owner of the INSA press and agency, very wealthy ...

Pünter is an accredited parliamentary reporter for the left wing of the Socialist Party, he writes reports from the Federal House for People's Rights' and a. newspapers. His version of what was happening about Soviet wartime espionage in Switzerland reinforces his own role and greatly distorts the truth.

He didn't even tell the truth about his own code name. He has explained its origin as an anagram of the first letters of cities where he had networks and springs, whereas Radó explains 'Pakbo' as a phonetic form of 'paquebot' (steamboat), which Pünter received because he was fat. Pünter's constant fishing in troubled waters seems to serve Soviet purposes as well as his own."

The overall picture changes when we turn back to Flicke and read Prof. Dr. Buchheit (97) assesses these events: "One can assume with the greatest probability

that the decodings of the Soviet agent radio service were not all passed on to the military intelligence, and at least not regularly from June 1942 onwards. They simply disappeared via Bormann, who was supported by his Gestapo party colleague Müller. This assertion finds support in the statements of a man who can be described as responsible. The Governing Council a. D. in the radio countermeasures department of the OKW, FW Flicke, reports in his book 'Agenten Funken nach Moskow' how, after the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, people eagerly searched for the whereabouts of the 'Radó reports', which had presumably already been outsourced. In fact, they had long since been discarded, since the Soviet spy network 'Red Three' had meanwhile been broken up as a result of access by the Swiss security police. Radós

Organization had to stop its activities. When searching for Radó messages, the number of telegrams that were allegedly deciphered became smaller and smaller. Incidentally, Flicke, the main witness to this manhunt, died suddenly in 1957 under previously unexplained circumstances in Lauf near Nuremberg.

In view of the Russian secret service's proven ability in so many cases - however often it changes its name - it is quite possible that even in this case an accomplice should be eliminated as soon as it prepares to publish its knowledge .

Flicke's assumption, which cannot be dismissed out of hand, could, if we assume it to be correct, point to a concealment tactic used by Bormann to protect himself by separating out certain decryption results. Such behavior was made easier for him — always assuming he had been the traitor at the Fuhrer's headquarters — because, as we now know, the Soviet intelligence organization maintained up to 280 transmitters during the war, with which they communicated with their agent radio operators all over the world connection was established. The more extensive the daily receipt of intercepted and deciphered reports was, the more inconspicuously certain reports could be sorted out and disappear before they were passed on to the Office for Foreign Affairs/Intelligence.”

To complete the picture of Flicke it is essential to hear another voice. dr Gert Sudholt (96) reports the following in his “Personal Information on the Red Orchestra”:

“Wilhelm Franz Flicke was born in Odessa on January 22, 1897; his parents were German. In 1915 he volunteered for the German army. During World War II he worked in deciphering against the Red Orchestra, mainly against the Red Three.

Although Flicke was an expert and wrote a book on the subject (The Red Chapel, Crossings, 1949), his information is sometimes inaccurate. After the war, doubts arose against him, mainly because his sister and his runaway wife lived in the Soviet zone.

Flicke died on October 11, 1957.”

We do not want to comment further on the justification of the doubts about Flicke, since the corresponding documents are not available, and on the detailed investigations by Schramms, who was employed at Adolf Hitler's headquarters was.

William v. Schramm makes the following considerations (94):

"Was it true that Moscow knew everything and was able to find out through betrayal? Did it really have an ear in Hitler's headquarters? A series of radio messages seemed to prove what Foote and Flicke claimed...

Perhaps it was then Martin Bormann, Reichsleiter of the NSDAP, head of the party chancellery and Hitler's brown shadow? Already in Flicke's book *Agents Funken nach Moscow* one could read that the pseudonym Pakbo was interpreted as party chancellery Bormann...

There were many references to the Fuhrer Headquarters itself... So the Wehrmacht command staff and the Sperrkreis I had to check the actual FHQu in detail. I benefited from the fact that in the summer of 1943 and then from October 1944 to March 1945 I was assigned to the Wehrmacht High Command and knew all the people who belonged to Blocking District I. You were in a familiar area and could reconstruct it with ease : who belonged to Blocking District I? Who had the right and duty to attend the daily leader briefings? Who could listen in when just about everything that concerned the war situation and leadership was being discussed, and when Hitler's most important decisions were being made?

Those who took part actually knew almost everything. Some of this omniscience seemed to be reflected in the radio messages to Moscow, as far as I knew them at the time. My attention was initially focused on the reconstruction of Hitler's immediate surroundings..."

Wilhelm v. In his investigation, which was based on memory, Schramm reviewed all circles and even named persons. Only one person remains as a suspect

Gen: General Scherf's adjutant, officer in charge of military history,
Lieutenant Colonel d. R Dr Wilhelm Scheidt.

Dr Scheidt was a secret bearer of the first order, since he was able to look into the latest protocols at any time and thus had a general overview of the warfare that none of the field marshals even, says Dr. v. scratch.

In his duties he enjoyed unusual freedoms, which he made generous use of. "There were always official reasons for going here and there... in the Reich. There is no mention anywhere of Scheidt driving at the front ..." (94)

Then Dr. v. Schramm on this, the life and character of Dr. to investigate Scheidts. "Scheidt was extraordinarily sociable ...

He knew everyone and everyone. Thanks to his unusual position, he always knew how to build bridges. He was also the only Wehrmacht officer in the FHQu who also belonged to the general SS (Reiter SS)... Scheidt was also particularly interested in Beck and Goerdeler and sought to get to know them...

Everyone who got to know him better during and after the war agrees on this: he was opaque and liked to carry things on both shoulders. So he almost inevitably came under suspicion: Scheidt is Werther, Scheidt is the long-sought traitor from Hitler's immediate vicinity. He got the code name because he was doing his doctorate with a thesis on Goethe. These rumors had been going around for years, practically since the end of the war. Scheidt had already nourished them by his behavior before the Nuremberg tribunal, where he sided with the prosecutors and acted as their witness." (Letter from the adjutant of the GFM Keitels, who witnessed this in Nuremberg prison, to Dr. v.

scratch.)

Another suspicion fell on Dr. Divorces by a note

v. Hammersteins of March 30, 1944, after Dr. v. Schramm (94):

"On March 30, 1944, I went to the Ministry of Aviation, where since the fall of 1943 one of three copies of my documents had been in the safe with the head of the motor pool... The

I had documents in Scheidt's safe for a while beforehand, but he then feared an inspection, *which did not come, because of his own delicate studies of documents from the Führer's headquarters that had been kept in his office for a remarkably long time* (Emphasized by Dr. v. Schramm)

Dr. v.

Schramm, which had already been published by Flicke, which was signed "Dora", i.e. Radó, and which, after Schramm, aroused further suspicion about Scheidt.

"And how was it in the Führer's headquarters (1943) itself," asks the witness Dr. v. Schramm: "It should have been known there what the radio defense was constantly decoding. Wasn't radio traffic between Switzerland and Moscow extremely alarming? The decrypted plaintexts were available to the Gestapo; nevertheless, the FHQu was not alarmed, on the contrary: Hitler and Keitel felt safe because they considered their own defense and security organs to be far superior..." v. Schramm and which shows that Keitel reported the best possible news to Adolf Hitler. Keitel simply didn't want to acknowledge anything to the contrary, apparently because he feared Adolf Hitler's outbursts of anger, today one can say even more than a lost war. As proof we quote Klaus Benzing (13):

"Although ... Admiral Canaris could not take direct action against Bormann (simply because Bormann had only one superior, namely Hitler himself, and he blindly trusted Bormann that any suspicion expressed would have immediately triggered the suspect's liquidation), tried Canaris several times to bring Field Marshal Keitel indirectly to Bormann's traitorous activities. For example, he presented Keitel with the decrypted radio messages which the military countermeasures had deciphered and which had been proven to have been sent to Moscow via Switzerland from the transmitter controlled solely by Bormann. At the same time, Canaris Keitel proved that the numbers given in these radio messages about troop divisions, casualties and troop movements

matched, i.e. were not so-called 'game material'.

According to Canaris' own report, Keitel was startled, looked at Canaris blankly, and then practically stuttered that they must have made a mistake in deciphering the radio messages. He did not enter into any discussion about it, but returned the file to Canaris, even without endorsement, and ordered him sternly that he did not want anything of the sort presented to him again."

Benzing can no longer be questioned about the monstrosity that is laid down in this sentence alone, since he, like WF Flicke, died suddenly. In any case, in this case Martin Bormann was clearly covered by Keitel. But also Dr. v. Schramm covers - certainly unconsciously - Martin Bormann when he assigns him an insignificant role in Adolf Hitler's headquarters by writing (94):

"The party itself was only represented in the FHQu 1943 - because that's what it's all about that year - by Reichsleiter Bormann and a small main staff, none of whom, however, took part in the daily briefing. Political and military conferences were held separately."

"Who was the great unknown? And where is one to look for him? How did this happen?" — asks Dr. v. Schramm repeatedly in his often-cited book — "that he could be up to mischief in a totalitarian police state like the Third Reich for so long without being caught? Weren't harmless 'talkers' ruthlessly subject to the death penalty if someone denounced them? Here, treason of the worst kind was proven by the radio messages that masters of the art of decoding deciphered. More and more plain texts became known in the course of the last years and their content frightened above all the old soldiers who had to do with secret things in the war and who knew the strict secrecy regulations. Some had cost their lives a single negligence in this area. But the hundredfold, knowing traitor simply slipped through the fingers of the Gestapo."

In such a case, common sense can be used: the "great unknown" did not act

only extremely skillful, but was also spared from the highest authority.

Chapters 12 and 13 show that Martin Bormann remained in besieged Berlin with Heinrich Müller, whose political homeland was to be found more in the East than in the West, although Adolf Hitler was free to follow anyone closely with him in the last phase of the fighting had to leave the bunker of the Reich Chancellery and fly to Bavaria or Tyrol. This was also used, e.g. B. from his longtime personal physician, Professor Dr. Morell, who flew to Bavaria on April 22, 1945.

The faking of the death of the head of the Secret State Police, Heinrich Müller, by means of a fake grave in Berlin increases the likelihood that his tracks should be covered, because he can only have defected to the Soviets.

In his memoirs, Hans Baur reports in the chapter "Horrible Hours in the Reich Chancellery Bunker" about a conversation with Heinrich Müller ("Gestapo-Müller") (129): "General Müller,

the head of the Gestapo department, answered my question, whether he would march along: 'Baur, I know the Russian methods too well to expose myself to the danger of falling into their hands. The Russians would shoot me anyway. I'll save myself the agony of interrogation and beatings if I put an end to it myself.'"

His close collaboration with Martin Bormann on the "big radio game" with Moscow may have promised personal benefits for the "after" in addition to the transmission of the game material. After all, both of them were never seen again after their disappearance, as they were the only ones from the leading class of the Third Reich.

After the war, numerous newspaper reports appeared that Müller is said to have been seen in Albania and South America. But the rumors about it soon faded away and were drowned out by the countless "reports from eyewitnesses" that Martin Bormann claims to have encountered in all latitudes of the western hemisphere of our planet.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Bormann's intrigues against the Luftwaffe — General Koller sees through Bormann — Koller's suspicions are confirmed by General Greim — Bormann breaks bridges with the Western Allies — General v. Saucken sharply contradicts Hitler — Brautigam's suspicions about the GPU murder of Gauleiter Kube

Let us turn our reflections back to Berlin, which was surrounded by the Red Army, and to the bunker under the Reich Chancellery. Those who stayed behind were witnesses to a drama unprecedented in history. According to one of these witnesses, the American historian, Captain Michael A. Musmanno (39), reported the following scene:

"About early March 1945, at a Führer briefing, Bormann presented Hitler with a note from the Allied press. This note read something like this: 'An American bomber crew shot down over Germany a short time before had been picked up by the advancing American troops. She testified that she had been mistreated by the outraged German population, threatened with death and killed if German soldiers had not rescued her and taken her under her protection. The women were almost more malicious and dangerous than the men.' On presenting this note, Bormann pointed out to the Führer in a few words that this confirmed that the soldiers would take action against the population in such cases.

He literally said: 'There you see, my Führer, how your orders are carried out.' Hitler,

immediately very excited, shouted: 'Where is the Luftwaffe?', turned to General Koller, who was present, and said very loudly and indignantly: 'Why aren't my orders carried out? I have already ordered that the bomber crews and terrorist planes that have jumped off may not be defended against the justifiable anger of the population! It

It is unheard of for German soldiers to take action to protect these murderers against the population acting in justified hatred.' Surprised by this

rebuke, General Koller replied: 'I know of no such order; besides, that's practically impossible.' Hitler, very loudly and very sharply: 'The only reason my

orders are not being carried out is the cowardice of the Luftwaffe! Because the gentlemen from the Luftwaffe are cowards and afraid that something could happen to them, so they don't carry out my orders. The whole thing is nothing but a cowardice agreement between the Luftwaffe and the Anglo-American Air Force."

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Karl Koller (37), kept a stenographic diary from April 14, 1945 to May 27, 1945, the documentary value of which cannot be denied, since during those days it was partly in the Headquarters of Adolf Hitler stayed. Koller reports here on the dismissal of a ministerial director, Knipfer, who had been dismissed on Hitler's express orders because he had fallen out with higher party officials and was constantly exposed to false accusations from these circles. Adolf Hitler wants Knipfer to be transferred to the SS punishment unit, which is commanded by the notorious SS Lieutenant General Dirlewanger. With this debate over, Koller continues his notes:

"Hitler rages on. From December 20 to January 19, an urgent order was left in the Ministry of Aviation, which shows the sloppiness of the Air Force leadership. He himself had the paper in question in his hands yesterday.

'I'd like,' I say, 'for the order number so I can investigate.' "You can have the number," he replies, "but nothing happens anyway. In the Air Force, a few have to be shot, then it will be different." — 'If,' I reply, 'this incident concerns my department, the matter will be investigated. But I don't know how to do it unless I'm told

where the order came from, what number it has and to whom it was addressed.' I'm convinced that the

whole thing is again Bormann's baiting. It is impossible for the event to have really taken place in this way. The Air Ministry probably has nothing to do with the story. (I have not received the order, its number, or any other precise information.)

Hitler has long raged against the Luftwaffe, and he's not just targeting its commander-in-chief. My objections to his irrelevant arguments are obviously annoying to him. His anger is fueled by lies from inside the party leadership."

In the meantime, General Koller has flown to Berchtesgaden to see Reich Marshal Goering. Here Goering consulted with Koller and others about the new situation created by the rapid advance of the Allies.

"Göring is full of misgivings," Koller writes in shorthand, "his greatest concern is that Hitler could have declared Bormann his deputy or successor given their long-standing tense relationship.

'Bormann is my deadly enemy,' says Goering. 'He's just waiting to kill me. If I act now, I'll be branded a traitor, if I don't act, I'll be blamed for failing in the darkest hours.'"

"Time is pressing, something has to be done," reports General Koller. "I therefore suggest the following to Goering: 'If you want to be absolutely sure, send Hitler a radio message and ask him the straight question. He can't take offense at one question, he put you in this situation himself.'

Goering picks this up immediately; those present are also in favour. Goering then dictated a long radio message himself, somewhat pompous and with many protestations. It's getting too big to be sold. After a few necessary cuts and changes, the message was sent to the bunker of the Reich Chancellery by the radio stations of the OKL, which were specially staffed with a general staff major.

After General Koller had been temporarily arrested by the Gestapo — allegedly on Adolf Hitler's orders — he made the following notes:
"Shortly before 7 p.m.

great news from the Oberdonau district.

The District Leader of Vöcklabruck, on the instructions of the Gauleiter Oberdonau, alerted the Volkssturm against an internal enemy. Anyone who was against Hitler should be shot immediately. He wants to carry this out 'in close cooperation with the Luftwaffe'. I am convinced that Bormann's measures were ordered and directed against the Luftwaffe. The district leader was probably wrong."

A few hours later General Koller is ordered to Berlin: "Another call about

Berlin. This time Admiral V. Puttkamer, who was supposed to tell me from Senate President Müller, Bormann's personal adviser, that according to instructions I should, if at all possible, fly out of the Führer bunker that night.

I decline for technical and health reasons.

Kaltenbrunner is announced for tomorrow. Besides, it would be folly to fly into the Ashen without knowing where and when to land up there. Inquiries as to which seats could still be used were not answered."

On April 26, 1945, at 2:30 p.m., General Koller noted:

"Call from Dr. Hummel, Obersalzberg" (belongs to the circle of representatives of Reichsleiter Bormann-Dr. Frank on the Obersalzberg), "he says: 'On a radio message from us, from the Obersalzberg, that you'" (General Koller) "last night couldn't take off, the answer we got was a radio message from Reichsleiter Bormann on behalf of the Führer. Herr General, you still have to start the following night and report to the Führer. One of us will come down to you to give you the order orally.'

But nobody comes from Obersalzberg. I'll call you back. Hummel confirms the order again and now explains that the order was signed by Hitler and that after this order I had to fly regardless of other things.

Who looks at an incoming radio message to see who really signed it? Why does Hitler only send the radio through Bormann, why not directly to my office? The radio documents are in the bunker. Why isn't the order sent to me via my liaison staff at the OKW? This military command route would be the right one!

Strange procedure! The thing smells badly sneaky! Still, it is possible that the order came directly from Hitler.

He doesn't always use the right places to issue his orders and often throws an order to the next man who comes along, more and more often to Bormann because he doesn't trust anyone else."

Reported on page 60 of his diary, undated
General Koller:

"In passing" (General) "Jodl says to me with a smile and winking eyes: 'Don't fly to Berlin.' I confess that this confirms my suspicions."

At noon on the same day General Koller managed to get through to the bunker of the Reich Chancellery from Fürstenberg, where he had gone in the meantime.

His attempt to contact Adolf Hitler by telephone was unsuccessful; He only received the answer: "Führer has withdrawn, cannot be spoken to now, must not be disturbed." Instead, a conversation took place with Ritter v. grime. Koller's report: "I report that I am with the OKW in a forest near Fürstenberg, after I kept receiving orders

from Bormann's offices to report to Hitler in Berlin.

According to what I have been informed, these orders were said to have been given by Hitler personally. I intend to fly into Berlin this afternoon under some kind of fighter cover or during the night and land on the axis.

'That you should report to the Führer,' says Greim, 'I don't know anything about that. He would have told me that for sure. That seems to me to be a very dark story—I must clear it up. I gave Hitler your report, he read it in my presence, even slowly read it twice—but not there himself

too voiced. Under no circumstances should you fly into Berlin! Firstly, the flight is superfluous, secondly, you can't get through anymore, and if you do get through, the question is whether you can get out again. I no longer expect to get out myself, I have to stay here with the Führer and then we'll both be in the bunker, that's quite impossible...

Wait and see,' Greim replies, 'just don't lose faith, everything will come to a happy conclusion. Being together with the Führer and his strength exhilarate me

properly strengthened, this is like a youth bath for me.'"

General Koller, who thought normally in this situation, took offense at the word "Jungbad". He comments on this word in his diary:

"'Jungbad' — my God, it's like a madhouse! Am I so limited that I cannot follow the high flight of these gentlemen and cannot recognize the 'redemptive path'?"

General Koller flew back to Berchtesgaden from Rechlin and writes on April 29 (1945):

"My subordinates are pleased that I was able to slip out of the jaws. General Schulz tells me: 'We didn't give a penny more for your life and reckoned that Bormann would have you eliminated in Berlin.' That could easily have been done, I reply, and no one would have noticed. But you could have told me your concerns earlier

...

The next visitor at 12 o'clock is the Chief of the Command Staff of the Reichsführer SS in Salzburg. I have only seen this Brigade Commander once and have not heard anything unfavorable from him. Nevertheless, be careful! (I am writing this as he sits across from me at the table.)

It's less of a conversation than a half-sentence sweep. We exchange common phrases. Gradually our conversation becomes more fluent. This is because my guest doesn't get along with Kaltenbrunner. He also says: 'Bormann only sends hate songs through the air.' We're talking about the case of the officers of the staff

office. My

Visitor mentioned that he was on guard in Salzburg

taken from the SD and handed over to the Waffen-SS in order to protect the lives of those arrested. As a reason he states verbatim (I am also taking the shorthand): Yesterday, April 30, Bormann sent a radio message to his people on the Obersalzberg with something like the following: 'The situation in Berlin is getting worse. If Berlin falls and we fall, you are responsible with your honor, your life and your family for the fact that the traitors of April 23rd are all liquidated immediately. Men, do your duty!'...

I ask: Which group of people is meant by the traitors of April 23? Am I there too?

You have to be damn careful, the fellows around Bormann must count me among this conspiracy that only exists in their imagination. But in their meanness they probably don't care. My counterpart cannot answer my question. But he says he doesn't think anything else is going to happen.

The SS resist Bormann, who is hated everywhere...

At 2 p.m. I received the message that Doenitz was in charge of the top management; Bormann signed the radio message. I get it from the OKW staff south, it hasn't been sent to the OKL...

At 6 p.m. a dusty and overtired man arrives at my house at Geiger's. He introduces himself, Standartenfuhrer Brause, leader of the SS guards of Goering...

We don't know each other and therefore feel at first away. Who is Brause? A dangerous agent of Bormann? On real, decent guy?"

The conversation referred to the detained Göring, who is said to have declared that he was making himself available for negotiations with the Western Allies and was aiming for a "man to man" discussion with General Eisenhower. According to General Koller, "Goering claims that his arrest was at the instigation of Bormann, that by law he was Hitler's successor. This law could not be changed by Bormann either."

When Trevor Roper in his book "Hitler's Last Days" speaks of General Koller's "mental confusion" when he called the Reich Chancellery and spoke to Field Marshal v. Greim phone

then he cannot claim to be a serious historian, since emotions apparently did not allow for an objective assessment of the events (98).

General Koller's diary shows that Martin Bormann's seemingly subversive activities remained unchanged even in the last phases of the collapse. Today one can ask oneself what might have moved Martin Bormann to vent his hatred of the Wehrmacht and the Air Force in the bunker even in the last few days, even hours, at a time when most of the bunker's residents remembered that Most important, thinking about breaking out and surviving.

Or did Goering's declared intention to negotiate with General Eisenhower, that is, with the West, stand in the way of Bormann's plans? Did Martin Bormann want to secure his future even better by liquidating the personally hated man, who was willing to negotiate with the West, with an SS commando in order to be able to continue his own plans unhindered? Here is just his "Big Game" conducted with Gestapo-Müller ("Aktion Bär"), which ran with Moscow.

The Soviet contemporary historian Lev Besymenski fell victim to a fundamental error when referring to Günsche (aide-de-camp at headquarters) attributing pro-Western tendencies to Martin Bormann:

"At a conference in January or February 1945, Martin Bormann gave instructions that a group of his people in West Germany should go underground but remain loyal to the American occupation authorities in order to prepare undisturbedly for the later rebirth of the National Socialist Party can.

One of the participants in the consultation wrote down the following statement by Bormann: 'Our salvation lies in the West. Only there will we be able to maintain our party. The slogan of the fight against Bolshevism will guarantee this.'" (100)

Unfortunately, the name of the meeting participant who made this statement, Martin Bor man noted.

Lew Besymenski seems to have adopted this erroneous statement about Martin Bormann's alleged views, since three years before the above quote was published in his book *Auf den Spur Martin Bormanns* (9) he wrote: "We know that Martin Bormann wanted to get to Dönitz in Flensburg at any price ...

In some conversations that took place during the night of May 1st and May 2nd (1945), Bormann confirmed several times that he wanted to make this attempt ... Recalling his nightly conversations with the Führer, Bormann absolutely wanted to start the experiments from Flensburg, to establish contacts with the Western Allies."

A few statements: Lew

Besymenski's knowledge that Martin Bormann "wanted to get to Dönitz in Flensburg at any price" lacks evidence. Martin Bormann's in the night from 1. According to the current state of knowledge in Bormann research, the information distributed on May 2nd that he "wanted to make this attempt" can rather be seen as "disinformation", ie misleading in order to cover his tracks. We will come back to this in detail.

For the sake of completeness, the main parts of the affidavit by Eise Krüger, a former secretary from Martin Bormann's party chancellery, are reproduced:

"On May 1, 1945, I saw and spoke to Bormann for the last time in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery. By that time I was no longer working for him because he was writing his own orders and radio messages by hand... His last words to me, spoken at a chance meeting in the bunker, were: ' So, because goodbye. It doesn't make much sense anymore, I'll try it, but I won't make it.'" (101)

Flight Captain Baur also reported in this direction that Martin Bormann had drawn the constellation of the Great Bear with the polar star while still in the bunker in order to use this orientation aid to find the way to Dönitz in Flensburg when he was traveling through Brandenburg and Mecklenburg at night

wander (68). Since the constellation is already known to every child, the incident looks like a deception.

Finally, the second sentence from the Besymenski quote above, that Martin Bormann absolutely wanted to continue the attempts to establish contact with the Western Allies from Flensburg, is also erroneous. Besymenski traces these intentions of Martin Bormann back to the memory of earlier discussions with the leaders.

Martin Bormann burned ties with the Western Allies when he ordered Allied airmen who had landed to be shot. Incidentally, in his circular of September 30, 1944, he had already called for the Allied prisoners of war to be treated more severely, and the authority to command all prisoner-of-war camps was withdrawn from the Wehrmacht and transferred to Himmler. Furthermore — according to Lieutenant Lambert's indictment speech before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg on January 16, 1946 (afternoon session) — lynchings that were organised, caused and approved by Martin Bormann were also said to have been committed. The two death sentences on Germans used in Lieutenant Lambert's argument can be doubted as to whether they came about, since the American military courts, in the triumphal frenzy of those days, usually did not deal fairly fairly (102).

Lew Besymenski's (100) suspicions that an active National Socialist organization was supposed to be rebuilt come to nothing. Former Gauleiter Rudolf Jordan (30) is very clear about this: "Bormann's slogan was not: 'After the military defeat, the NSDAP will go underground and continue to fight there', but rather it was: 'Killing is the last duty .'"

There are numerous reports on the events of the last few days in the Reich Chancellery bunker: by German eyewitnesses, by Western Allied reporters who questioned the Germans who fell into their hands, and reports by the Soviet side, who questioned their prisoners.

Since it is the essential task of this work, the behavior

and work of Martin Bormann, the events in the bunker should only be considered in connection with him. We are following the report of Rittmeister Gerhard Boldt (99), who had been ordered from the Foreign Armies East Division, where sober thinking still dominated everyday life, to General Guderian in the Chief General Staff Division. He reported on his impressions of the first meeting with Martin Bormann and Adolf Hitler in February 1945 in the Reich Chancellery:

“Soon afterwards the door to the study opens and Martin Bormann appears. So this, it crosses my mind, is the man who is supposed to have such a decisive influence on Hitler, the evil spirit behind the scenes. The man who now enters the anteroom is 45 to 50 years old, about medium height, square, stocky and bull-necked. The round face conveys an energetic, almost brutal expression with strong cheekbones and wide nostrils. He wears his somewhat sparse, straight hair parted back. Eyes and facial expressions show deviousness...

Hitler stands alone in the middle of the large room, facing the antechamber... I stand near the door and wait for what is to come. It is undoubtedly an extraordinary moment for me and I am terribly excited. Generaloberst Guderian is apparently talking to Hitler about me, because he is looking at me. Guderian gives me a sign, I go to Hitler. Slowly, leaning heavily, he comes towards me with a shuffling step. He holds out his right hand and gives me a strangely piercing look. His handshake is limp and soft, without any strength and without any expression. His head wobbles slightly, which I later noticed even more. His left arm is hanging limply, his left hand is shaking badly.

There is an indescribable flickering glow in his eyes that is downright frightening and completely unnatural. His face and the area around his eyes make a completely worn-out and worn-out impression. All his movements are those of a sick, senile man. He looks like to me

an annealed piece of iron... Slowly shuffling, accompanied by Bormann, he goes to his chart table and sits down."

Furthermore, Gerhard Boldt remembers the episode of March 12, 1945, which deserves to be recorded. On this day Adolf Hitler was expecting General der Panzertruppen Dietrich v. Saucken, who was already a bearer of the Swords for the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross. Gerhard Boldt:

"We were standing next to Hitler, who was seated at the card table, when Saucken entered. Slender, elegant, his left hand relaxed on his cavalryman's saber, his monocular in his eye, Saucken greeted him with a slight bow. That was three 'monstries' at once. Saucken had not saluted with a raised arm and 'Heil Hitler', as had been the rule since July 20, 1944, he had not asked for his gun to be taken when entering the study, and he had kept his eye on the monocular when greeting. I looked alternately at Hitler and von Saucken and thought something terrible was about to happen. Guderian and Bormann also stood there as if petrified.

But nothing happened, nothing at all! Hitler only briefly asked Guderian to introduce Saucken to the military situation in East Prussia and in the Danzig area. When Guderian had finished, Hitler spoke...

Von Saucken had listened to what Guderian and Hitler had said in silence, without asking any questions. He was standing right next to Hitler at the chart table. After a short pause, just to take a deep breath, Hitler continued.

He indicated to General von Saucken that he was to report to Gauleiter Forster in the combat area in and around Danzig and that he, von Saucken, was only responsible for purely military matters. However, Gauleiter Forster was to assume ultimate responsibility and authority for this entire area.

Hitler paused and looked up at von Saucken from below. The latter straightened up, returned Hitler's look, the monocle in his eye, and answered while at the same time, probably to emphasize his words, slapped the palm of his hand on the marble top of the chart table: 'I'm not thinking of it, Herr Hitler, me under the command of a Gauleiter

deliver.' You could have heard a pin drop on the carpet. It seemed to me that Hitler would have sunk even deeper at General von Saucken's words. His face looked even waxier.

Guderian was the first to break the leaden silence and, in an admonishing, comradely tone, urged Saucken to be reasonable. Even Bormann joined. But General von Saucken's only objection was, 'I won't think of it.' Guderian and Bormann said nothing, helpless. The silence that followed didn't want to end. Then Hitler answered in a feeble, toneless voice: 'All right, then lead alone, Saucken.' A few trivial things followed. Hitler said goodbye to the general without shaking his hand, and Saucken left the study with a slight bow in greeting."

Gerhard Boldt had also heard about the then Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, because he had gotten a good picture of this man in the short time he spent in the bunker or in the Reich Chancellery: "The Gauleiter Erich Koch , who also frequented

Hitler's, bore a great deal of resemblance to Bormann. He was heavier and clumsier, and his features were even coarser and more brutal. However, he was not inferior to Bormann in terms of ambition, selfishness and arrogance.

After the conquest of Königsberg in April 1945, the besieged 3rd and 4th armies in East Prussia waged a desperate, hopeless struggle while hundreds of thousands of East Prussian refugees were still waiting on the narrow Spit on either side of Pillau and in Samland to be transported west; At that time this 'King of the Reich on which the sun never sets', as he used to call himself, since his administrative district stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, appeared in the Reich Chancellery as if nothing had happened, and Hitler let him don't hang them like thousands of soldiers and officers who tried to save their bare lives from some cauldron. He had merely exchanged his party uniform for a windbreaker, probably because he had to fear that the

The people of Berlin would have killed him immediately if they had recognized him.”

It is striking that Erich Koch, who was supported by Martin Bormann and who had made countless enemies in the Ukraine through his brutal methods, made it unchallenged from Königsberg to Berlin during the collapse, while, as the diplomat and Russia expert Bridegroom (103) writes, the measured general commissioner of Belarus, Kube, was assassinated by the GPU; also his successor, v. Gottberg was to be assassinated on behalf of the GPU, but this attempt failed. The White Ruthenian doctor Yermatschenko, who maintained good connections with the General Commissar and the bodies of White Ruthenian self-government, was eliminated. The report of the groom:

“First of all, Yermatschenko fell victim to an intrigue and had to be deported to Prague. It has never been clarified who had a hand in this. But Moscow was apparently also targeting Kube” (and v. Gottberg) “itself; because it could do better with people like Koch, who made Germanness so hated that one could assume they were in the service of the Bolsheviks.”

With these words Bridegroom was close to the great together crowds approached.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Bormann prophesies Rittmeister Boldt "knight's estate after a victorious end" - Sharp controversy between General Burgdorf and Bormann - Bormann's resigned words to Else Krüger Misleading? — Interpretation of Bormann's prophecy "Knight estates after the victorious end"

On April 27, 1945, Rittmeister Gerhard Boldt had an experience that he recorded in his memories. After Adolf Hitler had painfully pinned an Iron Cross to the breast of a young boy who had distinguished himself through bravery, he sent him out again into the hopeless battle in the streets of Berlin. Gerhard Boldt further reports:

“Freytag, Weiß” (Major v. Freytag-Loringhofen, Lieutenant Colonel Weiß) “and I went back to our bunker rooms together and talked about the unreality of this scene. We were officers who had been in the field for a long time and were not used to hiding while the fighting was going on outside. For us it was an unbearable situation. We didn't notice that Bormann had come and was listening to us.

Suddenly he put his hands on Freytag and me's shoulders with a patronizing air and stepped between us. He came to speak of Wenck's troops, the relief of Berlin and the imminent victorious end of the war. Then he added in his unnaturally deliberate tone: 'You who are loyal to our leader and endure his hardest hours together with him will, when this fight is soon ended victoriously, hold high positions in the state and as a thank you for your faithful service received manors.' Then he smiled graciously at us and confidently walked on.

At first I was so taken aback that I couldn't say a word. So in order to get manors, we did our duty. I wondered if the 'victorious ending' today, 27 Ap

ril, could he really be serious? As so often when I heard and watched him or Goebbels or the other men around Hitler, I asked myself whether they really believed what they were saying! Or was it a diabolical mixture of pretense, megalomania and fanatical stupidity?"

Boldt's question "Did you really believe what you said?" is entitled. In view of the collapse that was unstoppable, to speak of a victory after which large rewards should be distributed was simply absurd. But Martin Bormann wasn't that naive. When he spoke of "victory," he could not have meant a German victory, but rather a Soviet one. Perhaps before he joined the Soviets he wanted to taunt the young officers whom he hated so much inwardly.

Gerhard Boldt made another revealing observation on the night of April 27-28, 1945: "Around 2 a.m. I lay down, completely overtired and overworked, to get a few more hours of sleep. There was noise from the next room. There sat Bormann, (General) Krebs and (General) Burgdorf, in lively revelers. I had slept soundly for two and a half hours when Bernd" (v. Freytag-Loringhofen), "who was lying under me in his bed, woke me up with the words: 'You're missing something, my dear, listen to this. It's been going on at this volume for quite a while.' I straightened up and listened to the next room.

Burgdorf was just yelling at Bormann: 'Nine months ago I approached my current task with all my strength and boundless idealism. I have always set myself the goal of coordinating the party and the Wehrmacht. I went so far that I was cut off by my Wehrmacht comrades and sometimes even despised. I really did my best to eliminate Hitler's and the party leadership's distrust of the Wehrmacht. After all, in the Wehrmacht I was accused of being a traitor to the German officer ranks.

Today I have to see that these accusations are justified,

that my work was in vain, my idealism wrong, not only that it was naive and stupid.'

He paused for a moment, breathing heavily. Krebs tried to calm him down and asked him to be considerate of Bormann. But Burgdorf continued: 'Leave me alone, Hans, one day all that has to be said. Maybe in forty-eight hours it'll be too late.

Our young officers set out with great faith and idealism. They died by the hundreds of thousands. But what for? For the fatherland? For our greatness and future? For a decent, clean Germany? In her heart, yes, but otherwise no. They died for you, for your good life, for your thirst for power. Believing in a good cause, the youth of eighty million people bled to death on the battlefields of Europe, millions of innocent people were sacrificed while you, the party leaders, enriched yourselves in national wealth. You have splurged, amassed enormous wealth, stolen manorial estates, built castles, indulged in excess, deceived and oppressed the people. You have trampled our ideals, our morals, our beliefs, our souls in the dirt. Man was for you only the tool of your insatiable lust for power.

You destroyed our centuries-old culture, the German people. This is your terrible fault!

The general had shouted the last few sentences almost imploringly. It had become very quiet in the bunker. You could hear his panting breathing. Bormann's voice came cool, deliberate, and oily, and that was all he could reply:

'But, my dear, you don't have to get personal right away. Even if the others have all enriched themselves, I am not guilty. I swear to you by all that is sacred to me. — Cheers, my dear!'

By all that is sacred to me! I knew that he had acquired a large property in Mecklenburg and another in Upper Bavaria, and that he had a feudal villa built on the Chiemsee. Hadn't he also rite to us a few hours earlier

goods promised? That was the sacred oath of the highest leader of the National Socialist German Workers' Party after Adolf Hitler."

In his report, Gerhard Boldt also provided pictures of the conditions in the bunker, as they are natural in cramped spaces:

"When I went downstairs with the papers for the lecture in the midday hours" (April 28, 1945), a strange, almost comical picture presented itself to me: Burgdorf, Krebs and Bormann, following their passionate nightly argument, had talked about their previous living quarters. and work rooms moved to the small anteroom of Hitler's apartment in the 'Führerbunker'.

Snoring loudly, wrapped in woolen blankets, stretched out their legs, the three of them lay peacefully side by side in deep armchairs that had been placed in front of the right-hand wall bench. Only a few steps away, at the table opposite, sat Hitler and Goebbels, on the bench to the left against the wall Eva Braun."

On April 29, 1945, Gerhard Boldt reported on one of his last encounters with Adolf Hitler: "With

an impenetrable, mask-like expression on his face, without directing a word to those around him, he retired to his living quarters with his back bent. Not so the vital, impulsive and mentally very active Martin Bormann.

That same evening he sent Dönitz a radio message to his Forelle headquarters near Plön, in which he frankly accused the responsible military leaders of the OKW - that is, Keitel and Jodl - of being unfaithful because they had not pushed the troops forward in such a way that Berlin was shocked...

Whether it was Bormann, Hitler, Goebbels or all the others, no one wanted to admit that the German army was completely at the end of its tether... And they didn't want to admit to themselves and those around them that our opponents were killing us many times over were superior. In their minds, failure could only be due to betrayal..."

Adolf Hitler married Eva Braun on April 28, 1945.

Afterwards he dictated his political and private will to his private secretary, Mrs. Gertrud Junge. He appointed Martin Bormann as executor. He also intended to have these wills or copies of them delivered to Grand Admiral Dönitz in Plön (Schleswig-Holstein) and Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner, who was in Bohemia with his army group.

General Burgdorf appointed Major Willi Johannmeier as the bearer of a copy of Adolf Hitler's political testament, who was to make his way to Field Marshal Schörner in Bohemia. SS-Standartenführer Wilhelm Zander, adviser to Martin Bormann, and Heinz Lorenz, an employee of the German news agency, went with him with similar documents. Zander's order was to accompany Johannmeier only one way and then to go to Plön to see Grand Admiral Dönitz, while Lorenz received his order from Martin Bormann and Goebbels to also report to Dönitz. In addition to the two wills, he carried with him an 'appendix' penned by Goebbels.

They made their way through three Russian siege rings and reached the Havel bridgehead near Pichelsdorf, where they encountered a Hitler Youth battalion. The task of this battalion was to hold a bridge for General Wenck's army, which was expected there (98). This small group was caught up here by Rittmeister Gerhard Boldt, who was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Weiß and Major v. Freytag-Loringhoven had been instructed by Adolf Hitler to hurry as quickly as possible to General Wenck, from whom relief and rescue were hoped for in the bunker - in vain.

In the bunker, the mood for the end of the world spread when it became known that Adolf Hitler wanted to end his life.

"Even though Hitler was preparing for death," writes Tre vor Roper, "there was still at least one man in the bunker who was thinking of life: Martin Bormann. If Bormann couldn't persuade the German armies to come and liberate Hitler and himself, he would at least insist on revenge...at 3:15 am on April 30, he sent in

more of those telegrams in which the neurosis of the bunker was so vividly preserved. It was addressed to Donitz in Plön, but Bormann no longer trusted the usual means of communication and sent it through the Gauleiter of Mecklenburg. It read: 'Dönitz! According to our impressions, which are

becoming clearer and clearer, the divisions from the Berlin area have been treading water for days instead of picking out leaders. We only get messages that are 'controlled, suppressed and colored by Teilhaus'" (Keitel). In general, we can only send via Teilhaus.

Fuehrer orders you to act swiftly and ruthlessly against all traitors.
Borman'

A postscript contained the words: 'Fuehrer lives and directs Abwehr Berlin.' These words, which contain no hint of the coming end - in fact seem to deny its imminence - give the impression that Bormann thinks so

—,
I am even reluctant to admit that his power will soon be over or must be renewed by some other, less predictable source..."

Words and deeds of Martin Bormann did not always coincide;
Contradictory statements can also be made:

During a chance encounter in the bunker, he resignedly said to Else Krüger: "...it doesn't make much sense anymore, I'll try it, but I won't make it through". (101) He asked Professor Speer to persuade Adolf Hitler to fly to Berchtesgaden after all, because "it's the last few hours when that's still possible". (32) He had previously received permission from Adolf Hitler, together with Dr. Morell and others to leave Berlin; why didn't he use it? What was the reason why the realist Martin Bormann did not want to part with Adolf Hitler, in view of the unstoppable advance of the Red Army?

In his study of the personal physician Dr. Morell (1) to give an explanation: "At the interrogation" (by US

officials) "Morell stated that he had wanted to put Hitler on morphine. Hitler must have noticed something, because with morphine Morell could

Thwart Hitler's decision to kill himself and either play him into the hands of the Soviets alive or, in the euphoria of the morphine intoxication, persuade him to reach a brotherly agreement with Stalin. Seen from this point of view, Bormann's last address to the crew of the Führer bunker only had a meaning that the listeners could not understand at the time: 'Everyone who perseveres to the end will shortly be rewarded with manorial estates.' Even if the manors were only dachas,

most of them, in the general drunkenness and the urge to survive, would have easily gone along with such a turnaround ...

Martin Bormann could" (under Russian rule) "remain what he was: the secret chancellor of a Soviet Germany. He was intrepid enough to carry out his task in shell fire to the last second. Morell took the opportunity to save his life..."

On April 30, 1945, in the afternoon, Adolf Hitler took his own life.

In the night from April 30 to May 1, 1945, General Krebs negotiated an armistice with the Soviet General Chuikov, but this did not materialize because the Soviets insisted on unconditional surrender. On May 1, 1945, Generals Burgdorf and Krebs and Dr.

Goebbels suicide.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Break out in groups from the Reich Chancellery - Bormann in the second group - Bormann fallen? — Tiburtius was the last to see Bormann — Bormann was already wearing civilian clothes — Faragó's list — additions from western and Soviet sources — Radio Moscow on June 16, 1945: Bormann arrested — legends about Bormann

Even in those days, Adolf Hitler's personality had the effect of a strong clamp on those locked in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery, whose cohesion was only weakened by his suicide. It was decided to break out of the bunker in several groups and make their way west, but very few succeeded.

Trevor Roper (98) bases his report quoted below on the statements of the witnesses Schwägermann (adjutant to Goebbels), Axmann (Reich youth leader) and Kempka (Hitler's driver): "In the bunker of the New Reich Chancellery

there was a mixed group of party officials, soldiers and women gathered. She was under Bormann's command, but, as one of the participants said, 'there was never a real command; everyone ran around like headless chickens'. When they were all assembled, the order of their departure was explained to them. They should walk in consecutive compact groups through the cellars and tunnels to the Wilhelmsplatz subway station. From there they would march along the subway tracks to the Friedrichstrasse station, where they would ascend to the surface again. At Friedrichstrasse they would join the remnants of Mohnke's Kampfgruppe" (SS Brigadeführer and commander of the Reich Chancellery) "which had been defending the Reich Chancellery and with their help try to find a way across the Spree and through the Russian lines to the northwest force ...

It was eleven o'clock before the party was ready to leave

was. They went in groups, as agreed... Bormann was in one of the middle groups; In his pocket he had the last copy of Hitler's private will (according to Bormann's communication to Axmann, reported by him) —"

Trevor Roper goes on to report that the groups that had escaped from the Friedrichstrasse station exit made their way individually to the Weidendamm Bridge, behind which a tank barrier had been erected and was under Russian fire. "They therefore retreated to the old admiral's palace at the south end of the bridge," writes Trevor Roper (98) further, "and waited until the arrival of some German tanks gave them any hope of breaching the barrier. They gathered around the tanks and advanced again: a mixed group consisting of Bormann, Stumpfegger (Hitler's last doctor), Axmann, Kempka, Hitler's second pilot Beetz, Naumann (State Secretary), Schwägermann and Räch (driver). Some of them passed the barrier with the leading tanks and, about 300 meters further, reached Ziegelstrasse, but there the tank was hit by a rocket launcher, which caused a violent explosion. Beetz and Axmann were wounded; Kempka was stunned and blinded; Bormann and Stumpfegger were thrown to the ground and may have lost consciousness, but escaped unharmed..."

Kempka was temporarily taken prisoner by the Russians and eventually came into American custody. Axmann found "both" (Bormann and Stumpfegger) "lying stretched out on their backs behind the bridge where Invalidenstrasse crosses the railway line, their faces bathed in the moonlight. Pausing for a moment, he saw that both were dead, but Russian fire prevented a closer examination. There were no obvious wounds to be seen, nor any sign of a shattering explosion. They were probably shot in the back." (Trevor Roper, 98)

In the hearing before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg on July 3, 1946, when questioned by Martin Bormann's defense attorney, Dr. Friedrich Bergold, the following detailed statements:

"Dr. Bergold: Mr. Witness! What days do you have it last seen of defendant Martin Bormann?

Kempka: I saw the Reichsleiter, then Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, on the night of May 1-2, 1945 at the Friedrichstrasse station, Weidendammer Bridge. Reichsleiter Bormann, then Reichsleiter Bormann, asked me what the general situation was like at Friedrichstrasse station. I told him that it would hardly be possible, there at the station. Chairman: ...

You speak too fast; what did he ask you?

Kempka: He asked what the situation was like, whether one could get through there at the Friedrichstrasse station. I told him that it would be almost impossible as there would be too much defensive fighting. I told him it was just a matter of trying. Then some tanks and some PSW cars came. Small clusters were then formed on these, on the tanks. The tanks then pushed through to the anti-tank barrier after the lead tank, where the Martin Bormann was walking about midway through the tank, was suddenly hit on the left. I assume with a bazooka out a window and this tank blew up. Just on the side where Martin Bormann was walking, a jet of flame suddenly erupted and I saw...

Chairman: You're still speaking too fast. The last thing I heard was Bormann walking in the middle of the column; is that right?

Kempka: Yes, in the middle of the tank, on the left side, Martin ... This tank, after the tank was 40-50 meters through the anti-tank trap, was hit, I assume, with a bazooka from a window .

The tank flew apart high up, just where Martin... Reichsleiter Bormann was walking. I myself was struck by the explosion and by a person flying towards me who was walking in front of me - I assume that it was the Standartenfuhrer at the time, Dr. Stumpfegger was—I was thrown onto my side and passed out. When I came to, I couldn't see anything either, I was blinded by the jet of flame. i crawled

then back to the anti-tank barrier and haven't seen anything from Martin Bormann since then.

dr Bergold: Witness! Did you see Martin Bormann collapse in the developing jet of flame on this occasion?

Kempka: Yes. I saw another movement that was kind of Collapsing, one could also say, was like flying away.

dr Bergold: Was this explosion so strong that, according to your observations, Martin Borman must have died?

Kempka: Yes. I'm sure he died from the force of that explosion.

dr Bergold: How was Martin Bormann dressed at the time?

Kempka: Martin Bormann wore a leather coat, an SS leader's cap and the insignia of an SS Obergruppenfuhrer.

dr Bergold: So do you think that if he had been found wounded at the time, he would have been immediately recognized as one of the leading men of the movement by his clothing?

Kempka: Yes.

dr Bergold: You said there was another gentleman walking next to Bormann or before him, namely a Herr Naumann from the Ministry of Propaganda?

Kempka: Yes. That was the former Secretary of State Dr. Nauman.

dr Bergold: Was it about the same height as the explosion?

Kempka: No, he was maybe a meter or two ahead of Martin Bormann.

dr Bergold: Did you see anything else from this State Secretary Naumann after that?

Kempka: I haven't seen anything more about it either, nor about the Standartenfuhrer Dr. Not Stumpfegger.

dr Bergold: Did you crawl back then?

Kempka: Yes.

dr Bergold: Didn't anyone else follow you?

Kempka: Yes. It's always been like this when you look... behind

If you went through this anti-tank barrier, you always got a strong defensive fire. A few stayed where they were and the rest kept coming back. I didn't see any more of those who were on the tank.

dr Bergold: High Court! I have no further questions for these witnesses.

Mr. Dodd: I have no questions, Mr. President!

President: Do the witness's defense attorneys want to ask any more questions?

(Turning to the witness.) How many tanks were in this column?

Kempka: I can't say that at the moment, there were maybe two or three, it could also have been four, but there were more PSW vehicles, armored personnel carriers.

Chairman: How many was there?

Kempka: Several always came and drove away again. They tried to break through there, there were maybe one or two, the others then got away again after the tank blew up.."

(The Chair's next three questions to Kempka are irrelevant.)

"President: Where did Bormann first ask you if it was possible to get through?

Kempka: That was at the anti-tank barrier behind the Friedrichstrasse station on the Weidendammer Bridge.

President: Do you mean that you met him on the street?

Kempka: Yes. Martin Bormann was not present when they left the Reich Chancellery, he only appeared there at the bridge between two and three o'clock in the morning.

President: You met him there by chance, do you think?

Kempka: I just met him there by accident, yes.

President: Was anyone with him?

Kempka: It was State Secretary Dr. Naumann from the Ministry of Propaganda with him, as did Dr. Stumpfegger, who was the last doctor to be present with the Führer.

President: How far were you from the Reich Chancellery?

Kempka: That is... are... until ... from the Reich Chancellery to Friedrichstrasse station maybe a quarter of an hour's walk under normal conditions."

"Chairman: And where were you with regard to Bormann?

Kempka: I was behind the tank, about to the left behind the tank.

Chairman: How far from Bormann?

Kempka: That was maybe three to four meters.

Chairman: And then a bullet hit the tank, is that right?

Kempka: No, I think the tank was hit by a bazooka from a window.

Chairman: And then you saw a flash of flame and wur
the passed out?

Kempka: Yes. I then suddenly saw a jet of flame and in a split second I also saw how Reichsleiter Bormann and State Secretary Naumann made a collapsing and flying movement. I myself was thrown away at the same moment and then lost consciousness.

President: And then you crawled away?

Kempka: When I came to, I couldn't see anything and then I crawled away and crawled until my head hit the anti-tank barrier.

President: And where did you go that night?

Kempka: I then waited there for a while, then said goodbye to my drivers, some of whom were still there, and then I... I stayed in the rubble of Berlin and then I was there the next day out of Berlin.

Chairman: Where were you captured?

Kempka: I was captured in Berchtesgaden.

Mr. Biddle: How far were you from the tank when
he exploded?

Kempka: I guess three to four meters.

dr Biddle: And how close was Bormann to the tank when it exploded?

Kempka: I assume he held onto it with one hand.

Mr. Biddle: Well, you say you accept that. Do you have him? seen or didn't you see him?

Kempka: I didn't see it on the tank itself. In order to keep up with the tank, I did the same and stopped at the back of the tank.

Mr. Biddle: Did you see Bormann trying to get on the tank before it exploded?

Kempka: No, I didn't see that, I didn't see any effort by Bormann to indicate that he wanted to mount the tank.

Mr. Biddle: How long before the explosion did you see Bormann?

Kempka: It all happened very quickly. While I was still talking to Bormann, the tanks arrived and we then immediately went through the tank barrier and after 30 to 40 meters the tank was hit.

Mr. Biddle: What do you mean, 'very briefly'?

Kempka: Yes ... during the conversation, it was only a few minutes maybe.

Mr. Biddle: And how long between the conversation and the explosion?

Kempka: I can't specify the time, but it certainly wasn't ... not a quarter of an hour, maybe not even half an hour, or rather.

Mr. Biddle: Were you at the Reich Chancellery shortly before?

Kempka: I'll be out of the Reich Chancellery around 9 o'clock in the evening."

(Further questions from Mr. Biddle to Kempka relate to previous interrogations on the same matter by US officers, etc.)

"Mr. Dodd: As a result of the Court's questioning, one or two questions have arisen which I believe should be put to the witness.

Chairman: Certainly.

Mr. Dodd: You were there at 9 o'clock that night
Bormann in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery?

Kempka: Yes, I saw him for the last time around 9 o'clock in the evening. When I was told by Dr. Goebbels, I also saw Martin Bormann down in the basement, and then I saw him at night, next, around 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. Dodd: Well, you may have said it before, but I didn't get it? Where did you see him at 2 or 3 am before you went with him with the tanks?

Kempka: I saw him before that at Friedrichstrasse station between 2 and 3 a.m. and before that I saw him for the last time at 9 p.m. in the Reich Chancellery.

Mr Dodd: I know that. Didn't you talk to Bormann about how you could escape from Berlin when you left the bunker in the Reich Chancellery around 9 p.m.?

Kempka: I received my orders from the then brigade commander Milunke, I no longer received any direct orders from Reichsleiter Bormann.

Mr. Dodd: I didn't ask you if you had an order from him. I asked you whether you and Bormann ... and who else was there, hadn't talked about how to get out of Berlin. It was 9pm and the situation was getting pretty desperate. Didn't you talk about escaping that night? There weren't many of you there.

Kempka: Yes, there were about 400 to 500 people in total in the Reich Chancellery, and these 400 to 500 people were divided into individual groups, and these groups then left the Reich Chancellery individually...

Mr. Dodd: Well, what I want to find out is: did you and Bormann and who else was in the bunker before you left the bunker talk about getting out of Berlin that night?

Kempka: I didn't talk to Reichsleiter Martin Bormann about it at the time. We had only one marching order to the effect that if we managed to report to Fehrbellin there would be a fighting force there that we should join.

Mr. Dodd: You're the only man who could testify that Hitler is dead, that Bormann is dead. Is that as far as you know?"

(Further questions relate to the circumstances surrounding Adolf Hitler's death.)

"Mr. Dodd: I guess I won't ask any more questions
Mister President.

dr Bergold: I don't have any further questions to ask either.

President: The witness can withdraw.

(The witness leaves the stand)." (104)

The State Secretary Dr. Naumann, who was in the immediate vicinity of Martin Bormann when the explosion occurred and who managed to flee to the West, said the following about Martin Bormann at the

Frankfurt public prosecutor's office on December 18, 1963: "The last impressions I had of Bormann weren't so much that he seemed exhausted

or desperate. Bormann wasn't hurt either... I don't know who went with Bormann. But I know that Herr Bormann was still alive at that moment. It must have been around three or four in the morning." (9)

Former SS-Sturmbannfuhrer (Major) Joachim Tiburtius, mentioned by Lew Besymenski (9), was also a witness to the events described above. From his report (105) we take the Swiss introductory and concluding comments and above all the passages in which he refers to Martin Bormann. The introductory words of the editors of the newspaper "Der Bund", Bern, which published Tiburtius' report, read:

"The revelations of Tiburtius are the first of their kind

shed some light on how Bormann could have escaped the fiery hell of the Reich Chancellery bunker. Tiburtius spent three years in American captivity.

His identity has been confirmed by the American Intelligence Service. He spoke calmly as he described the last hours of the Reich capital, but painted an impressive picture of this fiery hell. The rest of his unit, the SS Division Nordland, of which he was supply officer, would have fought on even after the Russians had surrounded it.

On May 2, at 2 a.m., 400 people banded together to break out of the Russian ring. Along with the men from his division, many of whom were said to have been wounded, there were men from the Spanish Blue Division, people from the Luftwaffe, the Bärenfanger Task Force and the survivors from Hitler's underground headquarters, including Bormann and some secretaries of the leader. Tiburtius said: 'The whole area was lit up as bright as day by the fire of the burning city...

So we left the small protection zone of the bunker" (the Reich Chancellery) "and went towards the Weidendammer Bridge. But as we crossed the bridge, the Russians opened fire from a barracks into which they had crept without our noticing. I ran to the left side of a tank for cover. Bormann, whom I had seen often in the past few days, was right behind me. SS General Ziegler, the commander of the 'Nordland Division' and also the leader of the breakout group, ran to the right side of the tank.

A few seconds later a 'bazooka' exploded on his side, knocking off his head and one leg.

I was now taking command of the breakout group, but there wasn't much left to command. Because as soon as the tanks realized they were being fired on, they rolled away, leaving us defenseless. The group was reduced to about forty people and Bormann was still at my side. I then lost sight of him for a while, but when I saw him later at the Hotel Atlas, he was already dressed in civilian clothes. We bumped into the shipbuilder

damm before, then I finally lost sight of Bormann.

But he had exactly the same chance of escaping as I did.

I went to Munich with six people in July 1945. The question of whether Bormann could still be alive is still one of the most debated issues in post-war Germany."

The final comment of the Schweizer Zeitung on this report reads, among other things:

"If Bormann is indeed still alive, his whereabouts have remained a closely guarded secret, although the German magazines take pleasure in reporting alternately that he is in North Africa, Spain, an Italian monastery, or aboard a mysterious one submarine." (105)

In 1964/65, Lew Besymenski compiled a list of eyewitnesses that became known through the press, who claim to have met Martin Bormann:

Year	witness or publication place	
1945		
May 10th	Luigi Sivestri	near Bozen
May 17th	unknown SS man	near Komotau
		(CSSR)
July 26	Heinrich Lienau	on the Hamburg-
or 27	"Welt am Sonntag"	Flensburg train
	October 2,	
1946	1960 Newspapers	US zone
		(Germany)
1947	Joseph Kleemann	Australia
	Ship Passengers	Egypt
	"Münchner Illustrated"	Spain
1950	"Kristenigt Dagblad"	Southwest Africa
	Copenhagen, April 24,	
	1950 "Reynolds News"	Southern Spain
	Karl Heinz Kaerner	Spanish-
		Morocco

1951	"Figaro" (Paris) West German and Austrian newspapers (Paul Hesslein) Die Furche June 21, 1951 Essener Kurier June 9, 1952 People's Voice July 15, 1962 Munich Illustrated November 7, 1957 Heilbronner Voice September 8, 1951 Freedom July 15, 1951 Munich Illustrated November	near the Rio Negro (Chile) Italy or Spain Argentina (submarine 29) Argentina Argentina
1956	7, 1957 Kurier April	Brazil
1960	30, 1956 "Telegraph" June 9, 1960	Borman of a doctor killed

Low Besymenski continuously added to the above compilation from the years 1964/65 and made it public in 1974 in his book "The Last Notes by Martin Bormann" (4). There is no need to take a closer look at the numerous press reports about Martin Bormann's appearance, primarily in the southern hemisphere, especially in the 'Nazi paradise of South America' (Besymenski). The series of these reports is interrupted by the statement by Goebbels' former adjutant, Prince zu Schaumburg-Lippe, who claims to have seen Martin Bormann in 1950 - according to Besymenski in Buchloe, according to other publications in Ulm. Requests for details on this went unanswered.

At the end of this list from the book "The Last Notes of Martin Bormann" (4) the author continues as follows:
"1971:

This was another 'Bormann year': the OKH

General and later head of the Federal Intelligence Service of the Federal Republic of Germany, Reinhard Gehlen, gives a new version in his memoirs: Bormann lives and hides in the Soviet Union because he was a 'Soviet agent'. This version was immediately picked up by the Springer press. But the sensation was quickly quashed: Gehlen had no evidence to support his claims. After Gehlen's interrogation by the Frankfurt public prosecutor, an official statement was published that Gehlen's version was completely unfounded. More than that: In McGovern's above-mentioned book one finds information according to which the same Gehlen, in response to an official inquiry from the CIA, reported that he knew nothing of an alleged stay of Bormann in the Soviet Union.

Various new publications appeared in connection with this scandal, from which it appears that Bormann was seen in Berlin in June 1945, that he fled to South America via South Tyrol and that he was allegedly buried in Berlin in 1945, but the graves have been opened there was not a single confirmation of this assertion (report from the Frankfurt public prosecutor's office). At the end of the year the examining magistrate Horst von Glasenapp (Frankfurt) declared that the investigations had not led to any clear results. There was no evidence that

Bormann died in 1945 is another proof of his escape."

We will come back to these statements by Lew Besymenski later.

Lev Besymenski's further question as to whether "the real paths of the fleeing Reichsleiter or his colleagues are being shrouded in smoke by the 'wisps' of the many reports on Martin Bormann's post-war fate" is understandable.

Because "the critical reader could of course have said long ago: wasn't the Bormann case conceived by a sensation-hungry press, and aren't the reports about it the result of the imagination of irresponsible journalists?" But such a verdict would be far more irresponsible, because the news doesn't just come from journalists. one among them

came from SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, who knew Bormann very well. In a radio interview on April 20, 1964, General Berger is said to have said: "In fact, I am firmly convinced that he (Bormann) did not die in Berlin. He went to the part of the world where it's easiest to disappear, South America." (4)

These statements by General Berger dated April 20, 1964 are contrasted with the written communications that he is said to have made, as was written to the author on October 22, 1979 by a credible source: "He" (General Berger) "died in 1975. He had the best sources of information imaginable. Before he died, he informed me that Martin Bormann had died a few years ago in a dacha in Moscow." Presumably, General Berger learned more in the years after 1964, which changed his statements about Bormann's whereabouts.

If the Soviet-Russian Bormann researcher Lew Besymenski has collected numerous reports reporting on Martin Bormann's appearance in many countries of the world except in the Soviet Union, the American Bormann researcher Ladislav Farago is more independent in this respect: He has in his collected reports, which largely coincide with those of Lew Besymenski, are also included (12): 1. "On June 12" (1945) "the '*New York Times*' reported on the basis of a report by the Soviet-controlled Berlin radio station, Martin Bormann was arrested, probably by the Russians."

2. "On August 2" (1945) "it became known *from London* that investigators had gathered 'secret evidence' that Martin Bormann might still be alive and a prisoner of the Russians."
3. "On September 1" (1945) "The '*New York Times*' reported Bormann's arrest by the Russians."

These three reports from the book by the American Ladislav Farago are supplemented by:

- a) "*Kärntner Nachrichten*" Klagenfurt of June 13, 1945:

"The Prague radio reports the arrest of the head of the

Reich Chancellery, Martin Bormann, who is on the list of war criminals..."

b) *"Kölnischer Kurier"* Cologne of June 16, 1945:

"Bormann too."

The Berlin broadcaster reports the arrest of the former head of the party chancellery, Martin Bormann..." c)

"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Zurich of June 17, 1945

"Bormann's arrest"

Moscow, June 16 ag (AFP) Radio Moscow reports the arrest of Martin Bormann, the former chief of the party chancellery. The Soviet broadcaster describes Bormann as the organizer of the attacks against Allied military personnel and against the representatives of the new German administration." d) *"National-Zeitung"*

Basel from June 18, 1945: *"Martin Bormann captured by the Russians"*

Moscow, June 17, ag (APF) Radio Moscow reports the arrest of Martin Bormann, the former head of the Reich Chancellery. He personally organized the terrorist network that currently exists in Germany. The Russian broadcaster describes Bormann as responsible for the attacks against Allied military personnel and against the representatives of the new German administration."

e) *"Aachener Nachrichten"* Aachen of

August 31, 1945:

"Martin Bormann is 45 years old, he was Reich leader of the NSDAP and head of the party chancellery, as well as a member of the Council of Ministers for the Reich Defense. In the SS and SA he held the rank of Obergruppenführer. Martin Borman was in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery until shortly before the fall of Berlin. After the Russians took Berlin, a rumor was spread that Bormann was dead. Later foreign newspapers reported that he was captured by the Russians."

The available press reports are incomplete insofar as apart from the Moscow Radio broadcast of June 16, 1945 and June 17, 1945, which incidentally was Martin Bormann's 45th birthday, and the broadcast of the Prager

Rundfunks from June 12th or 13th, 1945, no other publicly accessible report about the whereabouts of Martin Bormann from Eastern Europe has been known so far. It is quite conceivable that in the triumphant joy of those weeks every arrest of a person accused of war crimes, even if it had been reported by the Moscow state radio, was repeated in the Soviet press with the appropriate guise.

It is noteworthy that the three reports from New York and London and their supplements from Klagenfurt, Cologne, Zurich, Basel and Aachen drew their information 1. from the Soviet sphere of influence, and that 2. it is limited to the period between 12 June 1945 and September 1, 1945.

The flood of reports of Martin Bormann's appearance in all parts of the world except Eastern Europe, which began later and continued for years, encouraged the formation of legends foreseen by Martin Bormann's defense counsel at the Nuremberg trial.

The following chapter is dedicated to the formation of legends.

CHAPTER SEVENTEENTH

*dr Bergold requests that Bormann be declared dead - Court rejects - Grand plea Dr. Bergolds - He bows to the instructions of the court - Oracular words of Soviet General Rudenko about Bormann - Soviets do not yet know if they have him -
Lame Bormann manhunt in East Germany*

In the hearing before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg on June 29, 1946, defense counsel for Martin Bormann, Dr. Bergold, tries to prove his client's death by eyewitnesses, assuming that a deceased person can no longer be convicted (106).

In this hearing it was stated in detail: Dr. Bergold: "High Court! It's just that the last circumstances of the defendant Bormann's life are not very clear, and it is very necessary to hear all available witnesses, because only from the totality of the testimonies can one get the impression and the certainty that I strive for namely that the accused Bormann has already died."

Chairman: "That doesn't seem to matter very much; it doesn't matter if he's dead or alive. The question is whether he is guilty or innocent."

dr Bergold: "High Court! I am of the opinion that a sentence can no longer be passed against a dead person. This is also not provided for in the statute. In the statute, the court may only adjudicate against an absentee. But one cannot subsume a dead person against the legal term 'absent'. If the accused is dead, then the statute does not allow the case against him to proceed."

(A discussion ensued on procedural issues and on the admission or denial of the documents presented by the defense. [In particular pages 642 and 643 of IMT Volume XIV.]

dr Bergold: "I regret this extremely" (meaning the lack of evidence of the defense attorney), "that this evidence is not clear

and that the High Prosecutor's Office could no longer support me, because in this way the formation of legends is extraordinarily encouraged. A kind of false Demetrius, false Martin Bormanns, have already appeared, who address letters to me under the name of Martin Bormann, but which cannot come from him at all. I believe that it would have served the public as a whole and also the German people and the Allies if I had been able to provide the proof I had requested..." (107) About the content of these letters, about their Purpose and putative author and/or sender was never discussed, when interviewed in 1975, Dr.

Bergold that there must have been two or three letters with such clumsy omissions that he had given it no further thought. The former Reichsleiter Buch confirmed that these were forgeries because of his family connections (Martin Bormann's father-in-law). dr Bergold cannot remember whether he kept these letters or handed them over to the state archives.

if dr In his pleading of June 29, 1946, Bergold further explained that letters that reached him under the name of Martin Bormann could not have come from him at all, since "these letter writers are fraudulent people in need of recognition." he thought more about these connections than he is willing to share today. Finally, considering that these letters were written before the end of June 1946, i.e. within the first year after the war, at a time when millions of Germans were in Allied custody, which eliminated them from being letter writers on the Bormann case, while those who were not Germans in custody mostly had to struggle to earn their living - the black markets are only mentioned, the need for accommodation and clothing was part of it, so one wonders who from this group of people could have had the leisure under such living conditions to watch the course of the war crimes trials in Nuremberg to ver

follow, the name of the defense attorney Dr. To identify Bergold and to send letters to him?

The daily newspapers, which at the time were poor and only appeared sporadically due to a lack of paper, received scant information from the military tribunal in which the names of the defendants' defense lawyers were not named. How did these letter writers manage to find out the name of Martin Bormann's defense counsel? Who could possibly have been interested in interceding for the most hated man in the NSDAP ? His wife, Hildegard Bormann, née Buch, was seriously ill and operated on in a US military hospital in Meran, where she died on the day Dr. Bergold wanted to visit her for questioning. Their nine children were still minors at the time. The trail to these letter writers remains in the dark.

In the plea that Dr. Bergold on July 22, 1946 for Martin Bormann held, he explained among other things:

"Your lordship, my high judges! The case of the defendant Martin Bormann, which the High Court has ordered me to defend, is an unusual one. The defendant lived in the shadows when the National Socialist Reich still shone, he remained a shadow during this trial and in all probability dwells under the shadows, as the dead were called in antiquity. He is the only one of the accused who is not present against whom Article 12 of the Statute applies. It is as if history had wanted to preserve the continuity of the *genii loci* and wanted to see the problem discussed in Nuremberg, whether and to what extent the highest probability that a defendant died was a trial in *contumaciam* - in *absentia* - against stands in the way of such a man. A proverb has come down to us from the Middle Ages in Nuremberg that goes like this: 'The people of Nuremberg would not hang anyone unless they had him before'."

* In addition, Bormann's name was very little known outside the NSDAP, in fact completely unknown to most Germans. Bebenburg

At this point the presiding judge interrupted Dr. Bergolds as saying: "It seems to the

Tribunal that you wish to state, first, that this Tribunal has no authority to try the Defendant Bormann in absentia, and second, that it does so even if such a right existed, not appropriate..."

(This was followed by the reasoning of the President that Bormann should nevertheless be tried. Furthermore, the Tribunal was not ready to hear a discussion of the revision of its decision now and was also not inclined to reverse its decision. Dr. Bergold complained about the poor translation, whereupon the chairman spoke more slowly.

Another controversy between the chairman and Dr. Bergold came when Dr. Bergold insisted that Kempka's testimony made Bormann's probability of death evident and that he wanted to make a plea.

He was forbidden to do so by the President: "I said that the Tribunal does not want to hear the text from pages 1 to 10... If you want to start on page 10 with the words: 'I can't' — it's the last paragraph on page 10 — the Tribunal will hear you.)

Dr. Bergold: "I must agree to this decision ... In my opinion, it has not been proven in any way that the accused intentionally stayed away from the proceedings.

In my opinion, the questioning of the witness Kempka has clarified with the highest probability that the accused Bormann is dead... Even if Bormann had not been killed on this occasion, he would certainly have been injured so badly that that it would no longer have been possible for him to escape. But then it would have definitely fallen into the hands of the USSR troops, who, according to the affidavit of the witness Krüger, were already very close to the Reich Chancellery and had already occupied it on May 2, 1945 because the crew had fled. Of course, the USSR would have Bormann

Loyalty with which she takes part in these proceedings, handed over to the High Court to answer.

Since there are only two possibilities, at least in my opinion, of which the first, namely that Bormann fell wounded into the hands of the USSR, has proved not to have occurred, only the second possibility can have been suitable, namely that Bormann lost his life... The character of Bormann and his activities have remained obscure throughout this long trial, in which the defendant kept himself in the dark out of character predisposition. But no one knows what the defendant Bormann thinks Men could have replied if he had been present. He might have been able to show that his ...

entire activity was not responsible for the events dealt with by the prosecution, and that he also did not have the influence that is attributed to him as the secretary of the Führer and the party. It is a well-known experience throughout the world that

Secretaries and directors of central offices, like the princely valet of absolutism, have always been credited with having a considerable influence over their superiors and masters, because in the nature of things everything has to go through the hands of such a secretary that can only be dealt with in an office-like manner can. But what can escape the juggernaut of bureaucracy in a modern state? ..."

President: "The Court adjourns."

(The court adjourned until 2 p.m.)

dr Bergold: "These employees and subordinates, no matter how high their rank may have been, some of whom may even have feared the head of the party chancellery, perhaps for reasons that lay solely in their person and their mistakes, are these people not suited to enlighten us as to which of the two alternatives is the correct one. As long as Bormann himself does not appear and can be heard, Bormann's true role is always shrouded in twilight.

No one, not even the High Court, will be able to make a sure judgment. The facts as a whole remain doubtful...

It is characteristic of the Bormann case that there is no evidence that he himself had taken measures against the Jews. He only ever passed on, brought to the attention of, or otherwise published such orders as was prescribed by law and as was the result of his office-related position as party secretary. Even the major meeting of November 12, 1938, which took place under the chairmanship of Mr. Göring and from which a number of laws against the Jews emerged, is only connected with Bormann's person to the extent that Bormann gave Mr. Göring Hitler's order to holding such a meeting. In any case, it is not at all clear what influence Bormann himself had in these questions. But how is a fair court supposed to come to a judgment on the amount of an appropriate sentence if the share, if the participation of an individual accused in a crime has not been clarified?

No one can then say that the facts are not in doubt...

It is certainly true that Bormann was a vehement opponent of Christian doctrine, both philosophically and in terms of attitude. But such a mental attitude is neither a guilt nor a crime in front of the whole of mankind, which worships so many different views of the world and the higher connections and perhaps will produce many more. In modern times there are many staunch atheists. There are also legitimate organizations in other countries around the world that fight against the Christian form of world interpretation, and at the turn of the century there were large associations in many countries that openly rejected pure materialism as a philosophical system and the denial of spiritual facts had written their banner. No one can be punished for wanting to teach the tenets of his worldview to third parties and convert others to his point of view. The modern world still knows the shudder before the Inquisition. (Speech by author)
Bormann could therefore only be punished if he was denied participation in a real religious event

consequence and not only proven by an ideological struggle...

The quintessence of Document D-75 can be found in the sentence: It must be concluded from the incompatibility of National Socialist and Christian views that the party should reject any strengthening of existing Christian denominations and any promotion of emerging Christian denominations. It is immaterial which compelling justifications Bormann uses to reach such a conclusion in his letter. It goes without saying that failure to strengthen a philosophically contested religious view does not constitute religious persecution. No one is obliged to promote any religious belief...

It is also important that this document has only come down to us in a copy made by a Protestant priest named Eichholz. It has therefore not been proven at all whether the content of Bormann's statements is reproduced completely correctly by the document. In any case, the document does not constitute real evidence in this form ...

The remaining evidence documents do not reveal any real persecution measures either. That Bormann, on Hitler's orders, forbade the admission of priests or members of certain religious organizations into the party, that on Hitler's orders he forbade the appointment of priests to leading positions in the party for the purpose of preventing discord no persecution of religion...

The fact that during the war he demanded that the church make the same monetary sacrifices as the other state institutions does not represent a criminal measure for religious reasons to make better use of the nation, has also closed down ecclesiastical institutes, that within the framework of limiting the circulation figures and the number of pages of secular periodicals, he also wanted to see ecclesiastical periodicals restricted, does not fall under paragraph 6c of the statute ...

All documents show that Bormann always contacted the Be

Moods that were legally effective, so that he, who was so eager to obey Hitler's orders, certainly observed Hitler's decree, which ordered at the beginning of the war that all measures against the churches are to be adjusted.

In conclusion it can therefore be said that in this area, in spite of the many documents submitted, no real clarity could be gained. Documents alone are not sufficient to remove any doubt about the facts.

Bormann's personal responsibility appears to be necessary, especially in relation to the importance and the preponderance of Bormann's involvement in measures that persecute the Church. So this fact remains shrouded in a certain darkness. The basis for a fair assessment of the amount of punishment cannot be gained ...

I think the evidence I have now given is sufficient to show that even the documents presented by the prosecution prove with certainty only one thing, that Bormann, 'as the law directed', when Head of the Party Chancellery was involved in the office-like, secretary-like dealings between the top of the Reich and the subordinate offices and in the dealings between these subordinate offices.

Everything else is conjecture that has not been clearly proven... Unfortunately, legends have already spun around the figure of Bormann, his work and his continued existence. For the sober view of the lawyer, however, legends are not a fully valid basis for a safe, unequivocal judgement.

In view of the novelty created by the Statute in the legal history of all times and peoples, to let a final and irreversible judgment be passed on an absent accused, I therefore ask the High Court to now once again exercise its right to conduct such a procedure, only with due regard of previous legal opinions and, in particular, when examining them, to consider the requirements that Russian law has expressed in a particularly precise way.

I therefore expressly move that the High Court should decide either to stay the trial against Bormann on the ground of proven death or to stay the trial against the Defendant Bormann pending his personal examination and justification and from exercising his right under paragraph 12 to see." (108)

This plea is instructive in several respects.

It lets you feel the atmosphere in which winner and judge spoke "justice" in personal union, creating more than a legal novelty against which there was no appeal and which Martin Bormann's defense attorney Dr. Bergold had to bend. Dr Bergold was wrong, however, when he thought that Martin Bormann, the secretary of the Führer and the party, was said to have had an influence which he did not possess. However, the extent of this influence was much less known then than it is today. The statements of Dr. Bergold's comments that the USSR, "with the loyalty with which it has taken part in these proceedings," would have committed Martin Bormann to the High Court if he had fallen into their hands were. Incidentally, reference is made to the first chapter, in which, according to the Daily Telegraph and Die Welt, it is stated that Stalin himself told the former Czechoslovak President, Dr. Eduard Benesch, that Martin Bormann had been spying for the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Dr. Benes once said to the Czech General Bartik: "If Bormann is still alive, he will never be executed. He was one of Stalin's spies. Stalin himself told me that." (17)

A large part of the plea deals with Martin Bormann's position on the Church, which has been judged to be impeccable in legal and factual terms. His inhumane orders for the treatment of prisoners of war are played down. On July 29, 1946, the chief prosecutor for the Soviet Union, General Rudenko, summarized Martin Bormann's work, which was discussed in the previous chapters. The sentence: "Under his leadership, the NSDAP transformed into a police organization, whereby it was closely related to the

German secret police and the SS worked together" deserves to be emphasized.

In addition to the official Nuremberg trial reports, there are also the "Nuremberg diary notes" by Dr. v. Lip before (109). The author reports on June 29, 1946: "Presumably following a remark by the

Russian chief prosecutor" (General Rudenko) "'One does not yet know whether Bormann is dead, one only knows that he is absent from the dock', the rumor spread today that the Russians would bring the living Bormann to justice!"

These statements by the Soviet chief prosecutor, General Rudenko, are supplemented by the report by the Americans Dennet and Johnson: "With the Russians at the negotiating table":

"Most of all they" (the Soviets) "seemed interested in the indictment of important Nazis in their hands. But for a long time the Soviet delegation did not know which important Nazis were in Russian hands. So it was generally assumed that Bormann, whom all delegations wanted to see accountable, was among their prisoners. Eventually, the Russians (more correctly, the Soviet delegation) learned "that was not the case. You couldn't find him anywhere else. He was included in the final list, but as he was not found he was convicted in absentia." (110)

From another account by Joe J. Heydecker and Johannes Leeb, "The Nuremberg Trial," we learn:

"Even during the London conference in preparation for the Nuremberg Trial (1945) says (examining magistrate)

Jackson at the negotiating table: *'The only thing missing is Bormann, but we know the Russians have him.'* General Nikitschenko replies: *'Unfortunately we don't have him at the moment.'* The Court therefore felt compelled later to issue public notices asking Martin Bormann to come forward. For four weeks the call will be read out on all radio stations in the four occupation zones of Germany.

200,000 posters with Bormann's name are posted, all newspapers publish the appeal several times, in the bri

In the table zone alone, the notice is distributed in almost five million copies. It's wasted effort. Bormann does not answer. His place in the Nuremberg dock remains empty." (111)

In his book on "The German Soviet Zone to Today" by J. Peter Nettl (112), the author comments on the prosecution of war criminals as follows: "For example, war criminals,

National Socialists and militarists were not put on search lists as in the West systematically tracked down. The activities of the 'Central Registry for War Criminals and Security Suspects' (CROWCASS) did not extend to the Soviet zone, although the Russians included the names of the persons they were looking for in the lists of the West..."

According to Denet and Johnson, "With the Russians at the Negotiating Table", "it was generally assumed that Bormann was among their prisoners", i.e. therefore in Soviet custody, while "generally assumed" could only mean the three western negotiating partners. They, in turn, could have gleaned their information about Martin Bormann's whereabouts from their press, which had announced the Moscow radio report on Martin Bormann's arrest on June 16, 1945. This Moscow radio report went around the world, was repeated in almost the entire world press and was never denied. In those days and weeks the news rushed; this message seems to have been forgotten. Apart from Ladislav Farago, no Bormann researcher has reported on it. Just as Farago determined this important newspaper report and published it in his book "Scheintot" (12), other Bormann researchers could have acted accordingly. Why didn't they?

This general assumption of the three Western Allies about Martin Bormann's stay with the Soviet Russians is corroborated by the words of the examining magistrate Jackson in London (1945): "We only need Martin Bormann, but we heard that the Russians have him." Whence this knowledge of Jackson

is not recorded, but it is obvious that the Moscow radio report of June 16, 1945 was also the source here.

The words: "One does not yet know whether Bormann is dead, one only knows that he is absent from the dock" (General Rudenko) or: "Unfortunately we do not have him at the moment." (General Nikitschenko) and later the final declaration that Martin Bormann was not "owned" after all were not clear denials that would have made this case particularly conspicuous, but rather served to slowly let a "glitch" seep away, as is occasionally the case today hears.

The manhunt for Martin Bormann was carried out only lamely. Albert Bormann, his brother, once Adolf Hitler's adjutant, believed that his brother Martin was still alive: "Although he had received no sign of life from the brother, he believes that he is in the hands of the Soviets because they are eager for it all Nazi greats, just oddly enough never even looked for (Martin) Bormann." (10)

Hand in hand with the lax manhunt for Martin Bormann goes a report on the Soviets' disinterest in the missing Martin Bormann. In an essay: "Martin Bormann — Stalin's Gauleiter" (113) in the Munich "Echo der Woche", Harry Wilde quotes the statements made by Hans Fritzsche, the well-known former Nazi radio commentator in Soviet custody:

"Of all the reports about the deaths of well-known people in the collapse in Berlin, the report about Bormann's death seems to me to be the least proven. I only found out about all these things much later. But they were not enough to blur the impression that a surprising fact made on me in May 1945: I was never asked by the Russians about Bormann's fate.

In numerous interrogations I was asked questions about the whereabouts of leading men of the Third Reich. Even when I emphasized that I did not know this or that person personally or that I had never seen him, people persistently searched for my supposed knowledge of his fate. only woman

I was never given any indication of Bormann's way out of the Reich Chancellery when the Russians approached.

This gap in the otherwise complete interrogation struck me as early as the excitement and shock of the first week of my imprisonment. I therefore directed the chain of questions and answers to my last encounter with Bormann. It took place on the evening of May 1, 1945 in the destroyed Reich Chancellery, shortly before the start of his attempt to break out.

The Russians listened to this, but didn't ask any more questions. I mentioned that Bormann had first contacted me through State Secretary Dr. Naumann from the Ministry of Propaganda and then directly promised the dissolution of the Werwolf, which I had requested.

You didn't react to it.

I let slip in that Bormann, who at that moment was still wearing the SS uniform with all the insignia of rank... expressly annulled all orders issued for the 'werewolf'.

No one even asked who was there. The subject of Bormann seemed so remarkably uninteresting that, given the situation at the time, I said to myself that the Russians knew everything there was to know about the case. Inevitably, the assumption arose that they could have put their questions to Bormann himself. But that's a guess." (113)

Regarding these words of Fritzsche's, Harry Wilde comments in the "Echo der Woche": "Fritzsche's statement is to be regarded as decisive evidence that Bormann is still alive."

CHAPTER EIGHTEENTH

US judge: Bormann was a Soviet agent — Soviet officer Wassilew sky saw Bormann and reports — Kurt Singer-USA: Bormann leader of the Red Orchestra

In 1948, Walter Rapp, the American head of the investigative department of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, published a short memo, which also contained the bill of indictment against Generaloberst Dr. Lothar Rendulic wrote. Walter Rapp said he had proof that Bormann, who had become absolute ruler in the party chancellery after Rudolf Hess' flight to England, had long cooperated with the Soviets and deceived Hitler. The German army and the German administration made so many mistakes in the Russian campaign because Bormann kept giving Hitler wrong information. (114)

There was also an official American voice that described Martin Bormann as a Soviet agent, but without presenting the evidence for this.

But where was Martin Bormann now, if he really was still alive? The "Encyclopaedia Judaica" only writes: "His exact whereabouts after the war remained unknown ..."

(His exact whereabouts after the war remained unknown.) (115)

Wassilij Wassilewsky, a Soviet defector, gives the answer in the "Marburger Presse" of March 12, 1949 with the following introductory words from the editors: "The following report was

penned by a senior Soviet officer from Army Group Zhukov, who recently in fled west. The author saw Bormann behind the Soviet lines and assured that his Ge

The complete account is based on authentic material that was only accessible to him in his capacity as a political officer in the Red Army. We are therefore able to bring precise details about Martin Bormann's secret for the first time."

Wassilij Wassilewsky reports:

"In the last few weeks, assumptions and rumors about the former German Reichsleiter Martin Bormann have been published in Western European newspapers and news agencies. Bormann is said to have been seen in Spain, in Argentina, even in Moscow. A German newspaper even claims to have received a letter from him. Since the Nuremberg trial, in which Bormann was sentenced to death in absentia as the main culprit, the rumors about his probable fate have not stopped; over time, legends formed about the highest leader of the NSDAP after Hitler. It is therefore time to finally tear down the veil of mystery surrounding Martin Bormann.

In February 1947, the head of the political department of a Soviet Guards division, Colonel Korsakov, explained the reasons for the Russian victory over Germany in a speech to senior Red Army officers. Korsakov, who has excellent information from the Kremlin through his brother, explained in the He continued his remarks that 'a leading politician of the NSDAP and a personal friend of Hitler' had supported the Soviet Union's fight against Hitler's Germany 'to the victorious end'. This hint finds a curious explanation in the handling of Russian war propaganda. Since Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, the Politburo's press and radio have not only stormed against the greats of the Third Reich, but also against personalities such as Axmann, Dr. Todt, etc., who belonged to the second set. The unbiased observer must have been all the more struck by the fact that the name of the German Reichsleiter Martin Bormann was neither mentioned nor attacked, and was even hushed up.

The question therefore arises: Who was Martin Bormann,

and what role did he play in the crucial phase of the war between Hitler and Stalin? It is known that even before the war Bormann was one of the party's extremists and opponents of the Church and Christianity. For a long time, however, he was overshadowed by Hess, whose chief of staff he was, until the beginning of the war he was appointed liaison between the party and the Führer's headquarters.

After Rudolf Hess flew to England in 1941, the way was clear for Bormann. As head of the party chancellery, he became the highest leader of the NSDAP after Hitler. Through skilful anti-chambring, coupled with ruthlessness and considerable political ambition, Bormann was able to win important key positions in the Reich Chancellery and the Presidential Chancellery.

But he wanted more. Thanks to his vitality and psychological empathy, he quickly became Hitler's intimate confidant and adviser. He quickly moved up into the ranks of the 'Big Five' who vied for Hitler's favor. But while Ribbentrop, Göring and Goebbels fell behind in this race towards the end of 1944, and Himmler was appointed leader of Army Group 'Vistula', Bormann was able to further consolidate his position of power in Berlin and his influence on Hitler: he became the 'grey Eminence' of the German dictator.

This man was the Kremlin's ace of cards, the 'leading politician of the NSDAP and personal friend of Hitler' in Berlin, who supported the Soviet Union's struggle 'to the victorious end'. It remains a mystery when and how Bormann got in touch with the Kremlin. Perhaps his emphatically anti-church attitude in the party favored a rapprochement with Moscow even before the war. Perhaps it was only during the war that the Politburo agents won him over to their side. It remains a mystery how Bormann maintained contact with Moscow after the Soviet ambassador was recalled in Berlin in 1941, what intermediaries he used and what orders he received from the Soviet government.

What is certain, however, is that the X-day for triggering Plan Barbarossa (the German General Staff's plan of attack on the Soviet Union), which Hitler set for June 22, was already known in Moscow on June 15, 1941.

What is certain is that certain operative plans of the German 6th Army in the Stalingrad area were passed into the hands of the Soviet High Command.

It is also certain that Bormann, on the instructions of the Kremlin, as Hitler's advisor, exercised a decisive influence on the German conduct of the war, in particular the operations of the Kurland front. At the end of July 1944, Army Group North, consisting of 23 divisions of the 16th and 18th armies, was cut off from its rear connections by a pincer operation by the Russian army groups Rokossowsky and Bagramjan. At the beginning of 1945, the German General Staff, Generaloberst Guderian, proposed to evacuate the German troops by water in order to reinforce the 3rd and 9th Armies stationed in Pomerania and to drive the Red Army back out of Germany in a vigorous counter-offensive. Admiral Dönitz supported Guderian's proposals and offered to return the almost 500,000-strong army group via the Courland ports of Windau and Libau within four weeks.

Despite the OKW's urging, Hitler could not be persuaded of the strategic necessity of this evacuation and merely ordered the withdrawal of one division. He believed that the remaining 22 divisions would tie down as many Russian divisions and that the (weak) 3rd and 9th Armies themselves were strong enough to carry out a major offensive on the Oder. In these considerations, Hitler was most strongly influenced by Bormann, who for his part had long been in sharp opposition to Guderian. The Guderian-Bormann duel behind the scenes at the Führer's headquarters ended in Bormann's complete victory.

Guderian was appointed Chief of the General Staff at the end of March 1945, replaced and replaced by General Krebs, a friend of Bormann's, he

puts. The 16th and 18th Armies remained in Courland; Bormann had played a very big trump card into the hands of the Soviet high command. For now came what was inevitable: the weak Pomeranian and Oder fronts collapsed, the Kurland armies were taken prisoner, and the Russian army groups Zhukov and Konev quickly advanced on Berlin.

The end of the war was within reach.

In a meeting on April 22, 1945 in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery, Hitler declared the war lost. Along with Goebbels and General Krebs, Bormann declared his willingness to stay with Hitler to the end. But while all the other characters were in a decidedly doomsday mood, Bormann displayed the same self-confident, arrogant attitude to the end. As late as April 27, 1945, he declared 'that the war would soon be over in victory'. At the time, nobody paid attention to the double meaning of these words." (See also Chapter 15, Rittmeister Boldt.)

"Then the end came. On April 30, 1945, Hitler and Eva Braun committed suicide in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery; a day later, just before Russian stormtroopers entered, Goebbels, Krebs and others followed them to their deaths. But where was Bormann? Shortly after Hitler's death, Bormann left the Reich Chancellery and went behind Russian lines.

The writer of this article saw Bormann in the car of a Russian officer on the afternoon of April 30, after being rushed from Berlin to Potsdam.

However, the car collided with a German motor vehicle near Potsdam. Bormann was slightly injured.

When a group of Soviet officers—among them the author of the article—recognized the injured civilian as Hitler's chief of staff, the officers were ordered to maintain the strictest silence. After the accident, Bormann was transferred to a Soviet military hospital. Since then there has been no trace of him.

On April 30, 1945, the day Bormann fled from Ber

lin, the head of the Soviet secret service, Beria, arrived in Potsdam from Moscow. He will be able to answer where Bormann is." (116 and 117)

What is striking about Wassilewsky's report is the date — April 30, 1945 — which does not coincide with the generally known and attested date of the breakout from the Reich Chancellery bunker, the night of May 1-2, 1945.

On April 30, 1945, in the afternoon, Adolf Hitler took his own life together with Eva Braun. The corpses were then cremated. Therefore, Martin Bormann could not have been seen by Wassilewsky in a Russian officer's car at this time. There must be an error on the part of the author or the editors on this point, since the numerous and essential facts in the report indicate expert knowledge.

Unanswered questions for the reporter, such as how Martin Bormann first made contact with the Soviets, among other things, can be answered with a high degree of probability based on current knowledge.

A few years after Walter Rapp's information about Martin Bormann (1948) and Wassilij Wassilewsky's report (1949), the Swiss edition of Kurt Singer's book "The Greatest Spies in the World" was published in 1954. Here Singer writes:

"An organization called the 'Red Orchestra' functioned throughout Europe during and before the war. The principle of this organization was to let high-ranking Nazis work for the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the Russians succeeded in making individuals within Hitler's staff serve their purposes. There are millions in Germany today who are convinced that the real leader of the so-called 'Red Orchestra' was Hitler's intimate, Martin Bormann, the only high Nazi leader who has not yet been found..." (118)

It is left to the reader to get an idea of the life and work of Martin Bormann in his epoch. His "political homeland" lay more in the East than in the "decadent West".

"Bormann was Saxon, as is Walter Ulbricht," she wrote

"Southeast Daily Mail". "One should not underestimate the devious determination of this highly intelligent German tribe." (119)

These sporadic reports that Martin Bormann did not die in the escape from the Reich Chancellery bunker after all, but was alive and in the hands of the Soviets, were revived when the former head of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), General Reinhard Gehlen, published his wartime and post-war memoirs ("Der Dienst").

This put an end to the numerous "wisps about Bormann".

CHAPTER NINETEENTH

*General Gehlen's memoirs arouse right-wing and left-wing public
- Israeli intelligence chief is factual - Gehlen's statement about
Bormann - General Praun supports Gehlen's statement about
Bormann's transmitter - Bernd Ruland's anonymous news
assistants - Angelika v. Parchim's peculiar name*

General Gehlen's statements about Martin Bormann in his memoirs "Der Dienst" (21) are characterized by restrained objectivity. Their content seems to be of considerable importance, as a strikingly large propaganda apparatus was set in motion to "crack the Gehlen myth". The German edition of the book "Der Dienst" had not yet appeared, and primitive anti-Gehlen posters were already being put up in West German universities, which the students mostly met with indifference, occasionally also with interest.

Hardly any attempt has been made to give an objective assessment of this book. In essence, leftist tendencies were the common thread running through such public discussions. These tendencies were also adopted by radio and above all by television. W. Hertz-Eichenrode wrote about this in Die Welt (121):

"Even the reactions to the announcement of Reinhard Gehlen's memoirs made it clear that the name of General a. D. is an emotive word for some commentators. It seems to be more an irritation of the political faith than of the mind. This is easy to explain: Gehlen was not only an unusually successful head of the secret service, he also enlightened in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This is what irritates anyone who cannot conceive of peace other than as change through rapprochement with the communists.

The effect of the emotive word 'Gehlen' must be intense if intelligent people suddenly start chattering about things

who they don't even know. For example, on Monday evening in the ARD magazine 'Report' the British journalist Sefton Delmer honestly admitted that he had 'no idea about the Gehlen organization in Russia'. Nevertheless, he thinks he knows that after the Second World War Gehlen's informants could only have been bad. Anyone who listened to this in front of the television screen was no longer interested in Sefton Delmer's verdict on Gehlen's report that Reichsleiter Martin Bormann was a Soviet spy at the Führer's headquarters and had died a few years ago in Russia.

Perhaps television audiences would have been interested to know that in 1952 it was Sefton Delmer who, with his article in the Daily Express 'Hitler's General Now Spies for Dollars', unleashed a spate of disapproving publications about the 'Gehlen Organisation' had.

Another example. Before a single line of Gehlen's memoirs was published, Dieter Gütt happily commented on August 7, 1971 on the first television program. He dealt with The General in the Twilight, referring to the memoirs: although he knew his subject so well that he could not even correctly quote the title of the book. He quickly had a stab in the back legend ready.

For what else could Gehlen's statement about the spy Bormann mean than 'Betrayal of the Führer and the Reich led Germany to defeat'. It's so wonderful to comment when you're talking about something you don't know.

More knowledgeable and experienced people, such as former Israeli intelligence chief Isser-Harel, remain cooler. Isser-Harel Monday evening in the 'Report' on Gehlen's communication about Bormann: 'I am of the opinion that Gehlen is competent.' However, he distinguished between information and proven facts. His conclusion: Gehlen's disclosure about Bormann was very important: one only had to make an effort to verify it. The case is so clear for anyone who does not force the emotive word 'Gehlen' to put the reason under the emotion."

The reason for this one-sided and tendentious reporting

The reason for this was certainly the counter-intelligence chief's anti-Communist attitude, which he expressed clearly and very matter-of-factly, as well as the revelations about Martin Bormann, which we will now turn to.

Even years after the publication of this book, portions of these revelations are distorted or presented out of context, presenting a distorted, untrue picture to the casual reader. This intention is also based on the numerous false reports about Martin Bormann since he broke out of the Reich Chancellery.

In principle, General Gehlen's statement about Martin Bormann contained little that was new. In Chapter 18 and elsewhere in this work, sources are mentioned that were known before Gehlen's statements and according to which Martin Bormann was in Soviet custody or a Soviet agent. This information was only known to smaller circles and was forgotten, as was the repeatedly quoted Moscow radio report of June 16, 1945 (Chapter 16). Nobody had raised their voice against these reports. But when the former head of the Federal Intelligence Service, General Gehlen, broke his silence and even revealed the agent activities of the former Reichsleiter and intimate Adolf Hitler beyond what was previously known about Martin Bormann - as far as a secret service chief is at all possible, then unison broke a storm of protests broke out, which was gently initiated by the Soviet side, continued by the left-wing and liberal press and even by former National Socialists in the style of Goebbels propaganda. As a side note, they were marching together again, the Reds and the Browns, as they did when Poland was partitioned in September 1939.

To clear up any ambiguity, the wording of General Gehlen's statements in connection with Martin Bormann is now reproduced in full: "In a lengthy conversation, Canaris

and I came to the conclusion that the Soviets in the German top leadership must have a well-oriented source of information at their disposal. We have repeatedly found, independently of one another, that

the enemy was briefed in detail in a very short time on events and considerations that were being made on the German side at the top.

At this point I want to break my long silence about a secret which — guarded most carefully by the Soviet side — holds the key to one of the most puzzling cases of our century. It is the fateful role played by Hitler's closest confidante, Martin Bormann, in the last years of the war and afterwards.

As the Soviets' most prominent informant and adviser, he worked for the enemy right from the start of the Russian campaign. Independently of each other we established the fact that Bormann had the only uncontrolled radio station. We agreed that a targeted attempt to surveil what was next to Hitler's most powerful man in the National Socialist hierarchy was all but out of the question at this point. Any carelessness would have meant the end of the investigation and our end as well.

Canaris described to me his suspicions, conjectures and statements about the motives behind Bormann's traitorous activity. He did not rule out the possibility of blackmailing Bormann, but saw the more likely motives in the Reichsleiter's unrestrained ambitions to one day assume Hitler's position, which were based on excessive ambition and complexes towards those around him and were ultimately unsatisfied. It is now well known how skilfully Bormann alternately discredited his great rivals Goering and Goebbels with Hitler.

My own findings could only begin after 1946 when I had the opportunity to investigate the mysterious circumstances of Bormann's escape from Hitler's bunker in Berlin and his disappearance. The claims repeatedly made in the international press that Bormann lives in the impenetrable jungle between Paraguay and Argentina, surrounded by heavily armed bodyguards, are unfounded. Two pieces of reliable information in the 1950s assured me that Martin Bor

man lived perfectly secluded in the Soviet Union. The former Reichsleiter had defected to the Soviets when Berlin was occupied by the Red Army and has since died in Russia." ("The Ministry," pp. 47-49)

Lew Besymenski presents General Gehlen's clear statements differently. As already quoted in chapter 16, he claims in detail: 1. "that Gehlen

gave a new version in his memoirs
have",

2. according to which "Bormann is
alive" and 3. "is hiding in the Soviet Union since he was a 'Soviet
agent'", 4.

"Gehlen has no evidence for his statements", 5. "After
Gehlen's interrogation a statement was published by the Frankfurt
public prosecutor's office that Gehlen's version was completely
unfounded", 6. "in McGovern's ... book one finds
information where according to the same Gehlen, in response to an
official request from the CIA, reported that he nothing is known
about an alleged stay of Bormann in the Soviet Union".

The following can be countered to these assertions by Besymenski:
1.

General Gehlen did not give a new version, since it was publicly stated
before the publication of his memoirs that Martin Bormann was a
Soviet agent.

In Chapter 18, compare the statement by the US investigating
judge Walter Rapp from 1948, where Martin Bormann was a
Soviet agent, and in the same chapter the further statement by
the American Kurt Singer from 1954 about Martin Bormann in the
same sense.

2. Gehlen did not write in his memoirs that "Bormann is alive" but "that
the former Reichsleiter has meanwhile died in Russia".

3. Besymenski: "Bormann is hiding in the Soviet Union"; Gehlen: "that
he lived perfectly shielded in the Soviet Union", ie that he was
shielded and not himself

has "hidden". Besymenski's presentation looks like an unsuccessful glossing.

4. When Besymenski, as a former Soviet counter-intelligence officer, writes that "Gehlen has no evidence for his statements", then this sentence is deliberately formulated in a provocative manner and is intended for the uninformed and for the faint of heart. This ball was promptly picked up by the press in his direction; It was written scornfully: "Gehlen cannot name his sources", combined with malicious remarks of a subjective nature, since there was nothing to be said against it. Even a simple consideration leads to the realization that an intelligence chief would never reveal such sources or informants; Not because he can't, but because he mustn't. We don't know from which channels Gehlen obtained his "two reliable pieces of information" at the time. To name such people publicly, in this case even officially, who might have been able to provide further information, which might still be the case, would be absurd and at the same time her death sentence.
5. General Gehlen was only interrogated verbally; there was no testimony under oath. It was therefore easy for the Frankfurt public prosecutor's office to "publish an official statement that Gehlen's version was completely unfounded". The wording of this declaration was the only way for the Kremlin to continue to protect its state secret about Martin Bormann.

If General Gehlen had unmasked his informants and sources of information and thereby exposed Martin Bormann to the world public with conclusive evidence as the Soviet agent in the closest circle around Adolf Hitler, then the glory of the Red Army, which was portrayed as invincible, would have been extinguished. If Adolf Hitler's intimate and right hand man, as a Soviet agent in the Führer's headquarters, committed comprehensive acts of treason, then it was easy for Stalin to achieve final victory.

To keep this secret about Martin Bormann
or to accumulate, sympathizing writers are enga

eager to become active. A clear example of disinformation in this matter is provided by Bernd Ruland, former sergeant in the Army High Command, Dept. Army Communications, in his book *Die Augen Moscov* (122): "The most adventurous answer to the question

who was the great traitor was in Berlin, Reinhard Gehlen, from 1942 to 1945 chief of the department "Foreign Armies Ostf

in his memoirs."

With the words of Gehlen "I want my long silence at this point ...", Ruland allows General Gehlen to speak until Bormann had the only uncontrolled radio station at his disposal." Ruland does not cite Gehlen's reasoning that no monitoring of Bormann's radio station was carried out, nor Admiral Canaris' suspicions, assumptions and statements, which General Gehlen lists, that Gehlen also discussed this pertinent set of questions together with Canaris . Above all, Ruland does not quote the first paragraph in Gehlen's memoirs (p. 47, below), which introduces this matter and from which the cooperation with Admiral Canaris is illuminated. The words are quoted again because of their meaning: "In a lengthy conversation, Canaris and I came to the conclusion that the Soviets must have a well-informed source of information in the German top leadership. We repeatedly found,

independently of one another, that the enemy was informed in detail in a very short time about events and considerations that were being made on the German side at the top."

Ruland reproduces the last two sentences in Gehlen's memoirs in full. Regarding Gehlen's sentence: "Independently of one another, we ascertained the fact that Bormann had the only uncontrolled radio station," Ruland remarks (122):

"Assume that Bormann has other information channels to the Kremlin - perhaps via a transmitter in the Führer's headquarters

animal or even by couriers — is absurd. Not only is there not the slightest hint of such a possibility; it also belongs to the realm of speculation because there was no transmitter in Hitler's headquarters available to the 'Secretary of the Fuehrer'.

Bormann only had his own telephone and telex lines to the NSDAP's 'Gauleiternetz' throughout the Reich. Connections for his secret telex could only be established via the telex exchange 'Wolfschanze' (Fuehrer's headquarters)."

It will not be further discussed here whether the Chief of Defense, Admiral Canaris and General Gehlen were better informed than - Bernd Ruland. A year after Ruland's book was published, *Der Secretdienst in Euro* (5) was of published. The author refers to the memoirs of ... the General of the Intelligence Corps, General Albert Praun, the successor of General Fellgiebel. From the "Secret Service in Europe ..." we learn the following about

Bormann's transmitter: "We have Praun to thank for another piece of information, which must be thought-provoking: Reichsleiter Bormann claimed in 1944 that his telex connections to the Gauleiters were not sufficient, he was asking for his own wireless network. But this is exactly what General Praun did not want to make available to civilians because of the danger of abuse. In addition, the army at that time had neither the necessary radio equipment nor radio operators that it could have freed up for this purpose. The Navy stepped in, much against the will of the chief of Wehrmacht communications, and made the radio network available to Reichsleiter Bormann, which he requested. The Kriegsmarine had hoarded radios for submarines and was now making them freely available, since they were no longer being built. She also had radio operators, whom she now assigned to the party chancellery and not to the army, where they were needed more urgently. It is not known whether and how a control or obser

radio network is done. A dark zone has definitely developed here." (5)

6. It is not possible to comment on the information from McGovern's book, according to which General Gehlen reported to the CIA on request that he knew nothing about Bormann's stay in the Soviet Union, since this reference was not available before this work went to press could become.

It's worth staying with Bernd Ruland.

In his book (122), cited several times above, he writes (1973):

"Since 1972 it has been absolutely certain, for which Bormann's perfectly identified skull is irrefutable proof: Hitler's secretary died in Berlin on May 2, 1945 . "

"We'll come back to that later.

We continue the quotes from Bernd Ruland's book: Long

before the Bormann riddle and the adventurous hunt for him were canceled all over the world, Reinhard Gehlen made a fool of himself in an embarrassing way. His 'two pieces of reliable information' were — a moviegoer.

The founder and longtime head of the Federal Intelligence Service testified before the Frankfurt investigating judge Horst von Glasenapp as a witness at the Starnberg district court at the end of September 1971: 'One of his

contacts' had a film report from the GDR newsreel in 1946 or 1947, an 'eyewitness' about a spectacular event Watched a sporting event in Moscow and discovered the former Nazi Reichsleiter during a camera pan into the audience. Gehlen was unwilling to swear to his testimony.

The heads of the major secret services around the world could not help but gloating." (Unfortunately, Ruland does not list the names of these bosses.)

"The Swiss 'Weltwoche' reacted to the secret service Gehlen bomb with an apt caricature." (The following is a description of this cartoon.)

The "Spiegel" writes in its episode 47/1971 on page 24:

"Gehlen's 'eyewitness'"

BND memoirist Reinhard Gehlen ('Der Dienst') got his 'reliable information' about the alleged Soviet agent Bormann from the cinema. The founder and longtime head of the Federal Intelligence Service testified as a witness before the Frankfurt examining judge Horst von Glasenapp at the Starnberg district court at the end of September: In 1946 or 1947 one of his contacts had seen a report by the East Berlin newsreel 'Eye Witness' about a spectacular sporting event in Moscow and discovered the former NS Reichsleiter during a camera pan into the audience. 'Service' man Gehlen, however, was not willing to swear to his testimony — length: four DIN A4 pages." (123)

We continue the quotes from Bernd Ruland's book: "Gehlen's assumption that Reichsleiter Martin Bormann was the great traitor and informer of the Soviets is absurd if only because up to July 20, 1944 no military papers were left on the desk of the Hitler secretary left.

Otto Pünter ('Pakbo') hits the nail on the head when he states: 'Even Bormann didn't know as much as Roessler was able to report.' In reality he knew next to nothing about military matters. Bormann was Hitler's closest collaborator at the Führer's headquarters during the Second World War, but as head of the party chancellery (since 1941) he was mainly involved in NSDAP matters. He was also a member of the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, but he did not take part in any military meetings. Political or partisan and Wehrmacht conferences always met separately.

Only after the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler, when Bormann, as 'Secretary to the Führer', enjoyed increasing confidence with Hitler, did military papers pass through his hands in individual cases.

When Martin Bormann was finally the only one whom Hitler trusted unconditionally, when finally the most secret orders intended for the Wehrmacht went to him

and he literally found out 'everything': Roessler had long since stopped working in Switzerland.

As already mentioned, 'Lucy' was arrested from May 19 to September 6, 1944. His 'big game' with news was over anyway. After the end of the 'Red Three', Moscow heard nothing more from him."

Since the publication of Reinhard Gehlen's memoirs (autumn 1971), much has been published about his communications about Martin Bormann. However, no author takes a stand as committed as Bernd Ruland barely two years after the publication of Reinhard Gehlen's memoirs.

"This book begins with a provocation", Russia titles the introduction to his book and continues: "I dedicate it to those officers of the otherwise very efficient former German counter-intelligence who apparently slept during the war. With this publication, I will not make friends in the espionage community. Former German counterintelligence officers will be hostile to me: the outsider who dares to invade their 'competence'. You will also be reluctant to accept that the solution to the greatest mystery in espionage history is so simple.

The business of the defense and espionage professionals was (and still is today) to wrap the betrayal of state and army secrets in a mysterious darkness and to present each case as complicated as possible. Only then is their achievement considered great and admirable.

The old secret service agents will also attack me because I remind them how negligent they themselves acted: ..."

The author describes the core of his revelations as follows: During his night shift on June 14, 1941 in the telex center of the German Wehrmacht in Berlin's Bendlerstraße, he discovered that the news assistant Angelika von Parchim (pseudonym) was copying a GKdos telex to General Fromm (substitute army) had made. Bernd Ruland failed to report as required

but demanded an explanation from the news assistant. She said she was the daughter of an officer from the Prussian lower nobility. Her father was dismissed from the Wehrmacht at the beginning of 1938 because he rejected Hitler's war policy. Since then he has been in contact with officers who wanted to overthrow Hitler. She wants to support her father in this endeavor. She handed over the copies of the secret telexes to a German officer for forwarding.

After the war, on June 14, 1947 (compare this date with the date of the night service!), Bernd Ruland met another news assistant from the Wehrmacht telex center in Cologne, who had been doing a similar job to Angelika von Parchim. The father of this second news assistant, whom the author calls Maria Kalussy, was a prominent and convinced communist who was taken to a concentration camp in March 1933 and released in 1934. He fled to the Soviet Union and died in the Spanish Civil War in 1937 as an officer in an international brigade.

In his report, Bernd Ruland not only used aliases for these two intelligence workers, but also for former officers or officials who were involved in acts of treason. He justifies this anonymity with "the fact that the two news workers are still alive. Therefore their real names cannot be given. However, it is ensured that she and other Roessler helpers... will no longer remain anonymous after her death."

Bernd Ruland goes on to write: "This book was supposed to be written ten years ago under the title 'Two girls against Hitler - Where Moscow knew everything from'. But the former news assistants, Angelika von Parchim and Maria Kalussy, kept asking me for a delay, worried that they might suddenly be denounced as the great traitors."

With the same explanation, Pierre Accoce and Pierre Quet justify the use of aliases in their work "Moscow knew everything" (124): "Nobody knows their names. She

To name them publicly would mean exposing these families to the hatred of today's Germany and severe persecution(!). Too many citizens of the Bonn Republic could accuse these men" (officers) "who, out of disgust with Nazism, sabotaged the operations of the Wehrmacht by betraying their plans, thereby stabbing the German front-line fighters in the back transferred... to have.

That is why we will only identify these deadly enemies of the brown revolution by fictitious names and name only their boss who dared to fight openly and throughout his life this dark mysticism. A hero..." This refers to Rudolf Roessler, who radioed Moscow from Switzerland.

These two explanations for the use of fictitious names in the above context can no longer be maintained 35 years after the end of the war. If, in 1966, more than 20 years after the end of the war, Accoce and Quet feared that informants of the Roessler group and their families would be exposed to "the hatred of modern-day Germany and serious persecution" if they were named correctly, this is the case today, more than 35 years later there is even less talk of it than back then. As an example, the chairman of a large political party in West Germany may be cited, who was voted for by millions of Germans, although it has been known for over 15 years that this man was sentenced to one year by the Royal Swedish Higher Regional Court in Stockholm on November 6, 1942 prison and penal labor on the following grounds: failure to register with the police after moving from Norway to Värmland in Sweden, staying in Stockholm without the proper permit, and also obtaining

information about the military and political situation in Germany for the benefit of a stranger might. This information related to: the German war industry, public sentiment in Germany, damage caused by air raids in certain areas of Germany, and the German

Occupation troops in France (125). It is Herbert Richard Wehner.

In his book, Bernd Ruland chose the code names "Angelika von Parchim" and "Maria Kalussy" for the two news workers. It remains to be seen whether he wants to symbolically bring together the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie together against National Socialism. The choice of an "Angelika von Parchim" seems to be more important. This noble name is not included in Gotha. It is only known that there was a manor in Mecklenburg that belonged to Hermann von Treuenfels, which was located near Herzberg near P archim and that M artin Borm ann d ort was the administrator. (Cf. 1st chapter.) These facts make it difficult to believe that the choice of the name "Angelika von Parchim" is due to pure coincidence.

In summary, it remains to be stated that, according to Bernd Ruland, 1. Martin Bormann died on May 2, 1945, 2. due to the death of Martin Bormann at this point in time, General Gehlen's thesis that Martin Bormann a) was the traitor at headquarters and b) lived and died in the Soviet Union is refuted, 3. almost all previous assumptions about Roessler's informants are wrong and 4. it is time to end the many speculations about this complex of questions.

When Bernd Ruland says, "Gehlen's suspicion that Reichsleiter Martin Bormann was the great traitor and informant of the Soviets is absurd because up to July 20, 1944 no military papers passed the desk of Hitler's secretary." , then the wording of Reinhard Gehlen's statement should be remembered, in which he said, "that the enemy in a very short time about events and considerations and - which were made gen , on the German side at the top, until was informed in detail".

What kind of "procedures and considerations" have been, General Gehlen did not give any details. This is

remained open whether they z. B. have been of a political, war economy, military or other nature. All areas of state leadership were discussed at the numerous conferences in the headquarters, with the military problems, the substance of which is at stake here, being given the most space due to the war. It should be noted here that the official designation "Führer Headquarters" meant not only the name of the highest military command post in Germany, but also the general designation for Adolf Hitler's whereabouts (83).

By exonerating Martin Bormann, Bernd Ruland directs the suspicion, indeed the certainty, of acts of treason to the code-named intelligence assistants Angelika von Parchim and Maria Kalussy, as well as to several unnamed officers and civil servants. According to him, the war was won — for the Soviets — in Berlin's Bendlerstrasse, just as the war was “won in Switzerland” according to Pierre Accoce and Pierre Quet. This is the title of the French edition of the book discussed above, “Moscow knew everything”.

The following chapter will report on the exoneration of Martin Bormann by others.

CHAPTER TWENTIETH

*Surprising finds at Lehrter Bahnhof (Berlin) — Erich Kern pro
Besymenski and contra Gehlen — Gert Buchheit close to the essential
— Fargó's factual research — Distorted account of Gehlen
— slipping into romance — v. Lang's doubts*

There are currently eleven biographical publications about Martin Bormann. It seems convenient to make their assessment chronologically, before the appearance of Gehlen's memoirs in 1971, and afterwards, regarding opinions about Bormann's death and other characteristic details.

a) For Trevor Roper (11), Martin Bormann is still considered "missing", according

to his contribution in "Der Montag", 1954. b) Joseph Wulf (10) puts at the end of his book "Martin Bormann - Hitlers Schatten" 1962

the question of whether Bormann is not living under a false name, after Wulf has quoted numerous press and other reports about the alleged appearance of the wanted person.

c) Lew Besymenski (9) states in his book "In the footsteps of Martin Bormann" in 1965 that Bormann is "in the Nazi paradise of South America".

d) Werner Brockdorff (126) claims to have researched the escape routes of Martin Bormann and others in detail after his very detailed description "Flight from Nuremberg" (1969) and is convinced that the "financial genius Bormann" is supposed to be living in South America, about which he says a surprising amount know how to tell.

Since 1971, the year in which General Gehlen's memoirs were published, there has been a noticeable change in reporting about Martin Bormann. The critical reader may judge this for himself.

e) Bernd Ruland (1973): "Since December 1972 it has been absolutely certain, for which Bormann's perfectly identified skull is irrefutable proof: Hitler's secretary died in Berlin on May 2, 1945." This is followed by Ruland's omissions about a "disgrace of Gehlen", which are quoted in the 19th chapter. f) In his book *Der Admiral*, published in 1973, Klaus

Benzing not only agrees with Gehlen's views, but also goes far beyond them in biographical information about Martin Bormann; compare the 1st chapter of this work. g) Lew Besymenski, who in 1965 had advocated Martin Bormann's stay in South America in his book "In the

footsteps of Martin Bormann", after a few jabs at General Gehlen, he suddenly turned his back on the South America theory and advocated in his new one book "The Last Notes by Martin Bormann" (4) the view that Bormann died on May 2, 1945 in Berlin.

Besymenski eloquently justifies this expression of opinion with the fact that "in December 1972 an unexpected find was made public: During construction work in the area of the former Lehrter train station (today West Berlin) a skeleton was found that could be the skeleton of Martin Bormann".

"At the request of the 'Stern' employee Jochen von Lang" — Besymenski continues to report — "they dug at this point as early as 1965 because, according to the post office clerk Krumov, a burial had already taken place here in 1945. But nothing was found." On the same page of his book (207) Besymenski writes, "However, in 1972 workers laying water pipes suddenly discovered two skeletons on West Berlin territory. The police appeared immediately and, of course, the editors of Stern. The description of the skeletons matched what the magazine reported in 1965. The West Berlin public prosecutor's office undertook a detailed investigation ...

The identity of Dr. Stumpfegger's could easily be identified because X-rays of his teeth were available.

For Martin Bormann's tooth picture there were only the drawings that Professor Blaschke had made in captivity. For this, the traces of a broken collarbone were checked and confirmed, as well as the remains of a cyanide capsule. But an important part was missing: the dental bridge ...

That was the situation at the beginning of March 1973," Besymen ski continues. "Suddenly the picture changed: The area around the Lehrter train station proved to be very productive, here on March 11 — other reports claim on March 13 — a dental bridge was found that completely matched Bormann's skeleton. In addition, a Munich specialist was commissioned to reconstruct a plastic mask from the skull. The mask looked very similar to Bormann's photos."

Next Besymenski:

"At a press conference by the chief public prosecutor Joachim Richter, he officially declared that Bormann's identity had been established with absolute certainty.

Richter declared the Bormann case closed and asked the Foreign Office to withdraw the DM 100,000 reward. Bormann's death was finally entered in the death register in the Tiergarten registry office (West Berlin) in January 1974."

A. Strobel comments on the finding of this dental bridge "at the right time" in the "Deutsche National-Zeitung", Munich, March 30, 1973, page 10, as follows: "The
last bridge

According to reports in West German gazettes, one *suddenly* — Late 1972 — a skeleton believed to represent the mortal remains of Soviet agent Bormann found in Berlin. Lo and behold: now workers have even found Bormann's three-toothed bridge in Berlin's Tiergarten!

There are downright legendary 'finders' at work. It borders on the miraculous: suddenly everything in Berlin is found after the South America story collapsed. With

the '3-tooth bridge' you have accomplished a feat and found the needle in the haystack.

Unfortunately, the dentist who is said to have created this 3-tooth bridge has since passed away. According to the Gazettes, the public prosecutor's office in Frankfurt is still in doubt. I have my doubts about the whole story - because, as is well known, the Soviets are not exactly the most credible, to put it politely. If it really is the skeleton of the Soviet agent Bormann, who died in the Soviet Union, then the suspicion arises that it, together with the 3-tooth bridge, has meanwhile been taken to Berlin to 'be found' there. There are enough Soviet agents who could have carried this out..."

Lev Besymenski has become a real expert on this "enigmatic case of the century" through his many years of intensive study of the Bormann case. He followed the "traces of Martin Bormann", ie the "spirit of Nazism" through the entire German-speaking area. He is said to be an accredited foreign journalist in Bonn and therefore keeps his salary from the Soviet Union. Consequently, he can only write for the benefit of his government. And he does. Presumably to protect himself against such conclusions, he writes on page 206 of the "Last Notes by Martin Bormann":

"The author of this book did not have, nor does he have, his own means to elucidate the fate of Bormann, who has disappeared from our sight: he bases his judgment on publications that have appeared in the press over the past few years." (4)

In the eleventh study of the "Last Notes..." the author goes into "The Case of Dentures" in great detail, referring to the precise investigations of the American professor of forensic medicine, Reidar F.

Sognnaes, supports. At the slightest doubt expressed in this opinion, clothed in the words: "From the point of view of dental forensic medicine, there is

several puzzling and missing points, necessitating further research throughout 1973 and 1974 to establish the death of Martin Bormann, if indeed he is dead, with as certainty as that of Hitler," Besymenski responded sharply, quoting Canadian author William Stevenson: "But the secret Nazi brotherhood which he" (Bormann) "planned and directed is alive and thriving and more dangerous than ever." ("The Bormann Brotherhood")

Finally, Besymenski thinks that the Bormann case should not be viewed as an isolated case, here it is necessary to deal with the "Nazi danger"(!). This unfounded generalization coincides with the author's words "that for us the fate of Bormann's personality is not as important as the fate of his political legacy".

Then why the thirty-year long boron at all man activities ?

- h) Erich Kern (127) apparently wrote his short essay "So Germany was betrayed" under the shock of General Gehlen's statements, since he writes in the introduction: "General Gehlen's whole Bormann spectacle also had its good points", and expresses his satisfaction that now at last the mass media is also openly admitting a betrayal of the policies and conduct of the war of the Third Reich, which had previously been denied.

However, the author finds it macabre that this betrayal also extends to a prominent member of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, namely Martin Bormann:

"... it was believed that the Bormann legend, which has now been definitively refuted, could also be used to blame National Socialism or one of its prominent representatives for the betrayal of the Third Reich. This is undoubtedly one of the most macabre grotesques of our time."

At the end of his remarks on the "Red Chapel" and the "Military Resistance" the author writes:

"Reinhard Gehlen has in his advertisement for his memoirs

rehashing the Bormann legend and giving it new luster through the authority of the office which he possessed as former chief of the Federal Intelligence Service. However, his information is more than poor, not to say pathetic ..."

Kern then quotes General Gehlen's remarks from "Der Dienst" (21) page 47 in full and comments: "What Gehlen said here (!)

was not new at all.

As early as October 1947, SS Obergruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf declared... Bormann was convinced that he was a Soviet agent. However, Ohlendorf said that Bormann only made telephone calls to the commanders of the Red Army shortly before the capitulation...

In May 1948, in the Wilhelmstrasse trial, SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger declared: Martin Bormann was 'according to the SS' a Soviet agent. Before he traveled to Moscow (!), Bormann was ordered by the Soviets to shoot all Western European prisoners of war in Germany, including the American ones.

Of course, none of the 'witnesses' provided any proof of the absurd allegation. A Miss Gertrud von Heimerdinger" (to whom we shall return) "claimed to have seen Bormann on June 13, 1945 in Berlin at the NKVD commando ('Die Welt', September 12, 1971). On September 15, 1971, a Rudolf Ströbinger revealed in Herr Löwenthal's ZDF magazine that he had already learned in 1946 from a deceased Czech secret agent that Bormann had been a Soviet agent. All of these fantasies were taken at face value for some time."

Erich Kern explains "all these fantasies" from national socialist point of view:

"The statements of Ohlendorf and Berger can be explained by the fact that Martin Bormann in his unrestrained Striving for power not only offended Gering, Goebbels and Rosenberg, but also repeatedly put the SS in their place

pointed No one was as hated in the Third Reich within the Nazi hierarchy after the fall of Ernst Röhm as Martin Bormann. His influence on Adolf Hitler in matters of the small things in life was dominant through the indispensability he had created. Bormann believed that Adolf Hitler had been given powers of vision and that he needed all his strength for victory.

That is why Bormann was of the opinion that everything negative had to be kept away from Hitler in order to preserve this strength." (In a footnote, Erich Kern refers to the "statement by Hermann Buch, to whose sister Gerda Martin Bormann was married".)

Continuing the quote from

Erich Kern: "In this endeavor he not only shielded Hitler from all criticism, but also from all employees who he assumed would communicate their fears and concerns to Hitler. Martin Bormann created the vacuum around Hitler and is thus the main culprit for the situation in which Hitler, cut off from reality, lived his dreams and operated with them without regard to reality. Hence the hatred of numerous Nazi functionaries and above all the SS, who could no longer really get hold of Hitler. This aversion survived into 1945 and is also the reason why many former National Socialists eagerly embraced the Martin Bormann legend, without considering that this legend is only being systematically promoted and disseminated because it no longer leads to the legend could blame a high Nazi functionary for denying treason against the German Reich and the German Wehrmacht."

Without going into more detail about the mystical-occult "visionary powers" that are ascribed to their leader, Adolf Hitler, to save the honor of National Socialism, we recommend the reader to continue reading Gauleiter Jordan's report "Sperrmauer" around Adolf Hitler in Chapter 2 in the 3rd chapter the beginning and in the 6th chapter about the demarcation of Adolf Hitler from the population.

"After it was long believed that Martin Bormann lived in South America," Erich Kern continues in his writing, "we then learned that he was sitting in the Kremlin on Stalin's right hand while people were looking for him all over the world. The Bormann legend, so beautifully constructed, then died without a word in September 1972 when, based on a comparison of the teeth of a skull found in Berlin, it was unequivocally determined that Martin Bormann died together with Hitler's doctor, Dr. Stumpfegger died on May 2, 1945. At the end of the affair, General Reinhard Gehlen played an almost pathetic role, because it was he who gave the whole Bormann swindle weight."

Finally, according to "Spiegel", series 47/1971, General Gehlen's testimony before the Starnberg District Court, quoted in Chapter 19, follows, with appropriate commentary. Finally, Erich Kern confidently remarks:

"Thus the attempt to shift the role of the great traitor 'Werther' to National Socialism finally failed." i) Gert Buchheit (97) wrote the chapter "A

ghost that does not come to rest — Martin Bormann a traitor?" in his book "Spionage in Two World Wars" published in 1975. dedicated to the former Reichsleiter. In his work, the author conscientiously and factually follows the life of Martin Bormann on the basis of sources already known to us, free from subjective and distracting comments.

Buchheit also identified and used a source that we do not have and that cannot be obtained either in bookstores or in public libraries.

We quote Gert Buchheit:

"In this context, however, we must draw your attention to a publication by the intelligence service of the Russian emigrants, which — translated from the Russian by Dietrich von Kuehnheim — appeared in 1955 in a small publishing house in Oberreuthe in the Allgäu and hardly received any attention. 'In the person of Martin Bormann', one reads there, 'the Soviet agents found the man

whom they were able to direct as a provocateur into Adolf Hitler's closest circle. Bormann was never able to completely hide his basic communist attitude. Within the party hierarchy, he was always regarded as the Reichsleiter furthest to the left, and he was fiercely opposed by the Reichsleiter Buhler and Himmler because of his views, which often bordered on communism. But he was an extremely important man who gave Hitler a lot of money, and Hitler needed a lot of money for his party."

Buchheit writes later: "In the already mentioned publication of the Russian émigré intelligence service 'Soviet Agents Above All' it is claimed that Bormann was not Stalin's only agent within the NSDAP. He was not only effectively supported in the Gestapo, which could have been an allusion to the head of the Gestapo, Müller, with whom Bormann had been friends since his time in Munich.

He also had 'helpers' in Rosenberg's foreign policy office, including the former Methodist preacher Dr. G.

Leibbrandt, who later worked in Rosenberg's East Ministry for the administration of the occupied eastern territories.

Furthermore, as Bormann's collaborators in his work as an informant for the Soviets, the astrological adviser to the Führer, Berger, and Hitler's personal physician, Dr. Called Morell."

At the end of his remarks, Gert Buchheit commented on the reaction of "TASS" (Soviet News Agency) to General Gehlen's statements in "Der Dienst" (21) about Martin Bormann: "'TASS' took Gehlen's

reference to Bormann's betrayal as joke done. However, she overlooked one 'big detail'. Almost all the important figures of the National Socialist era are included in the extensive, very detailed Soviet historical encyclopedia ('Sovetskaya istori ceskaja encycloedinja'), which was published in eleven volumes under the overall editing of EM Schukov (up to the article 'Slavs'). biographical articles, such as party leaders Hitler, Gering, Goebbels, Hess, Ribbentrop,

Rosenberg, Himmler, Admirals Raeder and Dönitz, Field Marshals von Leeb, von Manstein, von Reichenau, Rommel, Generaloberst Rendulic, etc. Only one is missing: Martin Bormann." Buchheit cites Professor Stadtmüller's letter to the editor from "Die Welt" of October 22, 1971 as the source.

Next with Gert Buchheit:

"One could draw certain conclusions from this conspicuous omission — the failure to mention Hitler's 'grey eminence'."

Henning Fikentscher (1) drew these conclusions, which were not expressed by Gert Buchheit and gave names.

Henning Fikentscher:

"In 1945 the Soviet agent Richard Sorge was executed by the Japanese. The Soviet Union disowned him for twenty years before publicly recognizing him as their agent and declaring him a Hero of the Soviet Union... Bormann will probably have to forego honoring a Hero of the Soviet Union until Soviet troops reach the Rhine or the Atlantic stand. Dr. medical Morell is unlikely to share that honor. He seems to have been just a hand longer."

"But," continues Gert Buchheit (97), "since it was unequivocally established that Bormann died on the railway bridge in Invalidenstrasse in Berlin-Tiergarten after his escape from the Reich Chancellery on May 2, 1945, one has to ask oneself why Bormann — if he was already in contact with the Soviet secret service — didn't defect to the Russians? Perhaps that was what guided his escape from the bunker, assuming always that he was working for Moscow. Fate would have it otherwise. As the medical examination of a skull that was found proved with reasonable certainty, Bormann died back then.

That's how you often think you've solved a riddle, and

in the end you have to realize that new puzzles arise from this and that all efforts are like fighting for a hydra.”

Eberhard Engelhardt (128) takes a different view. In his essay “Was Bormann a Soviet agent” he writes, among other things:

“It is striking that the alleged skeleton of Bormann with the prosthesis identified by the dental technician and with the glass splinters was found at just the right time, namely about a year after General Gehlen's revelations and a few weeks after the publication of my commentary. On the other hand, assuming that Gehlen's report is correct, that Bormann died in the Soviet Union, then the USSR will do everything possible to refute Gehlen's revelations. If Gehlen's report is correct, then Bormann's body, complete with skeleton and dentures, was in Soviet hands. But then it cannot be ruled out that the skeleton together with the prosthesis was taken to Berlin-Moabit at the right time and buried there so that it could be found there during construction work...

Splinters of glass can also be put into the teeth of a skeleton afterwards...” j) Ladislav

Farago (12) informs the reader in his report “Scheintot” published in 1975 that Martin Bormann survived the Second World War and in 1948 escaped to Argentina with the help of the Peron regime. Farago claims to have spoken to Martin Bormann in February 1973 in a Redemptorist monastery near Tupiza, in the Andean province of Potosi. In the first chapter of his book *The Bones of Contention*, the author says: “It could become even more tragic one day if the entire skull find should turn out to be hocus-pocus.

But I am convinced of that. It is impossible for Martin Bormann to have fled to South America after the end of the war, leaving behind his skull and bones, and to spend the rest of his life today in a luxury villa in Buenos Aires.”

Faragó is more serious in his research report: "On May 10 (1945) a spokesman for the Allied War Crimes Commission announced the arrest of Reich Marshal Göring and added that the Russians had determined that one of the bodies found in Berlin, with a reasonable degree of probability' as Bormann's. On June 12 (1945) the New York Times reported on the basis of a report by the Soviet-controlled Berlin radio station that Martin Bormann had been arrested, probably by the Russians.

On August 2nd (1945) it was announced from London that investigators had collected 'secret evidence' that Martin Bormann might still be alive and a Russian prisoner. On September 1, 1945, the New York Times reported Bormann's arrest by the Russians. At the same time, a correspondent of the Associates Press, accredited to Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery's headquarters, claimed that Martin Bormann, 'who is said to have perished at Hitler's side in the ruins of the Reich Chancellery', had died on the night of 1 January. On May 1st, he was spotted in a Hamburg suburb 'by an anti-Nazi, a doctor who knew him well'. The correspondent referred to British intelligence material." (12)

The well-known rumors of Bormann's appearance in Neumünster, in Munich and later in Spain follow. But once again Faragó quotes: "A message from 10. However, November 1947 declared that the ubiquitous Martin Bormann, who had hitherto been hiding in Berlin, was now in the Soviet Union."

Unfortunately, Faragó did not name this source. But he also goes into the manhunt for Martin Bormann, which has already been dealt with: "The documents on the search prove that the efforts of the Allies to find Bormann were half-hearted and amateurish. A lack of system meant that Bormann's track was lost."

Elsewhere Faragó writes: "The whole world was of the opinion that several governments were conducting a worldwide hunt for the former Reichsleiter. The truth was different. No one was seriously looking for him. The former allies, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France, whose joint court had sentenced Bormann to death, didn't lift a finger to get hold of him. 'That would only have led to complications,' an American diplomat in Asunción told me." (Cf. Chapter 17, "Slow Manhunt for Bormann in East Germany", "Little Russian Interest in Bormann Becoming More and More Clear.")

Faragó has a hard time speaking with General Gehlen, he writes:

"Then in September 1971 in the New York Times, Henry Raymont revealed General Reinh. Gehlen, the former head of the German intelligence service, will finally solve the Bormann mystery in his forthcoming memoirs. According to Gehlen, Bormann was a traitor and spy who had provided the Soviet Union with important information via a secret transmitter. In a single paragraph on page 48 of the German edition of his memoirs, Gehlen added that he had not been able to do any research himself, but that two anonymous informants had told him that Bormann worked under an assumed name until his death in the late 1960s lived in the soviet union. I was skeptical of the Gehlen claim. Reliable friends in the Federal Intelligence Service(!) assured me that in the early 1960s Gehlen had authorized a manhunt for the former Reichsleiter and had sent a BND official named Horst von Westernhagen to Brazil. This agent died under mysterious circumstances shortly after arriving in Rio de Janeiro. He was murdered by gangster methods. Other agents, who were luckier than von Westernhagen, brought enough material to prove Bormann's escape to South America."

Apparently, Ladislav Faragó feels that none of his readers bother to compare what he says about Gehlen's memoirs with what he says in *The Service*. As a result, Faragó – in his own way – goes into the testimony of General Gehlen before the district court of Starnberg, which has already been described in this work and which he transfers “to his (Gehlen's) retirement home in Berg am Starnberger See”, etc. It is unnecessary to highlight Faragó's numerous mistakes.

In the chapter “The Birth of the Bormann Legend” Faragó reports matter-of-factly:

“Finally, on June 10 (1946), the lawyer” (defending Bormann's attorney) “was ready. That morning, the Soviet Chief Prosecutor, General RA Rudenko, caused a stir in the attending press by dropping the remark: ‘As far as we know, Bormann is not dead; he's just not in the dock.’ This sentence was interpreted to mean that the Russians would have caught Bormann and would present him at any moment.”

Ladislav Faragó fills many pages of his book “*Scheintot*” with the fictional everyday life of Martin Bormann in various South American countries. He even quotes from the 800-page manuscript of Bormann's memoirs. Faragó claims to have paid an advance of 500,000 dollars for this manuscript. The sponsor is an American film company. Faragó made the payment of this amount conditional on being able to speak to Martin Bormann. That was approved. After Faragó had reached the “tiny hospital” where Bormann was allegedly lying by air taxi, car and on foot, he was taken to a single room where the “patient” was lying. On entering, Martin Bormann said to Faragó in a low but rather harsh voice: “Why don't you come out. Don't you see I'm an old man? Let me die in peace.”

It is also worth noting that Ladislav Faragó came out on top his long list of helpers for this book “*Scheintot*”

apart from two former employees from Martin Bormann's staff, Dr. Ludwig Wemmer and Ministerial Director a. D Heim, also mentions the terrorist Beate Klarsfeld, known from the 1970s, "whose work I used in this area," as he writes. k) Jochen von Lang (8) is also of the opinion that the "skull and bone finds on the site", as he puts it, proves the death of Martin Bormann, according to the explanations in his book "The Secretary" published in 1977. v. Lang also writes that the Munich detective chief Moritz Furtmayr, based on the skulls of Bormann and Dr. Stumpfegggers reconstructed the heads and faces of the two dead. "We compared his work with photos by Bormann and Stumpfegger. There was no more doubt.

The Frankfurt public prosecutor's office presented the bones of Martin Bormann available to his relatives after the conclusion of the criminal case, with the restriction that they may only be buried and not cremated. Finally, it cannot be entirely ruled out that they will be needed again as evidence. Bormann's children have not yet responded to this condition. The 'Secretary of the Führer' is therefore resting in a cardboard box in the evidence room of the Frankfurt public prosecutor's office for the foreseeable future."

In the appendix of his book "Der Secretary" (8) Jochen von Lang quotes under "3. Reference to Gehlen" part of the statements made by General Gehlen at the Starnberg district court during his interrogation on September 21, 1971.

Following this quote, Jochen von Lang makes the following statements: "For

security reasons, the witness Gehlen did not disclose the two sources of information. There was no need to force him to do this in view of the obvious inadequacy and inadequacy of the two references. The Soviet journalist Besymenski, who has already been mentioned several times and is now accredited in Bonn as a Soviet correspondent for the Soviet newspaper Neue Zeit,

On the occasion of a meeting in Bonn on September 11, 1971 with the investigating judge, in which I took part, about Gehlen's announced publications 'only expressed that one could at best comment on this satirically' (note of the investigating judge of September 13, 1971 in Volume VIII Bl. 1276 of the A.). In my reference files I have on 12.-20. 9.1971 noted that Besymenski considers Gehlen's announced version of Bormann to be absolutely incorrect and that he was otherwise unable to give us any information as to the existence of the accused, which I in particular had specifically asked about." (8th)

The "turnaround in reporting around Martin Bormann" that occurred after the publication of Gehlen's memoirs, which was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, can be seen from the excerpts from publications a) to k).

The assumption that the former Reichsleiter survived, who is said to have been in South America, turned to the view that he had died trying to escape from the Reich Chancellery bunker on May 2, 1945. This view was strengthened by the finds of skeletons and skulls at the place where he might have died. Rarely is it noted that excavations were carried out at the same place in 1965 - without success.

It is even less common to think that these skeletons and skulls were not found in the long years, even decades, after the end of the war, but in the relatively short period of fifteen months after General Gehlen's revelations about Martin Bormann.

After the publication of General Gehlen's memoirs (21), not only books about Martin Bormann appeared, the content of which was discussed in Chapter 20. Reports from eyewitnesses and letters to the editor dealing with the critical phase in Martin Bormann's life after May 1, 1945 also reached the editors of the press and were — in part — published.

These memoirs also marked a turning point in Bormann's literature, as the number of publications to date rose from four to eleven. If

Considering that the first four of these works were written between the years 1954 and 1969, i.e. within 15 years, ie a Bormann biography about every fourth year, this is modest when compared with the seven publications between the years Appeared in 1973 and 1977, ie about two publications per year.

The first four works contained biographical data, Martin Bormann's work in the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), his influence on Adolf Hitler and assumptions about his disappearance without a trace, since the question of his death was unresolved. In particular, the majority of eyewitnesses describe his influence on Adolf Hitler as considerable; only his defense attorney in the Nuremberg trial, Dr. Bergold trivialized this influence, as did today's bearers of National Socialist ideas. As a result of Gehlen's revelations about his act of treachery, a further - above all undesirable - component has been added to the previous Bormann picture. The reasons why Martin Bormann should not have been a traitor to either the Kremlin or the National Socialists have already been explained elsewhere.

This is where the interests of the former enemies converge. Hence the common fight against Gehlen, mostly on a subjective level. The works of Bernd Ruland's "The Eyes of Moscow", Lew Besymenski's "The Last Notes of Martin Bormann" and Jochen v. Lang's "Der Secretär", which appeared "as if by order" at short intervals.

The author of the book "Der Admiral", Klaus Benzing, who once served in the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris, on the basis of his knowledge, agrees with General Gehlen's revelations to a greater extent, as we shall see. Erich Kern represents National Socialism, Gerd Buchheit tends towards Gehlen's statements, but, immediately convinced by the skull and bone finds, changes to the opposite opinion. La dislas Faragó seems to be a loner. The beginning of his book "Scheintot" is well founded, but then slides into the novel.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

*The publications before and after Gehlen's memoirs -
Witnesses after May 1, 1945 - An unpublished letter to the editor
- Nellesen's and Johe's "obituary" on Bormann*

We now turn to the further curriculum vitae of Martin Bormann, as far as this is possible with the sparse documents.

The last German who saw Martin Bormann alive within the German lines, at the Hotel Atlas in Berlin, was Major Joachim Tiburtius. In his report, Tiburtius states that at that time, on May 2, 1945, after two in the morning, Bormann had already put on civilian clothes. Please refer to Chapter 16 for details.

The former employee of the Foreign Office, Gertrud von Heimerdinger, said she saw Martin Bormann on June 13, 1945, surrounded by Soviet soldiers. Here is the report (130): *"A witness testifies to the notary: 'I saw Martin*

Bormann in June 1945 with the Russians'

Berlin, September 12 (ASD)

'I have been silent for a long time, but General Gehlen's assertion that Martin Bormann was an agent of Moscow during the war makes me break my silence. I want clarity at last. Because I saw Martin Bormann myself during my interrogations by the Soviet secret service in the former Moabit prison. I can swear to that.' A former employee of the Foreign Office reported this to the Axel Springer Domestic Service in

Stuttgart on September 8" (1971).

Gertrud von Heimerdinger, daughter of a general, from 1921 until 1945 employee of the Foreign Office, finally practical

Head of the courier department, was active in the German resistance against Hitler. She belonged to the resistance group around the former Freikorps leader Joseph (Beppo) Roemer, who had to pay for his anti-Hitler activities on September 25, 1944 with his life.

In his book 'German Resistance', Rudolf Pechel especially mentions 'a brave woman': 'Beppo Roemer and his comrades realized early on that the only way to get rid of the hated regime would be through Hitler's death. A small, inner circle of the group did everything possible to get rid of Hitler. To do this, it was necessary to always be up to date as to when Hitler was in Berlin and, above all, when he was traveling. Here Lieutenant Colonel Ertel, at that time adjutant to the Berlin city commanders General von Seifert and later General von Hase, who belonged to the circle of the men of July 20th, rendered essential services. He constantly briefed a brave woman, Gertrud von Heimerdinger, who deserves a special mention, about Hitler's travel plans ... From Gertrud von Heimerdinger, Roemer always received important information about secret dispatches from the Foreign Office.'

Days of interrogations

Gertrud von Heimerdinger experienced the end of Hitler's Reich in Berlin. In June 1945, it was precisely her activities in the resistance that earned her interrogations by the Soviet secret service for days. Felicitas von Reznicek, daughter of the famous composer and conductor Emil Nikolaus von Reznicek, referred to her friend Gertrud von Heimerdinger during interrogations by the Soviet secret service: she could testify to her activities in the resistance.

Over the weekend, the witness vividly described to ASD the events that led to her meeting with Bormann in Moabit prison. 'After the capitulation, on a Sunday morning — as far as I can remember, May 10, 1945 — two Russian officers knocked on my apartment door at 48 Schlueterstrasse at seven in the morning. Down in front of the front door

a car with a driver. Together with a German interpreter, we drove to today's criminal court in Moabit.

I was then interrogated there on that day and the following days.'

Since Frau von Heimerdinger's activities in the resistance were known, she was able to return to her apartment after each interrogation. Her interrogator, an officer named Kiwritzky, didn't treat her like a prisoner either. During one of these interrogations in Moabit — 'I think it was June 13' (1945), Gertrud von Heimerdinger recalls — the following happened

'Suddenly the door of the negotiation room was thrown open, there was nobody present apart from Kiwritzky, an interpreter and me. Two soldiers rushed in and excitedly reported something in Russian to the officer. The interpreter turned to me and said: "Listen, the two of them count, they just found Bormann. In the ruins between the Lehrter Bahnhof and Bellevue S-Bahn stations."

I then said to the two Russians: "Well, I congratulate you, you've made a big catch there."

Because Bormann, the gray eminence, was, in my opinion, even worse than Hitler himself. The interpreter translated that for Kiwritzky, and he then said: "We would have preferred Herr von Ribbentrop!" I replied: "Ribbentrop is unimportant compared to Bormann."

There is no doubt

that before Kiwritzky could answer, the two soldiers left the room. 'Through the open door', as Gertrud von Heimerdinger describes the scene, 'I saw Martin Bormann standing in the corridor, surrounded by many Soviet soldiers. I had never seen the "Secretary of the Führer" in person before, but of course I knew his face and his figure from many pictures. Bormann made a run-down impression. I can no longer say whether he was in uniform or in civilian clothes.

But I have no doubt that it must have been Bormann.' The witness received

confirmation of her experience on

evening of the same day. Her friend Felicitas von Reznicek told her that the major who was interrogating her had proudly told her that Bormann had been found and that the Soviets had him in custody.

During a later interrogation, Kiwritzky brought up Martin Bormann again. He told Gertrud von Heimerdinger: 'We have now taken Bormann to Russia.' For many years, Gertrud von Heimerdinger kept silent

about her experiences in June 1945. She feared being on a 'black list' with the Russians. She had refused the Soviet invitation to cooperate. Instead, she made herself available to the Americans; Allan Dulles, the American contact for the German resistance in Switzerland, knew the 'brave woman' from the Foreign Office.

It was only after Gehlen's revelations that she made a sworn statement before a notary that she saw Martin Bormann alive in the hands of the Soviets in 1945." (130)

The previously known Bormann researchers before, but especially after Gehlen's revelations in 1971, followed up many details of Bormann's biography very precisely in their work. Jochen von Lang worked the most conscientiously here. But Bormann's Freikorps affiliation and activities in the Baltic States, which can be read about in every major newspaper in West Germany, escaped notice from everyone, including apparently Jochen von Lang. The same applies to the repeatedly quoted Moscow radio report of June 16, 1945, concerning the capture of Martin Bormann by the Soviets. In the affidavit by Gertrud von Heimerdinger there is another statement incriminating Martin Bormann and confirming Gehlen. The concealment of such information should also be noticed and taken aback by those who believe in good faith. Common direction? Erich Kern is the only writer who does not keep silent about the Heimerdinger report, which was widely published in *Die Welt* (130). However, he dismisses this report with the words: "A Miss Gertrud von Heimerdinger claimed on

Seen on June 13, 1945 in Berlin on the NKVD commando Bormann. ('Die Welt', September 12, 1971)" Erich Kern does not conceal the statements made by SS General Gottlob Berger and Rudolf Ströbinger (alias Pavel Havelka, see also Chapter 1). In the end he judges flatly: "All these fantasies were taken at face value for some time." In so doing, without bothering to study this account, he simply categorizes as "fantasy" something he cannot believe, namely that its Führer was a secretary and closest associate in the service of the Soviets. In this he is much closer to a personal expression of opinion than to an objective refutation, which would have been much more important.

Two letters to the editor to "Die Welt" (131) about the book follow Gehlen's "The Service":

I. *"Questionable speculations"*

As a criminologist and writing expert, I was the closest collaborator in the Canaris and Gehlen departments for years, right up to the end. I've attended some of the most sensitive generals' briefings that could have cost us all our lives just because 'guesses' were made. I consider Gehlen's happily written speculation that Reichsleiter Bormann had been an "informer and adviser" to the Soviets since the beginning of the Eastern campaign to be highly questionable. I definitely know that Bormann, like everyone else, was closely monitored at all times because Hitler didn't trust anyone.

I'm very, very skeptical and can give objective reasons for this.

dr Walter Hemsing, specialist
psychologist, member of the German Criminological
Society, 51 Aachen, Dachsbad 7"

2. *Only three or four people know whereabouts In*

Germany only three or four people know where you are now
Whereabouts of the former Reichsleiter Martin Bormann.

After the capitulation in 1945, about fifty
people with Martin Bormann, who they did not recognize

live together. I myself doubt that Herr Gehlen is aware of the whereabouts of the former Reichsleiter.

Judging by the situation at that time, hardly any of the surviving persons will be willing to testify about the situation at that time.

Bruno Richter, 405 Mönchengladbach" (131)

In the first letter to the editor, "Questionable Speculations," legitimate disbelief is expressed because something is said that was out of the question in the Third Reich. There was only one opinion. Independent thinking was not necessary. Expressions of such thinking could have consequences. Gestapo agents and their helpers constantly monitored the population. And then *the right hand of Führer Adolf Hitler is said to have been an enemy agent?* It sounds so outrageous that Gehlen's revelation about Bormann is *dismissed as absurd without discussion, indeed without even thinking.*

Also an after-effect of the psychological compulsion that prevailed at the time. Certainly there was also a surveillance of Adolf Hitler's headquarters, which of course included all employees including Martin Bormann. However, this was a security measure for personal protection and not political surveillance, as Dr. Walter Hemsing mistakenly thinks.

More revealing is *a letter to the editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* by Klaus Benzing (132), *which was not published.* Here is the text (abbreviated):

"Dogs bark, but the caravan moves on

When in your issue of December 3, 1971 in a report under the headline 'Gehlen's memoirs reveal no secrets' there is talk of a 'grotesque' and of an allegedly 'bombastic revelation by Gehlen' that Hitler's intimate Bormann was a spy for the Soviets, one simply has to ask oneself when the last foolish people will understand that the defense activities and above all their results will not be published in any country on earth.

The former head of the Federal Intelligence Service, General Gehlen could very well have adduced other evidence

that the former head of the former Nazi Party Chancellery was in fact a Soviet spy. None other than the late former President of the Council of Europe, Paul Le verkuehn, writes on page 186 of his book, The Secret Intelligence Service of the Wehrmacht in War, that in the opinion of the former head of the Office for Foreign Affairs/Defense, Admiral Canaris, the threads of the Soviet espionage organization 'Red Chapel' ran to Bormann. A few surviving Intelligence officers could confirm that Canaris even knew that Bormann was working for the Soviets...

Anyone who is familiar with the situation at the time also knows that anyone who had dared to accuse Bormann of spying for the Soviets, even with evidence, would have been liquidated immediately without any investigation on Hitler's orders. But not only those who dared to say this, but the SS, as the perennial envious competitor of the 'defence', would have used such an expression of suspicion as an opportunity to liquidate the 'defence'. As frightening and fantastic as this sounds, it was the reality at the time. So Canaris knew that

Bormann was a Soviet spy. He also put it down in his diaries in a separate place, which one or two living members of the counterintelligence also know...

But there is other evidence that Bormann was in fact a Soviet spy, evidence that even General Gehlen may not have known about.

For example, when the Soviets, after the occupation of Germany from 1945 onwards, continued to operate the Sachsenhausen concentration camp near Berlin for the same purpose, only with new guards ... the specially guarded part of Lager in 1947/48 in the so-called 'Schuschnigg House', along with a son of Stalin, also a Soviet officer named Juschkov. He was waiting to be transported to the Soviet Union. He had been arrested by the Soviet secret police in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany for drunkenly bragging about it in a bar shortly before Germany's surrender in the immediate vicinity of the former so-called 'Führerbunker' to the Reichsleiter

Bormann to have waited and received him.

While still in Sachsenhausen, Colonel Yuschko in the Red Army was outraged at his arrest because—as he said—it was true that he had been waiting for Bormann and had brought him to Moscow in a special plane. Many of the former Sachsenhausen prisoners knew about these statements by Yuschko...

It must be surprising, however, when such an excellent secret service expert as the current head of the security department in the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Ministerialdirektor Nollau, describes General Gehlen's remark about Bormann's espionage activities as a 'duck'. Mr. Nollau should know how carefully the former chief of the counterintelligence, Admiral Canaris, worked and that Gehlen, as the former chief of 'Foreign Army East', certainly shared in Canaris' knowledge of Bormann. When he talks about a 'misappropriation' of the BND under General Gehlen, because the Federal Republic has allegedly been overrun by a network of agents and undercover agents" (of the BND), one simply has to ask Mr. Nollau whether he was out can no longer remember from his training period that there should be no limits to an effective defense activity in one's own country. It would be absurd if intelligence findings that were perhaps collected in an enemy or foreign country and lead to the Federal Republic could not be pursued further there.

All in all, unemployed people should stop talking or writing about intelligence and counterintelligence if they don't know anything about it. In any case, General Gehlen, and many people agree on this, will go down in post-war history as the man who, with his organization, gave the western world the best and most accurate news about an enemy who never stopped threatening freedom. " (132)

At this point it should be mentioned that the aforementioned Dr. Günther Nollau, who later became President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, repeatedly as a candidate for the SPD

vacant post of Vice President in the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) was announced and offered. Nollau was rejected for security reasons. General Gehlen on this in his last publication

"Verschlußsache" (133): "First and

foremost it was the never-explained circumstances of his 'escape' from what was then the SBZ in 1950, which made employment in the service impossible. It was undoubtedly helpful that a large part of the press expressed understanding and approval of this rejection at the time, including 'Die Zeit' with a noteworthy contribution from the pen of Countess Dönhoff." (133)

At the end of this chapter there may be the words that Bernd Nellessen and Werner Johe in "Die Welt" (134) on the subject "Gehlen Cannot Cite His Sources" published:

"Reinhard Gehlen reports the physical death of a man who, quite possibly, ate Stalin's bread of mercy for a number of years, but who has long since been buried politically. If he was Stalin's agent - he made the perfidy of the Führer clique in the millennium all the more clear to us, but we do not need this proof." (134)

CHAPTER TWENTY-SECOND

Soviet agents in high US government positions — Presidential advisers Harry Dexter White and Harry Hopkins also Soviet agents — Bormann's orders for the treatment of enemy planes that had landed in distress — US Major Jordan's encounters with Soviet agents - His revelations - Harry Hopkins ban on recording uranium shipments to the Soviets - Roosevelt's illness and incapacitation

In the previous chapters, an attempt was made to critically describe the life of Adolf Hitler's inconspicuous companion, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, who is inextricably linked to one of the most tragic periods of German history. Martin Bormann's work in the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) until he became Adolf Hitler's closest collaborator and confidante has meanwhile also become widely known to the general public at home and abroad.

Less well known, however, is what has happened around him since he disappeared into nowhere, since Joachim Tiburtius saw him for the last time on May 2, 1945, at around 2 a.m. at the "Hotel Atlas" in Berlin Friedrichstrasse. At this time, Martin Bormann was neither wounded nor disabled. Apart from the eyewitness and newspaper reports, there are no other documents that could provide precise information. Based on the available information, however, it can be concluded with a high degree of probability, even with certainty, that he survived: 1. The "New York Times" reported on 12 June 1945 based on a report by the Soviet-controlled Berlin radio station that Martin Bormann had been arrested, probably by the Russians.

2. "*Kärntner Nachrichten*", Klagenfurt, June 13, 1945: The Soviet-controlled Prague Radio reported the arrest of Martin Bormann.
3. *Gertrud von Heimerdinger* saw Martin Bormann le 275 during an interrogation in Berlin-Moabit, around June 13, 1945

bend in the circle of Soviet soldiers. The Soviet interrogation officer Kriwitzki confirmed to Gertrud von Heimerdinger that Bormann had been arrested.

4. According to the Berlin broadcaster (under Soviet administration), the "*Kölnischer Kurier*" reported the arrest of Martin Bormann on June 16, 1945.
5. On June 17, 1945, the "*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*" reports the arrest of Martin Bor, with reference to Radio Moscow mans.
6. On September 1, 1945, the "*New York Times*" reported the arrest of Martin Bormann by the Russians.
7. *Wassilij Wassilewsky*, former senior officer from the army group of Soviet Marshal Zhukov, reports after fleeing to the West, in the "*Marburger Presse*" No. 60/1949 of March 12, 1949, that he met Martin Bormann on April 30 (?) 1945, afternoon in a Russian officer's car and he was obligated to keep the strictest silence about it.
- 8th. *Soviet officer Juschko*, who was imprisoned by the Soviets in the Sachsenhausen camp, said he was waiting for Martin Bormann shortly before the capitulation in the immediate vicinity of the Reich Chancellery bunker and brought him to Moscow in a special plane.

We turn our attention once again to the very conclusive report of Wassilewsky, who had been a senior political officer on the staff of Army Group Zhukov.

Wassilewsky writes at the beginning that since the beginning of the Russian campaign, Soviet war propaganda had not only attacked the greats of the Third Reich, but also personalities of the "second rank", such as Reich Youth Leader Axmann, Dr. Todt and others, Wassilewsky further reported: "It must have been all the more striking to the unbiased observer that the name of the German Reichsleiter Martin Bormann was neither mentioned, nor attacked, indeed hushed up."

This statement about the absence of Martin's name Bormann in Soviet war propaganda also agrees with the statement that Martin Bormann's name was missing

in the new Soviet Russian encyclopedia, as Prof. Dr. Stadt Müller announces:

"In the comprehensive, extensive and very detailed 'Soviet Historical Encyclopedia', which has so far appeared in 12 volumes under the overall editing of EM Zhukov (Moscow 1961-1969), numerous important figures of the National Socialist period are covered with biographical articles.

So the party greets Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Hess, Himmler, Rosenberg, Ribbentrop, Donitz, Raeder, the field marshals Rommel, Reichenau, Manstein, List, the generals Rendulic, Leeb and others. The almighty Bormann is missing. It is difficult to explain this striking fact with editorial sloppiness." (134a)

Our previous considerations related to the work of Martin Bormann in certain events in the Third Reich and also extended to the theater of war in the east and south-east as well as to Norway. Bormann's influence and his collaboration with Adolf Hitler caused immeasurable damage to the German people and Reich and at the same time benefited the enemy in the East, so that it is justified to use the words Benesch to describe him as "Stalin's agent".

In order to be able to comprehend these events in their entirety, it is necessary to broaden our view of what is happening in the intelligence services.

We know from David Dallin (18) that "in the sphere of Soviet foreign policy, espionage is more important than foreign intelligence activities, such as those carried out by other powers ... Never in history has a government had more Trust in the secret intelligence service and attached greater importance to it. Nor has there ever been such an insatiable, excessive hunger for information from other countries.

This phenomenon is rooted in the Soviet belief in the imminence of major international conflicts, despite respites, 'fried lider coexistence'; this phenomenon is further rooted in the deep-seated and actual, albeit veiled

and desperately repressed feeling of inferiority that extends to more than one area and can be heard in the loud talk about the magnitude of one's successes. The Soviet leadership looks at the West with hatred and awe; the West repels her and she still admires it; she lives in an almost mystical sense of his power and at the same time creates an exaggerated image of his ugly features. As the opposition between 'capitalism' and 'socialism' inevitably deepens, the present time appears as part of a great world revolution...

Here lies the reason why the Soviet leadership attaches ever-increasing importance to intelligence of every kind, and why it maintains with such vigor a network of foreign agents unequaled...

From the historian's point of view, the performance of the entire apparatus is... remarkable and almost unique. Dozens of Soviet ND (intelligence) posts, spread across Western Europe and staffed by men and women of various nationalities, had long been on hold. Their radios had been silent, but now, as the first shot rang out on the distant eastern front, they began ticking in almost perfect unison. A stream of important information flowed to Moscow from all over Europe. Never in the history of warfare has espionage played such a crucial role as it did for the Soviet Union in 1941-1944."

Elsewhere Dallin writes: "The

foreign network of the Soviet ND is today the largest ND network in the world" (1956), "probably larger than the sum of the ND organizations of all other countries. The Soviet ND system relies on the one hand on 46 embassies, legations and diplomatic missions abroad, on the other hand on 53 communist parties in the Free World, furthermore on a number of apparatuses dependent on Soviet embassies and communist parties - one of the most remarkable phenomena of our time."

Igor Gusenko, code clerk at a Soviet embassy

in America, the author of *I Chose Liberty*, wrote after Dallin: "Thousands, indeed thousands, of agents were working in the United States, thousands in Britain, and many other thousands throughout the world." Based on his own experience at the headquarters of the military intelligence service, Gusenko explains that "from thousands of agents...a constant stream of information details came in".

Only after the war did a picture of the extent of Soviet espionage in the United States begin to emerge. In a top secret report to the White House, FBI Director Edgar Hoover disclosed the names of the following American officials who had passed information through intermediaries to Soviet government intelligence agents (18): 1.

- dr Gregory Silvermaster*, longtime official at the Department of Agriculture.
2. *Harry Dexter White*, Senior Contributor to Finance Ministers
3. *George Silverman*, formerly the Railways Board of Pensions, now the War Office.
4. *Lauchlin Currie*, formerly clerk to the late President Roosevelt.
5. *Victor Perlo*, formerly Office of War Production and Office of Foreign Aid.
6. *Donald Wheeler*, formerly Office of Strategy Services (OSS).
7. *Major Duncan*, OSS. 8th.
Julius Joseph, OSS.
9. *Helen Tenney*, OSS.
10. *Matinee Halperin*, OSS.
11. *Charles Kramer*, former aide to Senator Kilgore.
12. *Captain William Ludwig Ullmann*, US Army Air Corps.
13. *Lt. Col. John H. Reynolds*, Army.

None of those named were arrested. But Number Two, Harry Dexter White, was promoted to a very influential position in the International Monetary Fund. On February 1st

In 1946, FBI Director Edgar Hoover warned the White House through General Harry H. Vaughan for the second time against installing Harry Dexter White as the American delegate to the International Monetary Fund. Hoover wrote, among other things:

"As can be seen, the Bureau" (FBI) "has come into possession of information accusing White of being a key member of an underground Soviet espionage organization operating in Washington, DC.

According to the information available, material that was accessible to him because of his official position was forwarded to Nathan Gregory Silvermaster and William Ludwig Ullmann through intermediaries. Both Silvermaster and Ullmann are employed by the United States Treasury and are reported to be directly under the White's official supervision.

Information and documents from the Treasury were either forwarded directly or photocopied by Ullmann in a well-equipped photo lab in the basement of the Silvermasters' home. The material then went to New York by courier and was handed over to Jakob M. Golos...

This entire network has been examined in detail since November 1945. As a result of this investigation, I am able to send you this report today..."

The FBI's warnings were ignored. Harry Dexter White assumed the new post, taking with him members of the spy ring named in the FBI report. It was three more years before the American public, shaken by the scale of Soviet espionage, turned its previous indifference into outright outrage. In the early 1950s, after Dallin, eighty-seven cases were investigated involving foreign diplomats or persons with quasi-diplomatic status. Of these individuals, forty-eight belonged to various embassies and consulates, while thirty-seven were in the service of "international organizations." Among the embassies and consulates of foreign powers, the

representations of Poland and Czechoslovakia as bases for pro-Soviet espionage.

We come back to Harry Dexter White.

Von Bailey and Freidin: "The Experts. Master builder and destroyer of US foreign policy" (136), we learn that White was "the most important, because most powerful, American agent of the Soviet Union. In the early 1920s, while still a student, he was recruited by the OGPU. He was therefore no more or less unconscious contact man, no intermediary, no 'agent of influence', but a real hired, trained Soviet spy with clear ties to Russian functionaries. When he entered the U.S. Treasury Department in 1937, his efforts soon succeeded in insinuating Communist comrades in such numbers and into such positions that that department became a Communist fulcrum in the government...

From White's diary and guest lists it was stated that he arranged meetings of 'a number of selected senior officials from various departments' 'for the purpose of exchanging views and influencing policy decisions...

With White as the initiator and most active partner, far-reaching changes could be brought about in our government through such meetings'...

From 1941 to 1945, White was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and a representative to a number of major organizations important to the war effort. He had a position of such importance that it gave him access to virtually every aspect of American foreign policy...

When the war broke out, he managed to have the applicable wartime economic regulations repealed and German property confiscated and liquidated immediately...

At the Bretton-Woods International Monetary Fund Conference (1944) White was the chief American delegate and gave the negotiations the direction he desired... Towards the end of 1953 it was determined that the delivery of two sets of printing plates for printing Be

statute mark to the Soviets went into White's debt account. The United States was left behind and suffered enormous damage ...

Before the investigation was complete, it was also clear that Harry Dexter White had crowned his mining work against the free world with one of the most momentous fiscal operations in contemporary history: the catastrophic inflation of the Chinese yen. This was a development that contributed significantly to the economic chaos during the final stages of Chiang Kai-shek's fight against Communism on the mainland...

The rise of Harry Dexter White, whose parents still called themselves White when they immigrated from Russia, had also devised the plan that would later go down in post-war history under the name 'Morgen thauplan'.

White was exposed at the inquest by former Soviet intelligence couriers Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers as one of their liaisons.

While his case was still being investigated, he died under mysterious circumstances" (according to Bailey and Freidin, White committed suicide by jumping from the 14th floor of a Washington building in August 1948). "Subsequent revelations, however, confirmed the treason he had committed.

Harry Dexter White naturally supported the Morgenthau Plan on behalf of his Soviet clients because it would have destroyed the economy of Western Europe. Because that was part of the program of militant communism.

The proposal ('Morgenthau Plan') was based on another Machiavellian idea of the communists. By enticing the Americans and British to admit that they were the fathers of what Hull calls 'the catastrophic plan for Germany', these conspirators were able to inculcate hatred and loathing for Western democracies in the German people for years to come. Moscow then hoped for a mass conversion of the Germans to communism because, in view of this plan, he regarded them as the lesser of two evils

had to appear. Whichever way you look at it, the Morgenthau Plan could only hurt the United States...

Harry Dexter White had received his instructions from Jakob Golos, a senior Russian official in America who ran a number of communist cells in the American government and was one of the mysterious masterminds of two spy rings surrounding the White House. Of course, the Communists who belonged to this organization knew that Henry Morgenthau was the weak pipe they could use for their purposes, and that his 'deputy' White was the right man for the job." (136)

At this point we consider it necessary, in connection with the so-called Morgenthau Plan of the Soviet agent Harry Dexter White, to recall further measures taken by the then communist-infiltrated US Army and American military government in Germany. We quote from Bailey and Freidin (136): 1. 'In the

- early phase of the occupation the communists had quickly recognized their opportunities and acted accordingly to secure key positions. This was particularly true of the unions..."
2. "In December 1946, Stephan Heym became... an officer in the US Psychological Warfare Division Army and co-founder of the military government-published 'Neue Zeitung' demobilized because of his communist connections... In 1950 Heym resigned his American citizenship and relocated to East Germany in protest at US involvement in the Korean War."
 3. "In the spring of 1947, the Officers' Review Board proposed the dismissal of one Captain George Wheeler, who had worked on union affairs in the Economics Department of the Military Government... Reason: Communist affiliations. He later resigned at his own request, although General Clay pardoned him. Not long after, the US Embassy shared

General Clay in Prague by telephone that Wheeler had applied for asylum in Czechoslovakia and had been accepted. He is already teaching communist dogmatics at a middle school in Prague."

4. "In 1948, Representative George Dondero of Michigan held Secretary of War Patterson accountable for his failure to relieve 'Communist sympathizers who wormed their way into high key positions in the Army' from their posts. Among the ten crypto-communists named by Dondero was Josiah E. Dubois, the chief prosecutor in the Nuremberg IG Farben trial then in progress. Dondero described Dubois as a 'well-known leftist from the Treasury' who had delved deeply into communist theories.' 5. "In 1949, Delbert Clark, head of the Germany section of The New York Times, was exposed as a registered member of the American Communist Party by none other than the late SPD leader Kurt Schumacher."

6. "A high-ranking American intelligence officer said: 'The American policy on Germany was 'planned and formulated at Dzerzhinskyplatz' (the seat of the KGB headquarters in Moscow).' The expert is exaggerating here: the USA's Germany policy was planned and formulated in the Kremlin. Preparations were then made for the realization at Dzerzhinskyplatz."

Finally, when the numerous tortures of German prisoners of war by American interrogators for the purpose of extracting confessions took place, e.g. B. in the Malmedy trial, as has been handed down by Friedrich Oskar and others ("No grass grows over the gallows"), then the words of George N. Crocker (137) in his book "Pacemakers of the Soviets" are of considerable importance, since he Page 193 writes that the Morgenthau Plan "was intended to instill in the German people hatred and disgust for Western democracies for years to come."

We flash back:

Feelings like hate and disgust against the German people

However, it must also have been caused by measures and orders by Martin Bormann when dealing with the treatment of Allied airmen shot down. "In an announcement dated March 22, 1944 regarding the 'treatment by the German population of British and American aircrew who had landed in distress', Martin Bormann informed the Gauleiter that the population was arresting Allied airmen, but 'not those appropriate to the severity of the war distance' true. You should therefore be informed accordingly. 'Anyone who acts in an undignified manner towards the aircrew who landed in bad faith or out of misunderstood pity will be ruthlessly held accountable. In extreme cases, they are sent to a concentration camp and published in the district newspapers. In less severe cases, protective custody lasts no less than 14 days at the responsible state police headquarters, which will preferentially call on these comrades for clean-up work.'" (41)

As early as May 30, 1944, Martin Bormann issued an instruction to the officials of the party, "in which he forbade the intervention of the police or the initiation of criminal proceedings against persons who had taken part in the lynching of Allied airmen". (111) On September 30, 1944, his order was issued, according to which Bormann withdrew jurisdiction over prisoners of war from the Wehrmacht and handed it over to Himmler (111). According to this, the lynching of Allied airmen who had landed in distress had been made unpunishable by Martin Bormann, which favored the revengeful justice of the Allies.

With that digression, we turn our attention to another Presidential Advisor, Harry Hopkins. After Bailey and Freidin (136), General Mark Clark writes that "Roosevelt initially expressed keen interest in the plan for an invasion from the Adriatic, but was then dissuaded by Harry Hopkins. The Soviets had prepared it accordingly. He had returned from his post as ambassador in Moscow as the Kremlin's mouthpiece, spreading 'disinformation'". (136)

We do not have a biography of Harry Hopkins. He should

to have been ailing and died in early 1946. The following quotes are from George N. Croker (137): "Hopkin's view of the birthplace of Communism was a confused jumble of nonsensical ideas. He lacked any objectivity, his words made a childish impression. Until his death ... he considered his fata morgana of Russia to be a radiant reality. One should not think it possible that as late as August 1945 a person who was even somewhat in the know wrote the following: 'We know or believe that

Russia's interests, as far as we can foresee them, offer no opportunity for major disagreement with us on foreign policy.' Germany had capitulated in May, Stalin had broken his promises made at Yalta before the ink was dry; and the dark shadow of a new and terrible tyranny had spread over Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the man who for years had been the most trusted adviser to the President of the United States dictated this outrageous nonsense to his shorthand typist. And of the Russian people, who have been anaesthetized by the Bolsheviks for 28 years and have had no free traditions and no experience of democracy throughout their history, he said, 'they think and act just like us'. One would have asked for more insight from every student in the first semester!" (137)

Elsewhere, Croker writes: "The

Russophilia of the Harry Hopkins gang of White House minions was indeed almost pathological. Not even consideration of the implications for the security of the United States for years to come would dissuade these men. General Deane, who from his convenient vantage point in Moscow" (US liaison officer) "observed the flood of American aid to Russia and attended the related conferences, writes in his book that Harry Hopkins launched the Russia aid program "with a carried out with zeal that bordered on fanaticism'. The enthusiasm for it 'was so ingrained in his flesh and blood that he could no longer hold it in proportion'."

President Roosevelt took Harry Hopkins to all the major international conferences, such as Yalta, Cairo, Tehran, Ca'Sablanca and Quebec, where world decisions were made. President Roosevelt also sent Harry Hopkins on confidential talks with Winston Churchill and Stalin. "In the background, while the big men sat around the round table, Hopkins scribbled something important or just silly gossip on a piece of paper and passed it to the President."

One of the US State Department's experts, Alger Hiss, gave notes he had written to President Roosevelt during the Yalta conference. Alger Hiss sat behind President Roosevelt during plenary sessions with Harry Hopkins. Alger Hiss was charged with providing classified State Department papers and perjury and sentenced to five years in prison. (Gunzenhäuser, "History of the Secret Intelligence Service", 1968)

"Meanwhile, the secret implementation of the federal authorities with members of the Communist Party was already well advanced," reports Croker, referring to Borkenau: "From 1941 onwards, the Communists were assigned tasks such as: in America and England up to to infiltrate existing political and intelligence agencies... Lauchlin Currie secretly assisted the President in certain government business; going so far as to write his letters on White House stationery. Communist cells had sprung up in foreign, finance, trade, and other ministries. The growing war bureaucracy brought loyal Americans to Washington alongside cloaked renegades and schemers whose hearts were devoted to foreign power and ideologies. Members of a subversive network of conspirators, they held positions enabling them to advise cabinet members and write their speeches, nestle on important congressional committees, keep congressional minutes, and draft messages for publication. Even then they were espionage

rings that were only uncovered by the revelations of later years. Harry Hopkins was therefore not entirely wrong in his prophecy that 'the troubles with our public opinion regarding Russia would begin to be sorted out'.

America wasn't on guard!" (137)

We learn more details about Lauchlin Currie (see above) from

Crocker: "Lauchlin Currie sat at a desk in the White House as the President's confidential handler for Far East issues. He was not a native American, and we may assume that he did not care too much about his American citizenship, for after the war he shook the American dust off his shoes, settled and worked in Colombia, and retained his citizenship expire after five years; when witnesses testified when various espionage cases were uncovered in 1948 that he too belonged to the spy group around Silvermaster, Lauchlin Currie probably thought it more advisable to leave for South America and stay there. But during his guest appearances in the White House, under the protective wing of Mr. Roosevelt, the benevolent smile of the country's first lady, and in close contact with Harry Hopkins—which made him bolder by the day—"Leek" was what the President called him, placed so well that he could actually help other people. But Lauchlin Currie's sense of support from those around him was very special. He enjoyed working with Harry Dexter White and Nathan Witt to recommend Nathan G. Silvermaster; and when military intelligence was outraged that Silvermaster had been given a government job in which he had seen and heard much, and produced a classified report indicating that it was with the Seattle and San Francisco Police Departments, the 13th Naval District, the American Legion, and the FBI as a member and leader of the Communist Party and was on file as such, and when this report concluded that 'the overwhelming evidence was numerous

Testimonies of all kinds and other sources show without any doubt that Nathan G. Silvermaster is now and has been for years a member and leader of the Communist Party and very likely a secret agent of the GPU', it was Lauchlin Currie who successfully interceded on Silvermaster's behalf and made sure he stayed in government. To assist him, Lauchlin Currie sought out one Michael Greenberg, who was of English descent. In fact, he could claim to be a connoisseur of the Far East, but he also happened to have been a trained communist for many years. He, too, soon felt so at home in his new surroundings that he wrote his letters on White House stationery..." (Like Lauchlin Currie, so) (137)

Returning to President Roosevelt's aide and adviser, Harry Hopkins. Major Racey Jordan was associated with Hopkins when he served as liaison officer and expeditor of a portion of the United States lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union at Newark Airport and Great Falls, Montana, from May 1942 to June 1944 was. The vast mass of Lend-Lease material that was airlifted from the United States to the Soviet Union under "diplomatic immunity" included war material and supplies of all kinds, including mining and smelting plants, entire factories, etc. worth \$9.5 billion. This happened what General Ludendorff had foreseen when, on March 30, 1937, when he was in the Munich General Command, Adolf Hitler was very serious about war or military complications

warned:

"This time the United States will intervene on an even different scale, and Germany will eventually be destroyed." (52)

Major Jordan was not a professional soldier, as he writes in the foreword to his book, which he entitled "Soviets are victorious through spies" (138). He had volunteered in the interests of his fatherland. "Fortunately for me there are no reasons

to pinch because some pressure might be exerted on me. I represent the game as I saw it..."

The planes unloaded in the Soviet Union returned to the United States, manned by numerous agents and spies, where they researched the most important industries, their technologies, their patents, even armaments secrets and tons of secret political and military material as "diplomatic baggage" via Siberia shipped to Moscow. Roosevelt and his Hopkins, White and Morgenthau gave Stalin's spies an accurate picture of American nuclear research. At the same time they were supplied with the components required for the construction of an atomic bomb, such as: uranium, cadmium, heavy water, and cobalt. Tons of atomic material had been flown to the Soviet Union in this way since 1943.

Major Jordan uncovered all of this personally, so he can be considered a credible eyewitness. He writes: "It was more than I could handle. Eventually I protested through official channels, first in Great Falls and then in Washington.

Nothing happened." It was to be a long time before Major Jordan, with the help of superiors, members of parliament, radio commentators, and finally the Federal Criminal Police Office (FBI), was able to bring this complex before the American public.

American author William wrote after Major Jordan Henry Chamberlain on Harry Hopkins:

"Hopkins was the most powerful man in America during the war after the President. He was the administrator of the Lend-Lease. The law under which he operated had never been submitted to any court for comment or examination; and therefore it was he who explained the law; He alone decided what we delivered to Russia under Lend-Lease, and he himself said, addressing Stalin directly, that he had interpreted the law liberally when he had (also) non-military material shipped in support of Stalin."

Major Jordan quotes the following words from a speech given by Harry Hopkins in New York at Madison Square Garden at a rally in support of Russia:

"We know that in the past year you (Russians) have rendered all of us and all mankind an invaluable service in a heroic struggle against our common enemy. We are determined not to let anything prevent us from sharing with you all that we have and are in this conflict; and we look forward to share with you the fruits of victory and peace...' Mr. Hopkins concluded: 'Generations yet unborn will become much of theirs

owe freedom to the invincible might of the Soviet people.'"

On page 154 of his book Soviets are victorious through spies (138), Major Jordan reports on an interview Fulton Lewis had with Major Jordan's former superior, Colonel Gardner. "At the time," Fulton Lewis shared, "the Russians were dissatisfied with the way their affairs were being handled, which prompted them frequently to telephone their embassy in Washington, the one dealing with Mr. Hopkins had to make contact. All difficulties were then immediately eliminated.

I asked Colonel Gardner how he knew that Mr. Hopkins did that job. He replied that this was generally known there; the Russians referred to him, and so did everyone. That was general routine knowledge, he explained."

A direct long-distance conversation that took place between Major Jordan and Harry Hopkins in April 1943 deserves to be recorded.

Colonel Kotikov, the Soviet liaison officer who worked closely with Major Jordan on these Lend-Lease shipments, wanted a quarter of a million pounds in arrears. to smuggle an extremely important shipment ("experimental chemicals") to Russia. When Major Jordan refused for the above reason, Colonel Kotikov spoke to an agency in Washington. "Then there was an interruption with Slavic guttural sounds. Then he turned to me again. ,Mr.

Hopkins — appearing now,' he reported. Then he offered me the surprise of a lifetime. He handed me the receiver and announced

dete: 'The big boss Mr. Hopkins wants you.' For a moment I was silent. I was about to speak for the first time with a legendary figure of our day, the first man in the world of lend-lease in which I lived.

I recorded the following report as conscientiously as possible, both in substance and in wording. My memory, which is usually good, was sharpened by the upsetting events. The incident is so etched in my memory because it was unique among the experiences of nearly twenty-five months in Newark and Great Falls.

A little uneasily I stammered, 'This is Major Jordan speaking.' A male voice immediately began, 'This is Hopkins. Are you my expedient there?' I replied that I was the United States envoy at Great Falls, working with Colonel Kotikov.

Under such circumstances, who could have doubted that the speaker was Harry Hopkins? Since then, friends have often asked me whether it might not have been a Soviet agent who was American. I doubt it because his next comment was about something only he and I could have known about. He asked, 'Did you get the pilots I sent you?' — 'Oh yes,' I replied, 'they were very welcome and helped me clear the chock in the pipeline. However, we were accused of bypassing official channels and all hell was loosed on me.'

Mr. Hopkins ignored that and got to the heart of the matter: 'Well, Jordan,' he said, 'there's a certain shipment of chemicals going through there. I want you to speed this up. This is something very

special.' 'Shall I discuss it with the commanding colonel?'

'I don't want you to discuss this with anyone,' commanded Mr. Hopkins. 'There is nothing to be entered in the records either. Don't make a big deal out of it, just send it on quickly, with the utmost expediency!' I asked how I

could identify this shipment when it arrived. He turned away from the phone and I got his

Hear a voice say, 'How can Jordan distinguish this shipment when it arrives?' He came back to the line and answered: 'The Russian colonel there will tell you. Well, send the shipment on as soon as possible and make sure none of it gets on file!'

Then a Russian voice interrupted with an order for Colonel Kotikov. I was full of curiosity when Kotikov finished, hoping to find out what it was about and where the shipment was coming from. He said there were more 'chemicals' and they came from Canada, 'I'll show you,' he announced... From his bundle of files at on war chemicals, the colonel then took a folder labeled 'bomb powder'.

He pulled out a sheet of paper and placed his finger on an entry. The word 'uranium' meets my eyes for the second time. (I repeat, in 1943 it meant as much to me as it does to most Americans, namely nothing.)...

Fifteen wooden crates were loaded onto one of the shipments that left for Moscow via Alaska. In Fairbanks, Lieutenant Brown reported, a box fell out of the plane; one corner broke open and spilled a small amount of chocolate brown powder. Out of curiosity, Brown picked up a handful of the alien grains, intending to ask someone what they were. A Soviet officer slapped these crystals out of his cupped hands and yelled excitedly, 'No, don't — burns hands!'"

We finish quoting Major Jordan's records of uranium shipments to the Soviet Union: "It was not conclusively

established until late 1949, from highly reliable records, that federal agencies had sent at least three shipments of uranium chemicals to Russia during the war, totaling 1465 lbs., so almost three quarters of a ton. Delivery of one kilo or 2.2 lbs was also confirmed. Uranium metal, at a time when total American reserves were 4.5 lbs. deceive ...

The first two shipments of uranium traveled through Great Falls by air. The third was hauled by truck and rail, from Rochester, New York, to Portland,

Oregon, and then on the ship to Vladivostok: March and June 1943 and July 1944.

There is no doubt that the transaction discussed between Mr. Hopkins and myself took place in June 1943."

This chapter will end with a brief consideration of the health of President Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins as reported by George N. Croker (137).

As a White House Physician, he only gives Dr. McIntire, who may have been the chief physician, since the number of staff in the White House, the official residence of the President, was considerable during the war. A personal physician of the ailing President, who certainly required constant care, is not named. Croker reports on Roosevelt's health and appearance:

"In fact, he was already a sick man. Sherwood, who met him at the White House shortly after the Quebec Conference after not seeing him for months, said he was shocked at his appearance. I had already heard that he had become considerably thinner, but I had not expected this almost wasted face'. Secretary Stimson was also concerned about the President's physical and mental condition...

On September 11, 1944, the day the conference began, he wrote in his diary: 'I am very concerned about the President's state of health... I fear the effects of this tiring conference on him... I am in grave concern that he is going there without any real preparation for a solution to the difficult question of how Germany should be treated. As far as he has indicated in his discussions with us, he has absolutely no knowledge or experience of the exceedingly difficult problem which we are to decide.' drove to Yalta as if going on vacation. In fact, Hopkins writes quite frankly in his remarks: 'I was convinced the President was going to get back in Roosevelt... shape

men when he went to the Crimea, because he still knew the area

didn't know... and second, because once the election was over, he didn't have to worry about her for political reasons.' While the 'Quincy' crossed the Atlantic, he rested most of the time. James F. Burnes, who was also on board, was surprised that he did not prepare at all for the upcoming conference, even though there were stacks of files and documents on board. That worried Burnes.

Maybe his illness played a role in that. According to Stettinius, the president was already in poor health when he delivered his inaugural address on January 20 from the steps of the White House. 'That day not only did his hands tremble, but his whole body.' (Stettinius) On the other hand, Stettinius found him, when the ship entered Malta on February 2nd, 'cheerful, calm and well rested', or at least he says so in his book. Admiral King later told Harry Hopkins that he had noticed a significant deterioration in his health since taking office, which concerned him greatly (Sherwood). Nevertheless, Sherwood assures us that Mr. Roosevelt was 'cheerful as ever and excited at the prospect of new adventures as he disembarked from the Quincy for the rest of the voyage by air'.

A member of the US Navy interpreters' group in Yalta, who was able to observe Roosevelt at the conference and even served as his Russian interpreter on one occasion, was among the Americans who had trouble suppressing their displeasure. He felt, as he tells us, that President Roosevelt 'didn't belong at this conference.'

His lay diagnosis was quite simple: 'He looked ill, and acted and spoke like one.' (Statement by Andrew Sawchuk to the International News Service on 3/20/1955)."

In the chapter "Yalta" of his book, Croker writes: "Attracted from the beginning as by a magnet to the opposite party, Roosevelt offered a picture that can only be described as pathetic. This withering President, who slowly faded away from earthly life, who was dubbed and outwitted on every issue, of meaningless, stereotypical phrases

in the mouth and downright dripping with compliments before the dictator (Stalin)...

Returning to Washington, the President, seated in a wheelchair, addressed both houses of Congress in joint session. Since leaving Washington, he boasted, he had 'not been sick a single day,' it was just much more comfortable for him to be in a wheelchair because the braces on his legs weighed ten pounds. The Senators and Representatives in the front rows listened to him in disbelief, for they saw before them a man who was evidently at an end.

But of course everyone has the right to judge their own health, and perhaps a certain optimism is even healing. After all, one could not expect that Mr.

Roosevelt reported the same as one of those who observed him at Yalta: 'He looked sick and acted and spoke like a sick person.' Nor can he be blamed for the fact that his statement before Congress did not agree with Churchill's observations, which reports that the President at Yalta 'was ailing', that 'his face looked translucent... and often an absent-minded expression on his eyes' and that 'at the farewell at the end of the conference the President made a quiet, frail impression. I had the feeling that his life was hanging by a thin thread.' (Churchill 'Triumph and Tragedy') In any case, the carefully staged performance at the Capitol was superbly done and organized; so all the photos were checked and only those found useful were allowed to be published. There was no television back then. ..."

CONCLUSION

"Soviets are victorious through spies" - Soviet foreign policy through espionage - US Presidential Advisor Harry Hopkins in office at the same time as Martin Bormann - "Scouts of Peace" - Comparison between Richard Sorge - Martin Bormann - Prof. Morell

The American major George Racey Jordan titled his book (138) with the four words "Soviets are victorious through spies". If one considers that Soviet foreign policy uses the intelligence results of its worldwide foreign espionage as the basis of its policy, then the numerous Soviet successes in negotiations with "capitalist" and other representatives of the western world are more understandable. Countless "peace scouts", as spies were called in Soviet parlance, were deployed on their path to the "victories of socialism" all over the world, which they had embarked on and consistently pursued since 1917.

National Socialism and international socialism threatened and fought each other. Although National Socialism had great initial military successes, it had no prospect of a comprehensive final victory. The reasons were explained.

With the fall of National Socialism, the threat to the Soviet Union was eliminated. After the fall of Adolf Hitler, an era of peace was predicted and hoped for. That was in vain. The last German prisoners of war were still in Soviet Russian custody when the first post-war wars broke out in Korea and Indochina.

Diplomatic games and warfare often rely on clandestine intelligence exploration. We have the existence and operation of Soviet-Communist spy rings in the White House, the obscure closer associates

ters and advisers to President Roosevelt. His constant companion and closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, seems to have been an agent of influence, just as Martin Bormann was at the same time with Hitler.

The task of such "peace scouts" is to operate at the top of government in the target areas. Guillaume, the Ostagent in the Federal Chancellery in Bonn, over whom the then Chancellor Willy Brandt fell, was one. Other examples are the "queen's servant and Moscow spy", Anthony Blunt, the fourth after Burgess, McLean and Philby (FAZ, November 17, 1979), and the Soviet diplomat Viktor Lessiowski, who is one of the UN Secretary General's closest associates Kurt Waldheim was ("Neue Zeit", October 12, 1979). Audi Christel Broszey, the secretary of the deputy CDU chairman Kurt Biedenkopf, also Inge Goliath, secretary of the foreign policy expert of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, Werner Marx, and the secretary of the Bonn State Secretary Manfred Lahnstein, Helga Röding, were as East agents exposed or fled to the GDR. The SPD member of the Bundestag Frenzel was unmasked. The SPD member of parliament Friedrich Cremer was sentenced to imprisonment for spying for the GDR ("Neue Zürcher Zeitung", May 18/19, 1980). Ursel Lorenzen, a close associate of the head of NATO, Terence Moran, worked for eleven years in NATO before she fled to the GDR, from where she made massive statements on television about NATO's aggressive intentions (March 10, 1979). After 16 months of intensive police observation, the Deputy Military Attache of the Soviet Embassy in Canada, Lieutenant Colonel Valery Smirnov, was ordered to leave the country on 7/22/1977 on charges of technical espionage. Barely a month after a senior Soviet diplomat at the Consulate General of the USSR in Marseille was expelled for military espionage, the press attache of the Consulate also had to leave France (March 6, 1980).

"The GDR thanks its spies", the "FAZ" (February 9, 1980) headed an article. We quote from it: "SED General Secretary Honecker has all spies and agents

ten of the GDR thanks and recognition.' In a greeting from the Central Committee of the SED on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Ministry for State Security in the GDR, it says: 'The Central Committee of the SED speaks

to all members of the Ministry for State Security and the Feliks Dzierzynski Guard Regiment as well as the courageous spies and fighters at the thank you and appreciation to the invisible front.'

This appeal ends with the following words: 'In

the future, too, clarifying and thwarting the plans and intentions of imperialism, the forces of aggression, revanchism, great-power chauvinism and ensuring reliable protection of our country remain crucial tasks for the state security service. The Central Committee is certain that the members of the Ministry for State Security will continue to honorably fulfill every combat mission under all conditions in loyalty and devotion to the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party as socialist patriots(!) and proletarian internationalists.'" "In 1945 the Soviet agent Dr. Richard Sorge executed by the Japanese. For twenty years the Soviet Union disowned him before publicly recognizing him as their agent and

proclaiming him a Hero of the Soviet Union. Bormann will probably have to do without being honored as a hero of the Soviet Union until the Soviet troops are on the Rhine or the Atlantic. Dr. medical Morell is unlikely to share that honor. He seems to have been just a stooge." (1)

SUPPLEMENTS TO THE SECOND EDITION

TO THE NINTH CHAPTER

Hans Kehrl, head of the raw materials office in the Speer Ministry, reports in his memoirs (139) on an agitated debate in the Economics Ministry: "I rumbled: 'Bormann is our

evil spirit. He seeks to prevent everything that is right and necessary, and promotes everything that should be prevented. He acts as if bribed by the enemy.' I was taken aback by my own statement: 'And

what if it really were like that?' This suspicion would not leave me since then. I kept thinking about it.

Especially when, after the assassination attempt on Hitler, I heard from my Swiss source: 'The news from headquarters is still coming.'

What I thought was possible then, I still think is quite possible now: perhaps Bormann was somehow in contact with a foreign power, for example the Soviet Union. His mysterious hiding in Berlin in the last days of April or beginning of May 1945 also fed such an interpretation. The widespread theory that Bormann might still be alive probably also owes its existence to such ideas. Gehlen also believed he had to look for him in the Soviet Union. Whether the alleged corpse of Bormann found recently in Berlin is really the solution to the riddle will probably always remain unclear."

The tone of the first-name friend of Martin Bormann, Erich Kochs, Hans Kehrl reports on p. 228 of his memoirs:

"Kehrl, I can tell you that if you somehow get in my way, disrupt the guidelines of my administration or Ukraine-Ostfaser GmbH does not follow my instructions, then you can experience something. You yourself have no business in the Ukraine, since you belong to the Reich Ministry of Economics, according to the general regulations. If I you

should make an unauthorized impact there, your last screams will be echoed in the Pripet swamps of my region."

On page 367 of his book, Otto Brautigam gives another example: "I didn't

spare myself the acquaintance of Koch for long. On my next visit to Berlin, I met him in Dr. Leibbrandt. He was a short, stocky, very lively man, the type of person who, because of his inconspicuous figure, has an inferiority complex and tries to appease this by being as loud and obtrusive as possible. During the conversation he tried to make it clear to Leibbrandt and me that he was Goering's exponent in the Ukraine...

The East Ministry does not interest him at all. 'Do you think I'll take orders from you? Even in East Prussia I didn't let Berlin talk me into anything. When Herr Frick tried to do this as Reich Minister, I gave him a hard time. In the time that followed, he also refrained from doing so. If I want something, I always go directly to the Führer.'" (103)

The former Viennese Gauleiter Frauenfeld (140) showed amazing frankness in his memorandum of February 10, 1944, when he was General Commissar of the Crimea (Taurien). Because of their unusual length, only the following passages can be reproduced: "It takes a naivety bordering on

stupidity to believe that in the 20th century a people ... let themselves be constantly belittled and insulted, and at the same time happily and possibly will voluntarily place his labor and his achievements in the service of the tyrant ...

Every people, but especially naïve and somewhat primitive natural people who have retained extraordinarily healthy moral powers despite a quarter of a century of Bolshevik harassment, possess the strong ability to distinguish between harshness and injustice, between punishment and arbitrariness, which is also characteristic of children. ..

But since, after all, every dog has a sense for recognizing It shouldn't come as a surprise whether you want him for good or ill

that the Ukrainians also notice it and adjust their attitude accordingly...

It takes a great deal of folly and short-sightedness to believe that the best way to exploit an occupied territory is to let the population die and become idiotic...

It would no doubt be correct, when war and its severity compel one to take numerous unpopular measures which oppress the population, to compensate for this by choosing the harmless outlet of entertainment events in order to offer people at least something, especially when it comes to a people as unsophisticated as the Ukrainians, who are even willing to go hungry to play and dance. So, for example, it has proved extremely useful to promise the rural population a feast with dancing, singing and the indispensable physical pleasures at the end of the large work assignments of autumn and spring planting and harvesting, with the result that an astonishing increase in productivity was achieved. ..

I have achieved these achievements because I acted according to the principle - which actually goes without saying - that people who work constantly should also be treated decently, and because I successfully inculcated time and again in all my employees that the principle of the farmer, who treats his horses and draft oxen and his milk cows decently in his own interest, so that he can get the best performance out of them, who must also be authoritative for our behavior towards the Ukrainians and Russians if there are no other reasons for such behavior .. .

The inhabitants of the East, in their closeness to the earth and close to nature, have the instinctive certainty of the primitive natural man and feel, without many words, whether someone treats them with benevolence or whether he only feels contempt for them. The mood of an area is composed of these imponderables and influences the attitude of the people and their work performance...

If I have been in Tauria (Crimea) for more than a year of my work

fact that, although the Soviets repeatedly deployed detachments of parachutists as saboteurs and inciters, there was not a single case of sabotage or a wounding or even murder of a German among the population, this is not because - as has been said once again in ignorance of the situation - because forest and swamp are necessary for the training of partisans, both of which were missing in the steppe, but it is rather due to the fundamentally different treatment that I gave the population ...

I could afford, when driving 200 km across the steppe, not only not to take an escort with me, but not even to carry a pistol with me, while at the same time in Rovno, where the Reich Commissioner of the Ukraine, Erich Koch, was based on the main street in broad daylight Germans were murdered by Ukrainian national partisans and Soviet partisans."

Finally, in his memorandum to Adolf Hitler, Frauenfeld wrote: "The peasants, who are mistrustful in every country, only found in the Germans what they had already learned from the Soviets over two and a half decades: that one must not believe a given promise, that a given word was always broken, and from now on they used the same word for German commitments that they had already used in the days of Bolshevism as a swear word, with which they expressed their incredulity and their contempt, they described our measures as propaganda...

That the Herr Reichskommissar was personally offended and angry when someone pointed out the existence of the second great waterway in this area—the Danube—besides the Mediterranean route, seems quite understandable. Because if you want to bring the products of the country to Königsberg by land, it would be advisable in the first place to fill in the Dardanelles and the Danube, the existence of which the Reich Commissioner (Erich Koch) regarded as a treacherous nature that he personally liked. "

So much for Frauenfeld's extensive memorandum, which was demonstrably read by Adolf Hitler. But nothing changed. Erich Koch remained Reich Commissioner of the Ukraine.

Martin Bormann worked diligently to harm German interests wherever he could. An example of this, which the eyewitness Speer (32) himself experienced: "Bormann had also achieved that Sauckel should be appointed by Hitler and should report directly to him. Goering rightly protested, for it was a task that had previously been dealt with in the Four Year Plan...

In short, Sauckel's promises were not fulfilled. Hitler's expectations of being able to effortlessly recruit the workers Germany lacked from a population of almost 250 million failed, not only because of the weakness of the German executive in the occupied territories, but also because of the tendency of those affected to join the partisans in the forests to flee than to be deported to Germany to work." (32)

In his memorandum to Adolf Hitler dated February 10, 1944, Frauenfeld (HO) made it clear how these deportations were carried out: "The methods

that were used and that had their source in the reading of exotic novels for the more mature youth should have, these (bad) impressions were only reinforced. Camps surrounded by wire fences, from latticed transport wagons to the raiding and combing of villages and to the nocturnal levies, in which the people were roused from their beds in GPU fashion, became the entire register of Arab slave-hunting among the negroes of Africa in previous centuries brought into use. Raising the visitors of cinemas or theater performances, of market visitors was just as popular as the rounding up of the 'voluntary' workers with butts and rifles at the ready ...

People were often taken away without being given the opportunity to say goodbye to their relatives or to take their most necessary luggage with them. Then there were those at home" (Germany) "compared to the 'Voluntary Workers' in

The methods used, that under no circumstances were people allowed to eat at the same table as their employer... that public transport and shopping in markets were forbidden...

In addition, there was the obligation, which was felt to be disgraceful and tantamount to a Jew's mark, to wear the designation 'Ost' sewn onto the dress... By the time they started to abolish these amateurish and crazy measures, it was already too late!"

TO THE TENTH CHAPTER

With the preamble to the eastern campaign, which Adolf Hitler had presented to the generals on March 30, 1941, "with draconian measures ... that terror should be spread among the eastern peoples which alone is suitable for taking away any desire to resist".

A participant in the eastern campaign wrote to us: "This made any honorable and humane solution impossible... In the first six months of the Russian campaign, one order after another followed from Hitler, which put the meaning of the preamble into practice: the commissar order, the hostage decree, the night and fog order, the gang decree, the decree to burn down the villages outside Moscow (at 30 to 50 degrees), the instruction to starve the Russian prisoners of war (which could be seen in the consequences) and, as the crowning glory, the order to blow up of the Ukrainian national shrine, the 'Lawra' in Kiev. Hitler's almost Soviet orders were hardly or not at all followed by the Wehrmacht. Not even the 'Lawra' was blown up by SS units, only the entrance was destroyed in order to give the impression that the order was being carried out..."

Finally, this eyewitness tells us: "At the same time as the murderous orders for the Russian war came the ban on German writing and the assassination of Minister Fritz Todt in the Führer's headquarters by pretense

th plane crash, the criminal investigation of which was forbidden by order of the Führer."

At the end of the war, these terror orders in the East were followed by orders for the West: Allied airmen who had made an emergency landing, and even French and English prisoners of war, were to be shot — orders that the Wehrmacht did not comply with. General Dietrich v. When the Allies had already surrounded Paris, Choltitz, commander of Greater Paris, received the order from Hitler's headquarters: "Paris is to be turned into a rubble field. The commanding general has to defend it to the last man and, if necessary, go under the rubble."

"I soon saw what the Headquarters really wanted to do from an order that instructed me to paralyze the entire industry in Paris with explosives," reports General v. Choltitz (142) and continues: "A special team of demolition experts appeared. I made the following consideration: If I blow up industry, I deprive the worker who has worked properly and diligently all these years and who still behaves completely calmly of the opportunity to live and I drive him with my eyes wide open onto the streets and into the underground movement.

I make him a fighter out of need and desperation..."

general v Choltitz did not comply with this barbaric order and thereby saved much of the German reputation in France for the future.

TO CHAPTER SEVENTEENTH

The search for Martin Bormann

A search includes a personal description and a front and side view photograph. This was particularly necessary with Bormann because he remained unknown to the German people. The Englishman Trevor Roper wrote: "He deliberately avoided publicity, he scorned medals and public awards, and the German people scarcely saw him."

The figures of the leadership of the III. Reichs had always made an appearance and were depicted in countless photographs, while Hitler's closest companions, Dr. Morell and Martin Bormann, have never been reproduced.

The top leaders who knew Bormann were either dead or behind bars. There were a lot of good photographs of Bormann from Eva Braun-Hitler's camera, whose collection of photographs was found after the war and copies sent to the Allies. On these photos of the inner circle of leaders, Bormann sometimes appeared in civilian clothes, almost never with a hat and then rarely with a service cap. Nevertheless, the manhunt was missing a picture.

The mug shot appeared nineteen years later in Lev Besymenski's *Posledam Martina Bormanna*. It shows the Reichsleiter in uniform with his service cap pulled low over his forehead. Although the shot in 45 degrees from the right front

was taken up, the swastika on the left sleeve is turned to the front as if to catch the eye, so that every uninhibited person had to say to himself: "What a beast - a Nazi, of course!"

Martin Bormann was really no beauty and resembled the one depicted in Besymenski's work. Both belonged to one of the East Slavic types. The sitter fitted Besymenski's description not badly: sinister and devious.

On Bormann's live recordings, the expression plays more between patronizing enjoyment, restraint and discretion, but always attentive with open eyes

nothing escaped. Bormann must have been in a particularly bad mood in Besymenski's picture. Photographs can be deceiving. Snapshots sometimes show facial expressions that are otherwise not characteristic of the wearer. For this reason, the wanted picture was subjected to an anthropological comparison of a series of Bormann pictures. There were differences that could not have been due to the lighting, the shooting distance, or the shooting angle. Either an unusual photo had been retouched by Bormann, or a real Russian had been put in a Reichsleiter uniform and then retouched. Due to the rastering of the image, this cannot be seen with certainty.

On one and a half pages, the phrenological comparison between Eva Braun's Bormann photographs and Besymenski's Bormann photograph summarizes the result in the general impression: closed/pleasurable (Eva Braun) and powerful/masculine/sinister (Besymenski).

The following is further explained: The main differences between Besymenski's search picture and the Bormann photographs (Eva Braun) are the alveolar prognathism, the broad, receding chin, the strong eyebrows and the stronger lower jaw with the masticatory muscles. The mug shot is a fake. It cannot be decided whether it came about through the skillful selection of a foreign model or through the retouching of a Bormann picture. This is not essential.

The search for the main war criminal Martin Bormann was not a search, but a deceptive procedure to prevent the recognition of this Soviet agent in the leadership of the German Reich.

(Excerpts of the above statements reproduced with the kind permission of Mr. Henning Fikentscher)

TO CHAPTER TWENTIETH

We have just received the extensive work by Bahnsen and O'Donnell, *The Catacomb. The end in D. Reich Chancellery*" (141). Almost thirty years after the end of the war, the authors undertook the arduous task of investigating and skilfully questioning those who had survived. They managed to do this in the record time of just two years. From the group of eyewitnesses who were in the last days of April 1945: generals, politicians, doctors, adjutants, orderlies, nurses, telephone operators, waiters, drivers and the chief mechanic, they learned so much that they were able to write their book, which is well worth reading. It conveys a touch of the atmosphere that prevailed in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery during those weeks and days.

Embedded in this material is the unproven assumption that Martin Bormann is said to have died from cyanide on May 2, 1945. The authors claim to have learned from Professor Speer, who has died in the meantime, that "Martin Bormann was a drunkard, but not only in the sense of a habitual drinker; he was already in the advanced stage of alcoholism(!). Even if he had managed to get out of Berlin and somehow disappeared - I'm sure - he wouldn't have lived much longer. Bormann was already drinking himself to death in 1944."

In a footnote, the authors add: "Against the background of this characterization of Bormann by Albert Speer, which is confirmed by other eyewitnesses of the Führer-Secretary in the last few months, the improbability of General a. D. Reinhart Gehlen, that Hitler's 'eminence brown' worked as an agent for the Soviets. Why would z. For example, should a Bormann spy ask his intimate enemy Speer to persuade Hitler to fly to Berchtesgaden with the rest of the 'court', including Bormann? On April 23, 1945, Bavaria was about to be occupied by American, not Soviet, troops."

It must be countered that the teetotaler Adolf Hitler

would never have tolerated a drunkard in his closest circle, not even after 1944. A "drunkard", as Martin Bormann is described here, could never have been available to his leader at any time and been able to do what he did in busy office work - recognized without exception. In addition, Professor Speer (32) never referred to Martin Bormann as an alcoholic in any of the ninety places in his "Memoirs" in which he mentions him.

This argument is too new to be credible.

On April 21, 1945, Adolf Hitler gave everyone in the bunker the freedom to fly to southern Germany. Dr. Morell made use of it with others; Martin Bormann stayed because, as he said, he did not want to part with Adolf Hitler. He knew very well that his Führer was determined to remain in Berlin. So he, Bormann, could easily ask Speer to persuade Hitler to leave the bunker. This secured Martin Bormann's whereabouts in Berlin.

With the arguments that *"Bormann was a drunkard in an advanced stage"* and *"Bormann asked Speer to persuade Hitler to leave Berlin"*, General Gehlen's thesis about Bormann cannot be refuted.

Furthermore, the authors Bahnsen and O'Donnell (141) learned by former SS General Mohnke:

"After the return of General Krebs, who reported to Goebbels on the negotiations with Colonel-General Chuikov, Bormann demanded of me quite categorically that I must have him immediately put a direct telephone line to the Russians, in other words, to Chuikov's headquarters; he needed this connection immediately. I explained to him that, given the situation around me, firstly, it couldn't be done in five minutes, and secondly, that I had other things to do at the moment. He got rude; when I forbade myself this tone, he sat down
do ...

very quickly put on a friendly expression and then fell silent.

I would like to take this opportunity to say that there were some men who were determined not to stand idly by if Bormann tried to flee on his own. This included Otto Günsche, some others and myself."

Bahnsen and O'Donnell comment: "Especially

after this description by Wilhelm Mohnke, there can no longer be any doubt that Martin Bormann had only one goal on May 1, 1945: to get to Plön zu Dönitz, and if possible with the approval of the Russians (?!), that is, as a result of negotiations with the Soviet high command.

Hitler had appointed Bormann party minister, and only Dönitz could now, after the death of the leader, confirm this appointment and make it effective.

Reconsideration of this comment is left to the reader.

The authors learned from Johannes Hentschel, who was responsible for supervising the operation of the technical systems in the bunker, that Martin Bormann, Dr. Stumpfegger and SS General Rattenhuber had kept 'civilian belongings' in the engine room, 'Bormann ended up putting his civilian belongings on under his uniform'. (p. 354) We now know with certainty that Major Joachim Tiburtius was not mistaken when he saw Martin Bormann at the Hotel Atlas in civilian clothes on May 2, 1945 after 2 a.m. (See Chapter 16)

TO CHAPTER TWENTIETH

Martin Bormann's skeleton

The legendary series of lucky finds of Bormann's remains was picked up by the press and magazines and made credible to readers by printing photographs of Bormann's skull, e.g. T. even with real shots of Bormann's face next to it. The recordings show the skull sometimes with and sometimes without dentures, sometimes with and sometimes without the severed left frontal bone.

Not one of the skull images was professionally taken in the Frankfurt horizontal and none in an exact front or side view (sagittal and transverse view), let alone from above. In any case, they are recorded as close-ups and taken at an angle from below, so that only an experienced anthropologist can draw certain conclusions about the shape and dimensions of the skull. After correcting the skull images, the face-height-width index is around 95 percent, while Bormann's live images show an index of around 85 percent. These skull photographs show a razor-thin, bony nose with a suggested hump, quite high in a straight line. Bormann's nose, however, was bent to the left in the bony part and was a bit wide. When photographed from the right, this mimics a bump in the nose, while when photographed from the left, the unmistakable saddle nose can be seen.

The orbits of the skull are very low, the height-latitude index around 75 percent, rectangular with the upper orbital rims strongly outwardly drooping. That doesn't go well with Bormann's eye area of the live shots. In general, the narrow-faced facial skull does not fit well into Bormann's broad head. Of course, an impeccable judgment cannot be made from the anthropologically almost useless skull photographs.

Now, newspaper reporters tend not to have the anthropological knowledge needed to assess and photograph skulls. You have to face them

to allow mitigating circumstances, even if Sven Simon and his colleagues accidentally got the wrong skull on film. Such a mix-up was not tragic. The joy of discovery of the finders and assessors of the skull was ignited by the head of an unknown Berliner, for whom the Soviets could easily have delivered the dentures of Martin Bormann, who died in 1968(?).

As little weight was attached to the illustrated newspaper articles and book reviews, the more sensible was the order of the prosecutor's office to the detective chief Moritz Furtmayr, who had to knead a living bust over the skull in question from Berlin according to anthropometric principles. Unfortunately neither Furtmayr's work nor the dimensions of the skull have been published. Only the public prosecutor's verdict was known: that the bust was *"amazingly similar"*.

So there remains the vague hope that the public prosecutor's office had greater anthropological and portrait skills than the director of the Museum of Prehistory and Early History (Weimar), Prof. dr Behm-Blanke, his staff and assistants, and the biologist Dr. Herbert Ullrich.

The discoverers of the Bormann bones were in too much of a hurry to refute General Gehlen's explanation. With a little patience, an East Slavic skull that would have matched Bormann's face could certainly have been found among the remains of Berlin bones. The dubious proof of the authenticity of the Bormann bones was too obvious. The famous Eichmann hunter, Simon Wiesental, called for the Bormann bones in question to be cremated, but not as a mistake, but so that they would not become a place of pilgrimage for incorrigible Nazis. The reasoning was as wrong as the bones themselves, for Bormann was already the most hated of all Nazi leaders during his lifetime, and with Gehlen's publication of Martin Bormann as a Soviet agent, Bormann's reputation was completely gone. Prosecutor Dr. Judges prohibited the cremation of the bones, saying, "I don't want any fanatic to accuse me of destroying evidence." Although not all seekers of truth need be fanatics, this was a ver

reasonable decision for future factual research and historiography.

The discovery of Bormann's skeleton and skull in the rubble of Berlin, twenty-seven years after the end of the war, a year and a half after General Reinhart Gehlen's publication of Bormann as a Soviet agent in the leadership of the Greater German Reich, was a deceptive procedure that was made credible by the accumulation of six lucky hits of the circumstances of the find should be. It was just one of the futile attempts to refute Gehlen.

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CONCLUSION

Having reached the end of our reflections on the life and aspirations of Martin Bormann, this case appears to us to be so unique in its abyss that it can only be viewed and judged at a distance from the classic acts of treason of the past. According to Colonel Walter Nicolai, espionage and treason are as old as war, hence of military origin.

What is the neighbor doing, what is he planning? Responsible statesmen always had to ask themselves these questions in order to be protected from surprises. The phrase *"The most pious cannot live in peace if the evil neighbor does not like it"* did not come about by accident, but is an expression of bad experiences. Again and again, intelligent people have found themselves doing espionage for money, out of a thirst for adventure, innocence, blackmail or other reasons. The level of risk depends on the applicable laws in the target area and on the damage that you have caused to the country concerned through your activities. Not every spy can expect to be exchanged either.

It is quite different with high treason and treason when it is committed by one of the highest officials in the government or from the closest circle around the head of state. Martin Bormann, of whom we are speaking here, had deliberately gained the complete trust of the head of state, Adolf Hitler, through diligence and prudence, coupled with revenge. He misused his knowledge and power to the fullest extent by betraying his leader, his party, his people and his fatherland to the enemy of the time. He was an example from the teachings of the Chinese Sun Tsu (500 BC) who said: *"Use the work of the basest and most despicable people!"* In this, Martin Bormann surpassed Joseph Fouché, who, as Napoleon's police minister, was in secret contact with the other side.

Graz, May 1st, 1984

Hugo Manfred Beer

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